Between Orientalism and Fundamentalism: The Politics of Muslim Women’s Feminist Engagement

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Abstract

Discourses of race, gender and religion have scripted the terms of engagement in the war on terror. As a result, Muslim feminists and activists must engage with the dual oppressions of Islamophobia that relies on re-vitalized Orientalist tropes and representations of backward, oppressed and politically immature Muslim women as well as religious extremism and puritan discourses that authorize equally limiting narratives of Islamic womanhood and compromise their human rights and liberty. The purpose of this discussion is to examine the way Muslim women have been discursively scripted from these opposing and contradictory spaces, and to explore the negotiations and contestations made by both secular and faith-centred Muslim feminists in combating these oppressive arrangements. In the first part of the discussion, I will draw on post-colonial and anti-racist feminist analyses to map out the complex interactions of race, gender, sexuality and religion in earlier imperial practices of conquest and colonization and examine how the continuing legacies of these encounters implicate the current “war on terror”. In the second part of the discussion, I will examine Muslim women’s feminist political engagement with and resistance to the concomitant factors of imperial and fundamentalist domination and will craft a better understanding of how these factors variously shape and are shaped by Muslim women’s responses to them.

KEYWORDS: orientalism, fundamentalism, Muslim women, feminism

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Introduction

In the post 9/11 era, Muslim women navigate between both racialized and
gendered politics that variously script the ways their bodies and identities are
narrated, defined and regulated. Located within this dialectical dynamic, the
rhetoric of Muslim women’s liberation is all too often caught up in the vast
undercurrents of ideological extremism on the one hand, and racism and
Islamophobia on the other. Muslim women’s feminist praxis is shaped and
defined within and against these discursive terrains.

As a Muslim feminist and anti-racist scholar-activist, I maneuver between
these polarized spaces dodging racialized and Islamophobic discourses on one
battle front and puritan, fundamentalist narratives on another, held hostage to the
contradictory meanings being imposed upon my body and subjectivity from these
sites. In this discussion, I will examine the ways in which Muslim women’s
feminist theorizing and praxis has been implicated by the current context of the
‘war on terror’. Discourses of race, gender and religion have scripted the terms of
engagement in the war on terror. As a result, Muslim feminists and activists must
engage with the dual oppressions of ‘gendered Islamophobia’ (Zine, 2004a), that
has re-vitalized Orientalist tropes and representations of backward, oppressed and
politically immature women in need of liberation and rescue through imperialist
interventions as well as the challenge of religious extremism and puritan
discourses that authorize equally limiting narratives of Islamic womanhood and
compromise their human rights and liberty. The purpose of this discussion is to
examine the way Muslim women have been discursively scripted from these
opposing and contradictory spaces, and explore the negotiations and contestations
made by both secular and faith-centered Muslim feminists in combating these
oppressive arrangements.

In the first part of the discussion, I will draw on post-colonial and anti-racist
feminist analyses to map out the complex interactions of race, gender, sexuality
and religion in earlier imperial practices of conquest and colonization and
examine how the continuing legacies of these encounters implicate the current
‘war on terror’. This section will focus on how Orientalist and neo-Orientalist
discourses of gender, race and religion have positioned Muslims in general and
Muslim women in particular within the historical and contemporary
representational practices related to war, violence and empire building.

Related to these developments is the growth of fundamentalist movements in
Muslim societies that engage in a reactive ideological and political tug of war
with globalizing forces and the political, economic and cultural encroachment of
the West. Women’s rights, spiritual autonomy and physical safety have suffered
as ‘collateral damage’ in this new ideological battleground. In the second part of
the discussion, I will examine Muslim women’s feminist political engagement with and resistance to the concomitant factors of imperial and fundamentalist domination and will craft a better understanding of how these factors variously shape and are shaped by Muslim women’s responses to them.

Currently there is no cohesive framework for feminism shared among the variously oriented Muslim women who operate from either secular or religious paradigms. Secular feminists have built transnational alliances connected to global anti-racist feminist and anti-fundamentalist movements but remain ideologically at odds with faith-centred Muslim women who root their resistance within the space of religious reform. Reconciling these positions in order to develop strategic solidarities among Muslim feminists is a contemporary challenge. In closing the discussion I will propose a common agenda of combating racist, patriarchal and imperialist forms of domination as a means for developing a framework of solidarity among these diversely situated Muslim women engaged in liberatory feminist practices.

**Unpacking the Rhetoric of Race, Gender and Religion in the War on Terror: Imperial Legacies**

*The web of racism, cultural stereotypes, political imperialism, dehumanizing ideology holding in the Arab or the Muslim is very strong indeed...*  
Edward Said

Increasingly since the tragic attacks of 11 September 2001, Muslims have been positioned on the geo-political stage as anti-democratic, anti-liberal and living in societies located outside the western narratives of progress and modernity. The global fault lines of North-South are underscored by the complex fissures that occur as a result of social, economic, political disparities and ideological upheavals, yet the over-riding discourses being purveyed have reduced the dynamics of neo-imperial globalization to the essentialized notion of a ‘clash of civilizations’. Huntington (1993) warned that ‘the fault lines between civilizations will become the battle lines of the future’ (p.22). This fatalistic prophecy inscribes present global conflicts and insurgencies with a Manichean dualism carving the world into rigid and culturally irreconcilable enclaves. Through this binary formulation of the ‘West and the rest’, Islam and Muslims have become the foils for modernity, freedom and the civilized world.

The discursive arena of the ‘war on terror’ has re-inscribed the ideological rhetoric of the Crusades. The Bush doctrine used religious rhetoric to describe the early U.S. campaigns against Muslims in Afghanistan dubbing this military
engagement ‘Operation Infinite Justice’ thereby invoking attributes of God to justify their retributive incursions. Other ways of inscribing the ensuing military campaigns with theological purpose and justification came through Bush’s use of religious sanctions such as the need to rid the world of ‘evil doers’. According to Rosemary Ruether, a professor of theology at the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, Bush and many of his supporters on the Christian right speak of his administration as ‘messianic agents chosen by God to combat evil and to establish good’ (Lattin, 2004, p.A16). These pronouncements became similar in ideological nature to the ‘fatwas’ issued by Osama Bin Laden and al Qaeda cohorts who characteristically invoked religious legitimacy in their campaigns of violence and ‘jihad’ against the ‘infidel’ West. Whether it is the jingoistic chauvinism of Bush’s ‘American messianic nationalism’ (Lattin, 2004) or Bin Laden’s Islamist extremism, both views engage violent forms of religious rhetoric and fundamentalist notions of the enemy ‘Other’ in a theocratic Manichean divide.

