revised in later editions in the light of subsequent scholarly work.

The next generation was to go on from objectivity to admiration. The Ottoman Empire's toleration of all sorts of religious minorities was given as an example to Christians by Bayle and many others: that was the time when, following the example set by the Spanish Jews two centuries earlier, the Calvinists of Hungary and Transylvania, the Protestants of Silesia, and the Cossack Old Believers of Russia sought refuge in Turkey or looked to the Porte in their flight from Catholic or Orthodox persecution.1 Islam was looked upon as a rational religion, far removed from the Christian dogmas which were so strongly opposed to reason, and containing a minimum of mythical concepts and mystical rites (the minimum, it was thought, necessary to secure the adherence of the masses). Further, it reconciled the call to a moral life with a reasonable regard for the needs of the body, of the senses, and of life in society. In brief, as a religion it came very close to the Deism that most of the 'Men of Enlightenment' professed. On the historical level, the civilizing role played by Islam was highlighted: civilization had not emerged from the monasteries, but had had its origins among the pagan Greeks and Romans and had been brought from Europe by the Arabs who were (and so much better to the mind of the time!) non-Christian.2

Leibniz (1646-1716) was already thinking along these lines. Then came the anonymous author of a pamphlet challengingly entitled "Mahomet no impostor!" (1720):3 Henri de Bougainville whose apologetic Vie de Mahomet was published in 1730; and Voltaire, an admirer of Muslim civilization. This last, however,

2. See Voltaire, Robertson, Herder. Cf. Schipperges, Ideologie und Historiographie des Arabismus, pp. 29, 34. The subject was dealt with to the fullest possible extent by the Spanish Jesuit Juan Andrés (1740-1817) in his book Origen, progresos y estado actual de toda la literatura (Italian edn., Parma, 1782-98; Spanish tr. 1784-1806).

The spirit of the age eventually affected even the specialists, more particularly of course those who were outside the universities and the academic tradition. One of them was the lawyer and Arabist George Sale (c. 1697-1736), an enlightened Christian who, in 1734, published a remarkable translation of the Koran with a Preliminary Discourse, accompanied by terse, balanced, and well-informed notes, of which many later writers have made use. Another person in the front rank was the brilliant self-taught German scholar J. J. Reiske (1716-74). He was a dedicated student - incomparably the best in his day - of Arabic literature and history, an indefatigable scholar who was persecuted by Professors Schultz and Michaelis because they wanted to keep Arabic studies within the ambit of 'sacred philology' and biblical exegesis. This great scholar too saw something divine in the founding of Islam.4 The Oxford professor Simon Ockley, when writing his History of the Saracens (1708-18), the first attempt at making the results of Orientalist research available to the general reader, exalted the Muslim East above the West.5 Erudite facts and new ideas were put into circulation by these scholars and synthesized by such writers as Voltaire, to whom we have already referred, and Edward Gibbon (1737-94), whose balanced assessments award a high place to the Muslim world in the cultural and intellectual history of mankind. A myth was building up: that of Muhammad as a tolerant and wise ruler and law-giver.6

1. An oscillation in his point of view, of which Muslims and Orientalists alike have seldom been aware. Compare, for instance, the tragedy of Mahomet with chapters VI, XXVII, and XIV of Essai sur les Mœurs.
2. Fick, op. cit., pp. 168-244.
The eighteenth century really looked upon the Muslim East through fraternal and understanding eyes. The idea of the equality of natural gifts in all men, which a lively optimism, the true religion of the age, had helped to spread, now enabled men to examine critically the charges which earlier ages had levelled at the Muslim world. Cruelty and savagery were rampant in the East, it was true, but was the West above reproach? It was pointed out that slavery was gentler in Turkey than elsewhere, and that piracy was practised also by Christians. Despotism was a deplorable political system, but appropriate to be studied and, like any other system, to be explained by reference to ecological and social causes; the geographical conditions of the East might well have been favourable to it, but it had on occasion developed elsewhere. Montesquieu, who held strong beliefs about the importance of geographical factors, mentions Domitian as the forerunner of the Sophy of Persia. The comparative broad-mindedness of the Muslims in sexual matters, which had horrified (or else ambivalently or unconsciously attracted) people in the Middle Ages, was becoming highly attractive to a society which assiduously cultivated eroticism. In the Age of Enlightenment, the Muslims were looked upon as men just like other men, with many of them indeed superior to the Europeans. "The Turk, when he is not under the influence of fanaticism, is as charitable as he is trustful," wrote Thomas Hope, who stayed in the East on various occasions towards the end of the century.