Along with religious rhetoric, the war on terror like previous imperialist campaigns is inscribed with the politics of race and gender. Whether we examine the historical relations of colonialism or the neo-imperialist relations of current global politics, military violence is rooted in the complex inequalities of race, gender, class and ethnicity. The resurgence of racialized discourses is reminiscent of those predicated on early modernist tropes of social evolutionism and serve to cast Muslims in the global South as ‘uncivilized and barbaric’. Recall Bush’s dictum proclaiming the ‘we (read: civilized West) will bring progress and prosperity to Iraq’. This proclamation locates Iraq and Arab Muslim society in what McClintock (1995) has referred to as ‘anachronistic space: prehistoric, atavistic and irrational, inherently out of place in the historical time of modernity’ (p.40). The narrative of ‘progress’ therefore creates a rationale for the occupation of Iraq as a benevolent gesture of humanitarianism masking the self-serving neo-liberal economic enterprise at the heart of its imperial design.

Racialized knowledge production also acts in collusion with campaigns of power and domination. As Foucault (1982) noted, power and knowledge directly imply one another and that it is through sets of discursive practices that particular kinds of subjects are produced (p.27). Through the discourses of Orientalism, the late Edward Said (1979) described how particular kinds of Arab and Muslim subjects were constructed through literary practices as ‘demonic hordes of hated barbarians (p.59)’, ‘inveterate liars’...lethargic and suspicious’, who ‘in everything oppose the clarity, directness and nobility of the Anglo-Saxon race’ (p.39), or as the archetypal Oriental woman; the Egyptian courtesan who never spoke of herself or represented her emotions, presence or history, but relied on the European man to render and inscribe meanings for her (p.6). Veiled Muslim women were constructed in the Western literary imagination as objects of desire, sensual, elusive harem girls and yet they were disavowed in the same breath as
backward victims of their heathen and misogynistic cultures (Zine, 2002; Kahf, 1999). These history lessons exemplify Said’s warning that ‘too often literature and culture are presumed to be politically, even historically innocent’ (p. 27). Such presumed innocence, masks the machinations of power that operate through discursive practices. The war on terror reinvents these existing tropes and discourses in new ways that produce Muslims as dangerous foreigners, terrorists, and threats to public safety and render Muslim women as victims of their anachronistic faith, lacking agency and voice.

Neo-Orientalist writing has gained increasing currency since the 9/11 attacks and ranges from the sensationalist tell-all journalism of dissident Muslim journalist Irshad Manji (2003), marketing her pulp fiction ‘rafusenik’ angst in The Trouble with Islam to even more virulent racist and Islamophobic diatribes such as Italian journalist Orianna Fallaci’s (2002) The Rage and the Pride. Fallaci’s avowed anti-fascism rings hollow against her bitter racist manifesto. Consider this passage from her seething narrative exalting the ‘progress’ of the West and vilifying the ‘backwardness’ of Islamic society and culture:

The motor, the telegraph, the light bulb, I mean the use of electricity, the photograph, the radio, the television, have not been invented by some mullahs or some ayatollahs…And let us not forget the standard of life that Western culture has achieved at every level of society. In the West we longer die of starvation and curable diseases as they do in the Moslem countries. Right or wrong? But even if these were all unimportant achievements, (which I doubt), tell me: what are the conquests of the other culture of the bigots with the beard and the chador and the burqa (p. 92)?

She goes on to tirade against the undesirable Muslim foreigners ‘loafing around our cities with their ‘merchandise’, their prostitutes, their drugs…’ and defiling their cities with ‘the yellow streaks of urine, the stench of excrement blocked the main entrance of the San Salvatore al Vescovo: the exquisite Romanic church….that the sons of Allah transformed into a latrine…’ (pp.129-30). Muslim women are cast as ‘idiotic’ ‘uneducated’ and guilty of ‘marrying pricks who want to marry four wives’ (p. 95). Ordinarily such blatant xenophobic, neo-fascist, Islamophobic vitriol would be written off as a racist fiction: the baseless rambling of an acrid mind, however in the post 9/11 era, despite the protests of European anti-racist groups seeking its ban as hate literature, the book can be found easily in some prominent bookstores in the ‘international relations’ section, having garnered mass appeal and sales.

Such anti-Islamic and racialized motifs are activated in new ways to justify the current neo-colonial military campaigns in the Middle East by influencing popular consciousness and manufacturing the public consent required for these practices
of war and domination to take place. Thobani (2003) aptly points out that the current discourse in the war on terror has an unsettling resonance with earlier colonial constructions of the enemy ‘other’:

The language used in the construction of the ‘enemy’ is very familiar to peoples who have been colonized by Europe. It echoes colonial constructs of the native as barbaric and dangerous, whose colonization was not only justifiable but also welcome, bringing them into civilization and democracy. The use of this highly charged colonial discourse at that particular moment of crisis revealed the nature of the absolutist racialized Western ideology being mobilized to rally the troops and to build a national and international consensus in defense of the ‘West’ and its civilization (p.402).

Through the pervasive forces of the media these ideas are easily and uncritically absorbed by the masses as a means to legitimize the right to power and the right to rule over others in an almost benevolent and paternal gesture of bringing modernity, democracy and liberalism to those Fanon (1963) poignantly described as ‘the wretched of the earth’. This new hegemony operates as a form of ‘camouflaged politics’ masking the self-serving economic and political rationale behind the global dynamics of power.

Neo-Orientalism and the Sexualized Politics of Conquering Muslims

The current rise of militarism is also galvanized by a globalizing patriarchy that purveys a conquest–driven masculinist stance. According to Okazawa-Rey (2001):

Patriarchal values are promoted by militarism, particularly the social construction of masculinities that revere the (false) notion of invincibility, relationships of domination and subordination, the eroticisation of domination, emotional detachment, and the dehumanization of ‘others’ into enemies, like Arab ‘terrorists’ and Columbian ‘drug lords’. Misogyny is also at the core of militarism’ (p.21).

As part of the ‘eroticisation of domination’ the use of sex and sexual metaphors has long been associated with colonization as well as the current military industrial complex. For example, the feminization of land becomes a prevalent motif in colonial consciousness metaphorically tying the conquest of the female ‘other’ to the conquest of indigenous land. McClintock (1995) describes how geographic space became feminized in the narratives of exploration and conquest.
From the time of Columbus, who described the world as the shape of a woman’s breast to the Enlightenment, McClintock describes the metaphysics of colonial fantasies that inscribed gendered notions of conquest and subjugation:

Knowledge of the unknown world was mapped as a metaphysics of gender violence—not as the expanded recognition of cultural difference—and was validated by the new Enlightenment logic of private property and possessive individualism. In these fantasies the world is feminized and spatially spread for male exploration, then reassembled and deployed in the interests of massive imperial power (p.23).

Bullock (2002) describes how the colonial Orient was feminized and depicted in the travel writing of Flaubert who described swimming in the Red Sea as ‘lying on a thousand liquid breasts’ (p.8). The male imperial gaze therefore allowed for the metaphorical conquest over feminized land to work hand in hand with concurrent physical conquest taking place. Veiled Muslim women, however, inhibited the imperialist masculinist gaze by covering their bodies and producing an effect whereby they inverted the gaze and could see but not be seen (see Bullock, 2000). Pornographic images of unveiled Muslim women were circulated in the form of postcards during the European colonization of the Middle East and North Africa in the 19th century that rendered the bodies of these women otherwise covered and obscured from view by their veils, open to the imperial male gaze (see Alloula, 1986). Muslim women who were cloistered in the inaccessible inner sanctums of the eroticized ‘harem’ were now laid bare and open to the otherwise forbidden visual access of European men. Ella Shohat writes that ‘it is this process of exposing the female Other, literally denuding her, which comes to allegorize the western masculinist power of possession, that she as a metaphor for her land, becomes available for Western penetration and knowledge’ (1993, p.53).

During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the feminization of land and masculinization of conquest was reinvented by invoking metaphors of sexual violence in the representation of the U.S. military campaign. Analyzing the sexual politics embedded in the media representation of the Persian Gulf war, Kari Points (1991) observes how sexual violence was invoked in military euphemisms: ‘Listening to U.S. military talk about the conflict, I began to realize, that the United States was being portrayed as the masculine conqueror and Iraq as the feminine victim. An air force pilot at the start of the war predicted ‘it’ll just be slam bam thank –you Saddam!’(p.1). Further in response to Saddam Hussein’s famous dictum of fighting the ‘Mother of All Battles’ a U.S. air force officer responded with the challenge ‘Tell him dad’s coming to kick mom’s butt’. One of the most chilling examples Points cites was reported by the Washington Post and
describes how fighter pilots aboard the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy watched porno movies before their bombing missions (p.2). This revelation allegorizes disturbing images of cascading bombs as the brutal ejaculate of U.S. military imperialism being released upon the subdued feminized Iraqi nation.

Sexual bravado and the emasculation of the enemy ‘other’ are legacies that have carried over to the current ‘war on terror’ with Iraq as the continuing theatre of combat. New forms of violence and degradation now occupy the notorious torture chambers of Saddam Hussein’s Abu Ghraib prison. According to Burnham, ‘the Abu Ghraib portraits of sexual humiliation and submission have exposed the unbelievably tangled strands of racism, misogyny, homophobia, national arrogance and hyper-masculinity that characterize the U.S. military’ (2004, p.3). She goes on to note that the demoralizing images of Iraqi prisoners forced to wear women’s underwear are a sign that ‘degradation and weakness are still equated with the female in this man's army’ (p.3). In this way, the sexualized narratives in the war on terror continue the discursive practices of European colonialism where according to McCintock (1995) “…the rhetoric of gender was used to make increasingly refined distinctions among the different races. The white race was figured as the male of the species and the black race as the female (p.55)”. Therefore the grotesque feminization of Arab men through the degrading and sexually humiliating acts performed at Abu Ghraib recasts the earlier script of imperial domination in new yet equally demeaning ways. That Arab men are made to perform a debased and conquered feminized role in this new colonial narrative of occupation is as much a vulgar expression of the U.S. military’s enforcement of their perceived racial and civilizational superiority as it is of their thinly guised misogyny and homophobia (see Brittain, Ch 4).

Speculation has arisen that this new form of sexual humiliation as a tool of military subjugation was inspired by the book The Arab Mind by anthropologist Raphael Patai (1973/2002).19 This book detailing a litany of Orientalist claims about a singular ‘Arab Mind’ not only essentializes a presumed collective psyche but graphically depicts the perceived sexual proclivities of Arabs, such as the idea that masturbation was seen as more morally shameful than visiting prostitutes. Whitaker (2004) questions whether it was this ‘fact’ that lead to Iraqi prisoners being forced to masturbate in front of cameras. He goes on to argue that Patai’s book dubbed as the ‘bible of the neo-cons on Arab behaviour’ provided the U.S. military with the psychological ammunition to add this new form of sexual violence to their arsenal of racialized psychological subjugation. Whitaker notes that the Arab Mind is likely the single most popular and widely read book on the Arabs in the U.S. military and while discredited as Orientalist fiction in credible academic circles, was used as a textbook for officers at the JFK special warfare school in Fort Bragg. This neo-Orientalist genre of literature has therefore had a powerful affect on shaping essentialized notions of Arab otherness based on
presumed narratives of sexuality and deviance that has scripted the demoralizing role play of Abu Ghraib. The role of Orientalist knowledge production therefore continues to play a powerful ideological role in the continuing imperial contest and enactment of violence against the body of the racialized Arab Other.

Gendering Islamophobia in the War on Terror: Mapping Some Feminist Responses

I want to draw a picture or a kind of mapping of the global power dynamics as I see them at this moment, including their gendered and racialized dimensions. I want to ask whether there is some alternative, more humane and peacable way out of these two unacceptable polarities now being presented to us: the permanent war machine (or permanent security state) and the regime of holy terror.

Rosalind Petchesky

There are contradictory desires at the heart of the war on terror: to repress the Arab Muslim male on the one hand and to ‘liberate’ Muslim women on the other. Strategically images of burqa-clad Afghan women permeated the media to assuage any misgivings that the American public or world community might have about military intervention in Afghanistan. While bombs rained - indiscriminately at times - on Kabul, and children treacherously maneuvered through fields of landmines to retrieve bright yellow packages of ‘humanitarian aid’ (seen in this context more as weapons of mass destruction rather than aid) falling from airplanes, the ideological battlefront largely took place on CNN and other Bush-friendly media conglomerates. Here the archetypal image of the deprived and debased Muslim woman was resurrected to perform her duty as a signifier of the abject difference of Muslims, the barbarity and anti-modernism of Islam and its essential repression of women and most importantly as camouflage for U.S. military inventions.