At the end of Candide the heroes, now wiser, find peace near Constantinople, after following the advice of a 'very famous dervish who was reputed to be the best Turkish philosopher' and of an aged Muslim, who was industrious, sober, and indifferent to politics. There were many travellers through Eastern lands, and while some were narrow in vision, as were the missionaries who whilst in the East lived in a self-enclosed world, a few, such as James Bruce, Carsten Niebuhr, H. Maundrell, R. Pocock, J. de la Roque, N. Savary, and Thomas Shaw, returned with intriguing pieces of information which were added to the perennially read accounts of such men as Chardin and Tavernier from the preceding century.

Lady Mary Wortley Montagu penetrated into the women's world of Constantinople, and gave an account of it that was free from mysteries and myths. Contrariwise, some Easterners, mostly Christians, visited Europe. The youthful J.-J. Rousseau, son of a clock-maker at the Imperial Palace in Constantinople and relative of a consul in Persia and of the latter's son, who held consulates at Basra, Aleppo, Baghdad, and Syrian Tripoli, evinced no surprise when he met near Neufchâtel a bogus Archimandrite of Jerusalem, who was doubtless a Greek adventurer and a subject of the Grand Signior. The theme of the Turkish spy who gives a critical account of European manners and customs, a theme which was launched upon its prodigiously successful career in 1684 by a Genoese adventurer called G. P. Marana, who had long been resident in Egypt, was to lead to Montesquieu's Lettres Persanes of 1721.

On the other hand the pre-romantic tendency, revelling in the exotic and enchanting vision of the Muslim East that A. Galland had launched, was still strong and produced a masterpiece in William Beckford's Vathek (1781), whose author was in 1788 to become in Madrid the lover of a Muslim youth named Muhammad. Vathek is enlivened by the strong tendency towards esoterism that characterizes the end of the century in which the symbol is Cagliostro, the 'great Copt', who boasted of prolonged journeys in the East. A somewhat less fantastical aestheticism drove William Jones towards the study of Eastern literatures but,

1 Daniel, Islam, Europe and Empire, pp. 14f.
2 Esprit de los, iii. 9.
like Voltaire and so many others, he was to constrain both form and content into European canons and categories as much as possible, transposing Arabic verse, for instance, into the classical Greco-Latin metres. Yet, the realistic, positivist, and universalist tendency, which was in the line of the Encyclopedists, was still very strong and shaped such a mind as Volney’s, whose *Voyage en Syrie et en Egypte* (1787) is a masterpiece of careful analysis, remarkably sagacious in political and social matters, distrustful of the picturesque and dedicated to the observation of realities. Volney knew the Eastern languages, his scholarship was imposing, but his interest lay in contemporary affairs. He was to take an important part in the planning of the Egyptian expedition that led to the admirable *Description de l’Égypte* (1809–22), an unequalled collection of penetrating and exact archaeological, geographical, demographic, medical, technological, and (anticipating the term) sociological studies. Volney was well acquainted with Eastern history, but he held that the best way of getting to understand it was to start from observation of the contemporary East. He tried to further the practical study of spoken Arabic and criticized the scholars who knew a great deal about medieval Arab grammarians but could not make themselves understood by a living Arab.