A communiqué from the White House (2002) reporting ‘progress on the war on terror’ celebrates the liberation of Afghans from the ‘brutal zealotry of the Taliban’ sidestepping any complicity or collusion that the American government had in supporting the regime in the first place. As further evidence for the success of the war on terror, the report goes on to cite how ‘Afghan women are experiencing freedom for the first time’ (p.2). This pronouncement locates Afghan women in a de-contextualized, ahistorical space where they seem to begin and end within the current crisis having been provided ‘freedom for the first time’ by U.S. forces. The history of Afghan women before foreign military occupations

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and conquests is obliterated through this statement. They are invested with freedom and agency only by the grace of the American military complex. As a result, their agency and ontological presence is erased from history prior to the ‘liberatory’ conquest made by the U.S. led ‘coalition of the willing’.

As deplorable as the conditions faced by Afghan women were under the formerly U.S. backed Taliban regime, the fact that their plight became strategically positioned as being ‘prime-time worthy’ only during the violent campaigns of the war on terror, reinforces their role as a political guise activated to engender sympathy for the military campaign as an act of ‘liberating’ oppressed Muslim women from fanatical Muslim men (also see Hunt, Ch 3). Through this process Afghan women’s plights were reduced to a war against fundamentalism, erasing other important factors affecting their lives such as poverty, internal displacement and lack of healthcare and ability to meet even the most basic of needs, which the military campaigns were exacerbating. Their ability throughout decades of war and hardship to survive adversity with tenacious resistance was lost in the attempt to cast them as voiceless, victims. As Peters (2002) notes, ‘[p]reviously not on the West’s radar screen, Afghan women are now showing up as ‘pregnant’, ‘fleeing’, ‘starving’ and ‘widowed’. All true, I suppose but such adjectives reduce Afghan women to the sum of their most desperate parts’ (pp.122-3).

The static and essentialized construction of the Muslim woman as the abject, oppressed ‘other’ became an important tool in the arsenal of ideological warfare designed to gain public consent for the war on terror. This discursive positioning cast all Muslim women within this limiting narrative. Historically the category of ‘Muslim woman’ has been a malleable construct constantly redefined to suit particular political, cultural or ideological purposes (see Kahf, 1999; Zine, 2002). The regulation and policing of this category occurs at the hands of both imperialist and fundamentalist regimes that inscribe competing and contradictory frames of reference on the bodies of Muslim women. Within imperialist conceptions we have seen how the images of Muslim women have been represented in the Western male imaginary as sensual harem girls as well as debased, voiceless, and universally oppressed victims, forming a complex nexus of desire and disavowal.

The representation of Muslim women’s bodies as signifiers of difference can be understood as a form of ‘gendered Islamophobia’ (Zine, 2004a). Islamophobia, can be understood as a fear of Islam or its adherents, that is translated into individual, ideological and systemic forms of oppression. Far from being an ‘irrational’ fear, Islamophobia operates as part of a rational system of Western social, economic, political and cultural power that necessitates the construction of abject difference to maintain positional superiority (see Zine, 2004b). The notion of ‘gendered Islamophobia’ pertains to specific forms of discrimination leveled at
Muslim women that proceed from historically contextualized negative stereotypes that inform and sustain the structural conditions of domination. The re-emergence of overt Islamophobia that has been generated as a result of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent ‘war on terror’ often fixates on the bodies of Muslim women. The banning of the *hijab* or headscarf in French schools is another example of gendered Islamophobia operating to systemically deny young Muslim women the freedom to express their religious identification. Within this highly charged controversy, the bodies of Muslim women are inscribed as ‘dangerous foreigners’ and must be purged of any symbols that would further align them to their violent and degenerate faith. Within such xenophobic conceptions, the veil is constructed as a signifier of the pervasive ‘Islamic threat’. By perpetuating such hegemonic myths within French national consciousness the denial of human rights and civil liberties therefore seems a small price to pay for maintaining public safety (Freedman, Ch 8).

Faith-based and secular Muslim feminists often collide over politically charged issues such as veiling. Many secular feminists view the *hijab* as a unequivocal example of religious fundamentalism and patriarchal oppression and largely dismiss the views of Muslim women who wear the veil as a sign of modesty, as ‘false consciousness’ (El Saadawi cited in Nassef, 2004). Yet not all Muslim women who situate their feminism from within a faith-based perspective necessarily view issues such as *hijab* as an inviolable religious tradition. On the contrary, Muslim feminists such as Leila Ahmed, Asma Barlas, Amina Wadud and Azzizah Al Hibri, do not consider the *hijab* to be a religious requirement, yet they may nonetheless support the civil liberties of Muslim women in Europe and Turkey who are denied the choice to adopt this particular style of dress in schools and other public institutions, but without necessarily seeing this as a capitulation to patriarchy and fundamentalism but rather as an assertion of women’s agency over the representation of their bodies. Scholars have also noted the multiple social and political meanings and purposes that the veil has embodied within different historical contexts, such as Iranian women who took up the veil in the 1970s as a form of political protest and revolutionary action (see for example, Bullock, 2002). The issue of the *hijab* ban in Europe must also be articulated from within an anti-racist paradigm and connected to broader systems of xenophobia and Islamophobia and the undue connection of Muslim women’s bodies with global terrorism. The way in which the politics of such representation acts in service of neo-imperialistic goals and global militarization as well as xenophobia and policies of racial profiling and exclusion needs to be constantly critiqued as a threat to civil liberties and democratic pluralism.
Mapping Muslim Feminist Resistances to Orientalism and Fundamentalism

Muslim women’s bodies continue to be disciplined and regulated by both oppressive laws mandating veiling under authoritarian theocratic regimes in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan as well as by the laws denying their freedom to wear headscarves in Western democratic societies like France, Germany and Turkey. In either case, the fact that their bodies are made subservient to the decrees of patriarchal state authorities is an anti-feminist move. Muslim women therefore must be attentive to the way their bodies and identities are scripted in service of neo-imperialist goals and from within fundamentalist worldviews. Both ideological views limit their agency, autonomy and freedom and seriously circumscribe their lived conditions, choices and experiences. As well, both views authorize equally limiting narratives of Islamic womanhood containing them within self-serving paradigms that sustain the goals and ideals of specific religious or imperial patriarchal arrangements. In the ‘war on terror’, Muslim women operate as pawns manipulated to corroborate the moral righteousness of the political and economic goals of U.S. imperial intervention in Muslim societies executed on their behalf as a campaign delivering their ‘liberation’. On the other hand, they also operate as the guardians of faith and honour in Islamic fundamentalist conceptions that must be safeguarded from the seduction and encroachment of Western moral corruptions.

Entangled within these binaries, Muslim feminists battle not only both these fronts, but also the often-conflicting ideological positions they hold among themselves. This creates seemingly irreconcilable divisions along secular and faith-based orientations (see Zine, 2004 c). The social and political views and orientations held by Muslim feminists vary across the ideological spectrum from conservative to secular to what I have termed ‘critically faith-based’ (Zine, 2004c). Therefore there exists no monolithic framework for the articulation of Islamic feminism. ‘The ontology of Islamic feminism is implicated not only by ideological divides, but also by the imbalances of North/South geo-political and economic disparities. Those of us who are able to write, organize and resist from Western-based academic spaces benefit from our social, political and economic location on the global landscape and therefore occupy privileged stances in transnational feminist contexts. As we claim this space of privilege to speak with (not for) our Muslim sisters in the South we must nonetheless remain cognizant of allowing our privilege to co-opt their voices. As Muslim feminist scholars in the North, we are also positioned here as ‘native informants’ performing our roles as bearers of all things Islamic for the Western academic audience. Khan (2001) argues that the Western-based Muslim native informant is called upon to ‘present
true accounts of experience in relation to her own racial/cultural group from a position of fixed identity (p.269). This a priori positioning implicates the space of Muslim women’s theorizing and praxis by containing it within static notions of Islam and Islamic identity and since the ‘war on terror’ increasingly forces us to demonstrate whether we qualify as ‘good Muslims’ or ‘bad Muslims’ (Mamdani, 2004). The ‘good Muslim’ feminists locate the locus of their struggles in the North and South strictly within the ‘religious paradigm’ which neatly reduce the complexity of women’s lives in theocratic societies to a singular religious cause for inequality or under-development and clearly declaring Islamic fundamentalism as the primary culprit in the ‘war on terror’. The ‘bad Muslim’ feminist provides deeper more holistic analyses that examine the root causes behind the rise of fundamentalism, global conflicts and terror, and makes the algebra of violence more transparent in relation to the global formations of economic and political power. The ‘bad Muslim’ feminist and indeed any feminists who occupy an anti-imperialist political stance, are vilified as anti-patriotic and on the side of the ‘evil doers’. Consider the demonization of the Canadian scholar and activist Sunera Thobani, the former president of the National Women’s Action Committee, whose impassioned speech at a women’s conference after the 9/11 attacks took aim at U.S. foreign policies that created the economic, political and ideological conditions for religious extremism and militant violence to flourish. The racialized media and public backlash situated Thobani as an ‘enemy outsider’ and as she notes, ‘…repeatedly reconstructing my status as a non-White, immigrant woman, the media reiterated-in a highly intensified manner-the historically racialized discourse of who belongs to the Canadian nation, and hence, who has a right to speak to it’ (Thobani, 2003, p.401). Therefore the social disciplining of Thobani as an ‘angry woman of colour’ operated to silence any spaces of dissent to the dominant discourse of blind patriotism being purveyed and was considered an affront to the national grief that was being unsettled and disrupted by the accusations of complicity being generated from the social and political margins.

Both Muslim and non-Muslim feminists have taken aim at the global imperial project that lies at the heart of the structural inequality between the North and South that breeds poverty, dependency, political instability, hopelessness and finally rage among the disenfranchised masses. Feminists have been quick to point out the interconnectedness of these factors and the rise of global fundamentalisms and religiously based extremism and violence. As Joseph and Sharma (2003) aptly point out, ‘If there is an intimate relationship between violence, militarism and patriarchy, there is an equally strong bond between that unholy trinity and what has come to be known, somewhat inaccurately as fundamentalism’ (pp. xiii-xiv). Nigerian Muslim activist and founder of the organization Baobab, Ayesha Imam, provides a cogent analysis of the rise of
Puritanism and religious extremism in Nigeria as the by-product of global economic restructuring. In providing a context for the highly publicized imposition of harsh forms of shariah laws such as stoning as punishment for sex outside marriage, Imam connects the development of extremist religious movements with the devastating impact of globalization and structural adjustment policies that have opened the door to religious groups gaining power (cited in Landsberg, 2002).

The World Bank and International Monetary Fund dictated structural adjustment policies to Africa in the 1980s and early 1990s as a means of economic reform. The rationale behind these programs was that poverty could only be solved with extreme capitalism. In order to qualify for loans, African governments had to slash social spending on health and education and they had to shift their mode of production from subsistence farming to cash crops that would compete in a global free trade market. As a result of these policies women’s access to land and property was weakened due to the privatization of land. This advantaged men who were the only ones who could legally own land and acquire loans and men usually claim most of the income generated from cash crops. The effect of land privatization has therefore weakened women’s access to and control over land and made them increasingly more dependent upon their husband. Structural adjustment policies also led to the slashing of social programs. In Nigeria as a result, religious groups with extremist orientations began to step in to fill the gap and gain power. These externally imposed social, economic, and political changes therefore opened the door to extreme reactionary groups filling the voids in society that were generated by these reforms. Many of these extreme religious groups situate themselves in opposition to the cultural imperialism that occurs as a by-product of globalization and implement harsh measures to counteract these rapid changes in their societies. Therefore, the devastating effects of globalization, neo-liberal economic policies and the ‘invisible hand’ of imperialism fuel the impetus for radical religious insurgency.

Similarly, in her analysis of the imposition of the controversial Hudood Ordinances in Pakistan that legally regulate sexually morality and punish the commission of zina or adultery, Khan (2001), brings a holistic integration of political, economic and social factors into the understanding of what engenders and sustains these religiously encoded sanctions. The Hudood Ordinances cover a range of sexual violations including fornication, rape and prostitution along with adultery and classify them as offences against the state. As a result, many Pakistani women who are raped, but cannot produce the required four male witnesses to provide evidence of a forced sexual act, are charged and jailed under the zina laws. Khan demonstrates that poverty increases a woman’s chances of being convicted due to her unequal access to legal counsel. Muslim feminists have demonstrated the fact that these laws violate and corrupt the Quranic dictates.
regarding zina that sought to protect Muslim women from undue accusations and aspersions against them, making them inherently un-Islamic (see Quraishi, 2000). These analyses are absent from popular media stories in the West sensationalizing the plight of victimized Muslim women. Khan (2001) for example, describes how these stories are represented in the Western media as the product of extremist cultures and societies, with no interrogation of the more complex factors that sustain such regimes of thought and action. Khan describes the images presented in a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) documentary ‘Murder in Purdah’ that examined the effect of the zina ordinances and honour killing in Pakistan. The featured plight of a couple who married without parental permission is interspersed with images of brutal violence:

The juxtaposition of text and images is dominated by a narrative of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and its connection to erupting violence in Pakistan. Scenes depict terrifying images of armed male Pakistanis rioting in the streets, burning, shooting and looting. None of this mayhem in Karachi is shown to be related to the further devaluation of the rupee and the resulting rise in food and fuel prices or to the lack of employment opportunities and growing poverty and degradation connected to globalization (p.269).