The preoccupation with the present, and the passion for understanding the true mechanics of things, are little conducive to purely philological studies, and these wilted during the whole of the eighteenth century. Maronites like the Assemains in Italy and Casiri in Spain catalogued collections of manuscripts. Louis XIV in 1700 and Maria Theresa in 1754 founded schools for the essentially practical purpose of training interpreters. In India in 1784, William Jones founded the first learned Orientalist society, the Asiatic Society of Bengal. There was there, in Muslim territory, a body of Britons who were equally interested in Muslim and in classical Indian languages and literatures. In 1800 the East India Company, for practical ends, founded Fort William College in Calcutta, under whose auspices there were published and translated, often by native writers, many of the Persian and Arabic classics, as well as manuals and other works of a practical nature. Out in India, they still thought that a knowledge of the East was a basic necessity. But around the 1820s a westernizing attitude was beginning to predominate, and the older attitude was now adjudged unnecessary; in 1835 Lord Macaulay anglicized the whole of the Indian school system.¹

7. The nineteenth century: exoticism, imperialism, specialization

In the nineteenth century three tendencies are apparent: a utilitarian and imperialistic sense of Western superiority, full of contempt for other civilizations; a romantic exoticism, with its delight in a magical East whose increasing poverty spiced its charm; and a specialized scholarship whose main concern lay with past ages. Despite appearances, the three tendencies are more complementary than opposed.

Romantic exoticism did not spring from a change in the relations between East and West, but from an internal transformation of Western sensibilities now craving for the bizarre. What was foreign had always appeared at the same time strange, but there was now a delight found in the most *autrice*. It is from this that English pre-romanticism derived, with its love for so-called primitive poetry, the atmosphere of which must have given the direction to William Jones’s interests. So also the German *Sturm und Drang* to which Herder (1744–1803) belonged with his deep interest in Eastern literatures among others, and whose studies in historical synthesis place the Muslim contribution in the first rank, the Arabs having been ‘Europe’s teachers’. But the desire to know and understand exotic worlds was for a long time linked to the classical, universalist approach of men who were searching first and foremost in the East, as elsewhere, for the man of all times and of all places. Goethe’s poems to the glory of Muhammad, and in particular his *Muhammed Gesang* of 1774, are incomparably more poetical

than Voltaire’s *Mahomet* (1742), but have even less of local colour. More than forty years later, in 1819, Goethe wrote his *Westöstlicher Divan* with its twelve nāmehs, its opening call to a ‘Hegira’ towards the East where the poet will recover his youth in the spring of Khidr (Chisér) and its learned notes and appended comments full of Oriental erudition. Lucid as he always was, Goethe felt impelled to apologize for having allowed his irrepressible European origin to show through, as well as his specific accent that marked him as a foreigner.\(^1\) The Orientalist Merx went too far when he declared Goethe’s East to be a ‘wholly invented phantasmagoria’, for, as H. Lichtenberger has said, ‘he did not intend to depict either the East or the West, but man as intuitively he found him, in one as much as in the other’.\(^2\) (See also on Goethe as a figure in the growing understanding of the East by the West in the Romantic period, below, Chapter VII, pp. 342–3.)

The renewed vogue of Oriental studies, which indeed looked like a Renaissance, supplied the Romantics with a wealth of material. Nevertheless, scholarly Orientalism was rooted in the preoccupations of the Enlightenment. Anyone in Europe who wanted a worthwhile introduction to the languages and civilisations of the Near East turned to the École de Langues Orientales Vivantes in Paris which had been set up by the Convention in March 1795 at the instigation of Langlé. The latter laid very special stress upon practical usefulness, but not before he emphasized the contribution which Eastern languages could make to the progress of literature and science.\(^3\) Paradoxically, the great pioneer here was Silvestre de Sacy, a Legitimist, a Jansenist, and a positivist, who clung to the values of the past and who, for example, envisaged linguistics within the framework of an abstract universalism, as defined by the ‘grammaire générale’ in the spirit of Port Royal. Sacy became the master of all European Orientalists and Paris the Mecca of all who wished to specialize in the study of

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1 See his *Westöstlicher Divan*. Noten und Abhandlungen, Einleitung.
3 Fück, op. cit., p. 141.