Muslim feminist voices continue to be a corrective to the narrow and Islamophobic representations of the social, economic and political difficulties they endure. As Shaikh (2003) notes ‘Muslim women and men with feminist commitments need to navigate the terrain between being critical of sexist interpretations of Islam and patriarchy in their religious communities, while simultaneously criticizing neo-colonial feminist discourses on Islam’ (p.155). Cooke (2001) refers to this notion as engaging in a space of ‘multiple critique’ where ‘post-colonial subjects articulate an oppositional discourse that simultaneously targets local and global antagonists’ (p. 109). Cooke argues that a multiple critique shifts the binaries that lock critical engagements into polemical dialectics on to a space of multiplicity where various types of contestations can be addressed simultaneously.

Yet by providing multiple critiques and anti-imperialist analyses and interventions as a means to address the complex inter-dependent dynamics of globalization and the growth of religious extremism, this does not mean that these feminists are positioning themselves as ‘apologists’ for religious zealotry. Many Muslim feminists employing post-colonial and anti-colonial analyses and critiques of these contexts are politically and ideologically aligned with feminist anti-fundamentalist movements such as Women Living Under Muslim Laws and Women Against Fundamentalism. Anti-racist feminists are particularly aware however of how their theorizing and shocking ‘revelations’ of Muslim women’s
religiously based oppression can be taken up in the current political climate of rampant Islamophobia. As Khan (2001) notes, ‘Accounts of how the zina laws have affected Pakistani women’s lives have the potential to become yet another sensationalized Third World woman event’. She goes on to echo Homi Bhabha’s (1990) observation that in these formulations ‘the context does not travel as well as stereotypes sustaining sensational stories do’ (p.268).

In attempting to rupture the authoritarian and patriarchal structures within our communities, racialized Muslim women are often reticent to expose our concerns within the pervasive context of racism and Islamophobia that already exists and gathers strength upon such unseemly revelations. By exposing issues of sexism within our communities and societies, Muslim feminists are immediately subject to the racism and Islamophobia that negatively essentializes these experiences as the defining referents of the Muslims and Islam. As Khan (2001) also reminds us, as researchers we must be not only responsible for what we write, but also ‘examine how our work might be read given that racism and imperialism influence our lives’ (p.268).

**Negotiating Secular and Faith-Based Muslim Feminist Stances**

Many Muslim feminist scholars and male Muslim allies are embarking on the path of epistemological reform as a means to combat authoritarianism, patriarchy and religious Puritanism in the interpretation of Islamic texts and the laws derived from them. Many Muslim women scholar-activists, including myself, locate our struggles for faith-based feminism within both an anti-imperialist framework as well as the discursive arena of exegetical reform based on anti-patriarchal readings of religious texts and advocating new understandings of gender justice in Islam moving by away from narrow, patriarchal interpretations as the only authoritative or legitimate epistemic possibilities (see for example Abou El Fadl, 2001; Barlas, 2002; Wadud, 1992). As such, we represent a genre of faith-based Muslim women committed to the feminist goals of combating patriarchy and transforming the oppressive ideological and material conditions that sustain the subordination of women, but who unlike our secular counterparts do not see this as inherently inconsistent with Islam.

Many Muslim as well as non-Muslim secular scholars are highly critical and ultimately dismissive of attempts to extract liberatory modes of feminist theorizing and praxis from the pervasive and totalizing grasp of fundamentalism (Moghissi, 1999; Mojab, 1995; Winter, 2001). There are many secular scholars from Muslim backgrounds committed to social justice and anti-racism who also do not see any possibilities for situating feminism within a religious framework. Haideh Moghissi (1999) for example argues that Islamic feminism is based on a
prescribed set of religious ideas and teachings that are rooted in an irreconcilably sexist discourse. She asks the question: ‘How could a religion based on gender hierarchy be adopted as the framework for struggle for gender democracy and women’s equality with men?’ (p.126). Despite rightly problematizing the totalizing notion of the term ‘Islamic’, Moghissi then re-inscribes a singular conception of Islam as being essentially misogynistic and thereby irreconcilable with feminist goals and aims, as the only possible narrative. This reduces the broad epistemological expressions of Islam to a singular negative framework, de-legitimating the discursive challenges made by Muslim women who advocate gender reform. For Moghissi this rationale behind the discursive strategy is insufficient as are all attempts to reconcile issues of gender equity from within an Islamic framework. She argues that shariah law is based on the discrimination of women and minorities and as long as women support this as a legal framework for women’s rights, they will never be achieved, since the shariah is in her view not compatible with the principles of equality of human beings (p.141).

Despite the excellent work of scholars such as Amina Wadud, Asma Barlas, and Khaled Abou El Fadl, who have opened up the hermeneutic spaces of Qur’anic exegesis and corresponding elaborations of shariah or religiously-based jurisprudence, to alternative readings and interpretations based on gender justice, some secular feminists remain dismissive and reject any form of epistemological reform. Such theorizing actually reinforces a patriarchal, fundamentalist view and reading of the Qur’an by closing off any other possibilities for invoking more gender positive readings. By dismissing alternative or ‘progressive’ readings, secular feminists uphold the most rigid and dogmatic narrations as being the authoritative voice. They therefore fall into the same trap as fundamentalists who derive only static and literal meanings from the Qur’an and see the human interpretation of these laws derived from religious texts as inviolable and fixed, rather than the product of historical, cultural and gendered attempts to apprehend the meaning of Divine intent. Secular Muslim feminists also argue that religiously based feminism does not represent the only legitimate form of indigenous feminism in Muslim societies. They contest all moves that situate the debates over women’s rights on an exclusively religious terrain closing off possibilities for secular interventions (see Zine 2004c for further discussion of secular and faith-based approaches to Islamic feminism).

The ideological divide between Muslim feminists is also implicated by their respective political priorities. Egyptian Feminist writer, Nawal El Saadawi for example, takes up a Marxist position and is critical of other Muslim feminists who she views as inattentive to the implications of class and patriarchy in their subordination:
We don’t have feminists anymore. Feminism to me is to fight against patriarchy and class and to fight against male domination and class domination. We don’t separate between class oppression and patriarchal oppression. Many so-called feminists don’t. We can’t be liberated under American occupation, for example. The new women are not aware of that (cited in Nassef, 2004, p.2).

She goes on to argue that contemporary Egyptian feminists suffer from ‘false consciousness’ and have not clearly theorized and disentangled their liberatory projects by politically challenging class based domination and focusing too narrowly on only patriarchy, rather than on the interconnections between patriarchy and class:

These days there is also a phenomenon I call ‘false awareness’. Many women who call themselves feminists today wear make up, high heels, tight jeans and they still wear the hijab. It is very contradictory. They are victims of both religious fundamentalism and American consumerism. They have no political awareness. They are unaware of the liberation of women on the one hand and of the economy and country on the other. Many consider only patriarchy as their enemy and ignore corporate capitalism (cited in Nassef, 2004, p.3).

Inscribing notions of ‘false consciousness’ upon marginalized women reproduces the paternalism of imperialist feminist theorizing that cast Muslim women and Third world women as politically immature and unable to theorize or combat their own oppression (see for example, Mohanty, 1991). Yet, El Saadawi points out an interesting phenomenon of the double consciousness generated by globalization and corporate imperialism on the one hand and religious conservatism on the other. Yet to dismiss women’s negotiation with these forces as blind victimization divests their rationality and ability to make reasoned choices about their bodies. Such logic creates static binaries that cast all women who wear hijab as ‘fundamentalists’ and all women who wear make up and jeans as victims of global corporate capital. Such extreme dismissals do little to build either political awareness or solidarity across feminist divides.

In attempting to mediate the divides amongst Muslim feminist theorizing and praxis, elsewhere I have suggested a ‘critical faith-centred’ approach to Islamic feminism (Zine, 2004c). Toward this end, a critical faith-centred framework develops an understanding of how religious and spiritual identities and identifications represent sites of oppression and are connected to broader sites/systems of discrimination based on race, class, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, and colonialism, while acknowledging that religion has at times been historically misused and become complicit in the perpetuation of these oppressions.
The epistemological foundations of this framework are based on the understanding that various forms of social marginality based on race, ethnicity, class, gender, sexuality, religion, and ability form a system of interlocking oppressions that are mutually reinforcing. Attempting to unravel and dismantle these systems involves addressing the multiple sites of oppression and challenging the hierarchies of racialized and class-based dominance that ideologically and structurally sustain social difference and inequality. As in critical integrative anti-racism (Dei, 1996), this framework also allows for the analysis of systems of oppression based on race, ethnicity, class, gender, sexuality, religion, as well as imperialism as they intersect within the lived experiences of marginalized groups. While the issues of religious difference and discrimination are central, the analytical approach must remain attentive to how religious difference intersects with other forms of social difference and, in some cases, can contribute to the oppression of others. This positioning helps elaborate Cooke’s (2001) notion of ‘multiple critique’ by positing a methodology of analysis and praxis for Muslim women’s theorizing and activism, that moves beyond the reductive ‘religious paradigm’ (Lazreg, 1994) that regards religion as the central cause of women’s subordination. In contrast, an intersectional framework connects religion to the broad nexus of social, economic and political factors that implicate the way it is taken up, interpreted and implemented by both individuals and states.

Moreover a critical faith-centred perspective acknowledges that while religion and spirituality can be sites or sources of oppression, they also offer powerful spaces of resistance to injustice and provide avenues for critical contestation and political engagement. It is this understanding that can allow for critical articulations of Islam to subvert the more puritan and extreme variants; a goal that Muslim feminists of all persuasions would support. It also situates spirituality as a space from which to resist and subvert other forms of domination, such as racism, sexism, imperialism, and other by-products of the current ‘war on terror’. Dei (2001) for example argues that a ‘revolutionary spirituality’ is directed from the intrinsic to the extrinsic or outward manifestation through social transformation, revolution, and a collective struggle geared to emancipatory aims:

There are different spiritualities and the focus on reclaiming the spiritual is for an action-oriented, revolutionary spirituality. This approach moves beyond the liberal focus on compassion, humility and caring, to discussing how we evoke spirituality and spiritual knowledge to transform society and to challenge oppressive systems and structures. This approach thus focuses on questions of power and domination and role of spirituality in strengthening and empowering the self and the collective to resist marginality (p.3).
Critical in Dei’s conception is the centering of spiritual knowledge as the basis for building socially transformative movements that present possibilities for challenging oppressive structures and conditions. Muslim women, for example, are reclaiming the hermeneutic spaces of religious discourse as a means for developing a basis for Islamic feminist engagement. Despite critics such as Moghissi (1999) who challenge the centering of feminist movements within an Islamic paradigm, arguing that the inherent patriarchy in Islam cannot be transcended, other faith-centred Muslim feminists see using strategies such as feminist exegeses of the Qur’an as a means to articulate feminist thought and engagement from within the broad discursive parameters of Islam as a means toward achieving greater gender equity and countering oppression (see Cooke, 2001; Wadud, 1992). This approach seeks to use the politics of hermeneutics as a means to create alternative readings of religious text that build a discursive and spiritual basis for more equitable gender-based structures, systems, and practices. Yet unlike other revolutionary spiritualities Islam has been unduly demonised, particularly since 9/11, as a religion of terrorists rather than as a ‘liberatory theology’, as the basis for which struggles of Latin-American popular revolutionary movements have been characterized. Extremist elements within Islamic society have been held as an essentialized norm that negates the vast moderate majority of Muslims. This points to the way some spiritual traditions are seen as valid forces of insurgency and oppositional political engagement while others are de-legitimated and their liberatory political imperatives are unjustly vulgarized. The extent to which this representation acts in the service of broader neo-liberal goals and economic rationales embedded in a global, imperialist practice needs constant examination.

(En)gendering the War on ‘Terrors’

Many acts of terror have been afflicted on the people’s of this earth. The sacredness and dignity of human life and the right to peaceful existence and justice have been destroyed through the fundamentalism of imperialistic globalization and religious fundamentalism.

Diverse Women for Diversity

In this discussion I have indicated that what should unite otherwise diversely positioned and oriented Muslim women (including those who dismiss feminism as a Western construct) are our common struggles with neo-imperialism and narrow and extreme religious Puritanism. The politics of representation in the ‘war on terror’ mask the fact that there are multiple and interlocking forms of ‘terror’ that
need to be combated; the terror of neo-imperialism and global militarism, the terror of global corporate capitalism, the terror of poverty and starvation, the terror against the environment as bio-terrorism (Shiva, 2003), racial terror (hooks, 1992), sexual terror, the terror of occupation and exile and the terror that is invoked in inscribing a Manichean world along racial and religious lines (Fanon, 1963). Globally the effects of these terrors disproportionately affect women and are further mediated by issues such as race, ethnicity, class and religion.

While Muslim feminists of both secular and religious persuasions have a vested interest in combating the multiple forms of oppression which are manifest in their lives and societies either in the global North or South, women with secular orientations accuse faith-based Muslim women of colluding with patriarchal theocratic rule by not unequivocally disavowing what they view as the doctrinal underpinning of women’s subordination in Islam. Many faith-based Muslim women are also not unsuspicious of the motives and rationales of secular Muslim feminists as being purveyors of Western ideological discourses alien to indigenous feminist theorizing and praxis. Yet mobilizing against common oppressions requires a suspension of such mutual dissent to allow a greater understanding of the convergences rather than divergences of their respective epistemological standpoints. This political divide has compromised concerted efforts to coordinate action among the secular and faith-based Muslim feminists in key forums such as United Nations conferences in Nairobi, Cairo, Vienna, and Beijing. Overall the participation and inclusion of racially and religiously marginalized women in these forums has been subject to ‘invisibility’ with respect to their structural and politically strategic absence in shaping the framework and scope of global feminist advocacy (Chishti, 2002). The existing marginality of Muslim women’s voices in transnational feminist organizing and policy-setting agendas is further fragmented and compromised by the lack of solidarity among secular and faith-based Muslim feminists.

In response to 9/11 and the war on terror, Muslim women’s organizing has not capitalized on opportunities to build transnational links and as a result the global movement remains fragmented. Using the Canadian context from which I write as an example, we can see the way various Muslim women’s organizations have attempted to address local and global issues arising from interwoven terrors of war, imperialism and patriarchy from within their spheres of activity, but have not effectively worked across the boundaries of religious and secular activism. Organizations such as the Afghan Women’s Organization in Toronto have directed their international activities toward providing training support to existing formal and informal Afghan women’s organizations in rural and urban areas focusing on issues of human rights, health, NGO management and leadership skills, to aid in post-war reconstruction initiatives geared toward developing stronger political literacy and increasing the capacities of women in Afghanistan.
They maintain a critical faith-centered perspective in their work and challenge attempts made by other aid agencies that do not value the role of spirituality in the lives of Afghan women, yet resist capitulations to patriarchal religious authoritarianism. This has allowed them to work in a way that respects the religious sensibilities of Afghan women and yet still challenge the way these women have become the ‘collateral damage’ due to the insurgency of both religious extremism and global militarism. Other secular yet pro-faith groups such as the Canadian Council of Muslim Women have been also taken up a critically faith-centered stance and remain attentive to how the dual effects of Orientalist stereotypes and gendered Islamophobia as well as patriarchy and fundamentalism operate in the lives of Muslim women in Canada and abroad, using media based projects as tools to promote more complex narratives through which the lives and struggles of Muslim women can be engaged and understood. However, other more traditionally oriented faith-based women’s organizations in Canada such as the Federation of Muslim Women have been active in countering negative stereotypes of Muslim women post 9/11 but are more reticent in their critique of equally limiting patriarchal structures in the community and abroad. The unevenness of these approaches and the lack of concerted focus on how the barriers of religion, racism, imperialism and patriarchy are interwoven into the lives of Muslim women, limits the way in which these struggles are epistemologically framed and politically challenged.

Developing a more cohesive framework for diversely oriented and ideologically situated Muslim women to collaborate in the struggle against common oppressions is a contemporary challenge. Chishti (2002) suggests that a space for a more collaborative feminist praxis among Muslim women be rooted in a ‘strategic-integrative approach’ based on developing more independent and integrated analysis of the multiple, challenges, oppressions and injustices that Muslim women face and also through building active and strategic solidarities in local and transnational contexts as a basis for political resistance. She argues that ‘[a]s Muslim women, we need to create these spaces for collaborative engagements as well as to connect with existing ones, which interweave our diverse voices for specific and strategic political purposes’ (Chishti, 2002, p.83).

This form of building strategic alliances does not create a false homogenization of Muslim women’s ideologies or religious orientations, but rather allows for these epistemological divergences while developing common platforms for social action and political critique. A project of this kind involves recognizing the limits of these associations and acknowledging both the common as well as the incompatible frames that are invoked from these often competing and contradictory sites. For example, building alliances between secular and faith-based feminists in order to challenge common oppressions is necessary in building strategic coalitions between communities of difference. By respecting
and validating the differences posed by the varied social and ideological locations that Muslim women inhabit, it then becomes possible to construct strategic spaces of Muslim feminist insurgency in the global arena. Such a process involves strategic solidarities where common interests intersect as well as strategic dislocations where incompatible interests and agendas diverge. Muslim feminist resistance must engage polyvocal and dialogical encounters that allow for both platforms of affirmation and dissent to be expressed.

In attempting to combat the dual oppressions of neo-Orientalism and Islamophobia on the one hand and fundamentalism and religious extremism on the other, Muslim women must seek to develop these strategic linkages among themselves and others in order to shift the current terms of engagement in the ‘war on terror’ toward a war against the multiple and intersecting terrors that are insidiously woven through the ‘new world order’.

I use the term ‘fundamentalism’ to refer to puritan and literalist trends within the Islamic theological, social and political traditions. I do not equate all forms of fundamentalism or conservative religious views with extremism or violence.

Following the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Department of Defense designated the military response as Operation Infinite Justice. The origins of the name can be traced back to the 1998 Operation Infinite Reach airstrikes against Osama bin Laden's facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan in response to the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Following the disclosure of Operation Infinite Justice, Muslim groups protested the name on the basis that their faith teaches that Allah is the only one that could provide ‘infinite justice’. Operation Infinite Justice was changed to Operation Enduring Freedom on 25 September 2001 (see, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/infinite-justice.htm).

In Europe, The Rage and the Pride sold 1 million copies in Italy and was on the Number One Best Seller’s list in France, Germany and Spain.

While this book was originally published in 1973, it was later reprinted in 2002 in time for the Iraq war.

I use the term ‘Islamic feminism’ to refer to specific social and political initiatives as well as ideological and discursive practices geared toward combating patriarchal domination and seeking conditions of social justice and freedom from all forms of oppression for Muslim women.

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