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the Near East.\(^1\) He was a scrupulous and meticulous philologist, extremely cautious in reaching conclusions and anxious not to put forward anything which the texts did not clearly exemplify. He was a positivist before the word was coined, and imposed upon the European world of specialists the rigorous purism to which his Jansenism had predisposed him. His style of work has remained to this day that of a large number of Orientalists. The criticisms that are now levelled at this attitude were discernible in his own day. The narrowness of mind which it fostered (but which is not in the least an inevitable consequence of it, since many of its ablest and most gifted exponents have escaped it) irritated Volney and later Renan. Scholarly purism tended to keep the problems of the past separate from those of the present world, to the occasional impairment of understanding of the former. It also often led to the unconscious acceptance of the opinions that were common in its own environment. Rejection of rash conclusions in the work of synthesis could lead to a rather barren agnosticism or to an uncritical promulgation of implicit ideologies, underwritten, as it were, by the prestige of impressively scholar. But this was only the reverse side of exceptional qualities and advantages indispensable to scientific progress. The mistrust by Sacy and his disciples of brilliant and facile syntheses, however unjust it may sometimes have been to certain valid and important theories, was a necessary condition for building new superstructures on a secure foundation.

Another condition was the final severance of all ties with theology that had been achieved in England and in France in the eighteenth century. The training of dragomans in Paris and in Vienna had led to the liberation of teaching from theological fetters, and resulted in the founding of the Paris School of Oriental Languages, which, created in the fervour of revolutionary France, provided under the devout Silvestre de Sacy the model of an Orientalist institution both scholarly and secular. In German-speaking

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countries, the universities were still controlled by the theologians, and secular Orientalism had at first to be practised by amateurs, with the prolific Josef von Hammer-Purgstall (1774–1856) in the forefront. He was a pupil of the Vienna Oriental Academy and a professional dragoman. He lacked philological precision but was an unequaled popularizer of knowledge of the East, founding the first specialist Orientalist review in Europe, the Fundgruben des Orients (1809–18), to which all European Orientalists contributed as well as some Eastern scholars. Von Hammer divided his interests equally between the past and the present.

The recourse to objectivity, to arduous specialized work, was in line with the deeper trends of an age when scientific research in depth was being organized, and of a society in which capitalism was inspiring an unprecedented industrial development. The success of Silvestre de Sacy’s teaching throughout Europe is a reflection of this, as is the flowering of specialist institutions. The Paris Asiatic Society was founded in 1821, and in 1823 it launched its own periodical, the Journal Asiatique. In 1834 there appeared the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, the Society dating itself from 1823. In 1839 a regularly produced journal, the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, took the place in India of the Asiatic Researches of William Jones’s group. In 1841, the Bombay branch issued its own journal. The year 1842 saw the founding of the American Oriental Society which also had its own periodical. In 1849 the Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft was launched in Leipzig. It was published by the German Oriental Society which had been formed two years earlier. The westernizing of Russia had, from the second half of the eighteenth century, brought forth a certain flowering of Orientalist works. From 1804 the teaching of oriental languages at university level was extended at Kharkov and, above all, to Kazan, which lay in Muslim territory. The internal Muslim policy of the Russian state stimulated the rapid growth in importance of this centre at Kazan.1

1 Cf. V. V. Barthold, La Découverte de l’Aise, French translation (Paris, 1947).

Such was the origin of Orientalism. The term ‘Orientalist’ occurred in England towards 1779, and ‘orientaliste’ in France in 1799. ‘Orientalisme’ finds a place in the Dictionnaire de l’Académie Française of 1838. The idea of a special discipline devoted to the study of the East was gathering support. There were not yet enough specialists to justify the establishment of journals or societies dealing exclusively with one country or one people or one region of the East. Instead, the ambit of the journals and societies extends over several domains, not all receiving the same depth of treatment. A scholar was therefore an ‘orientalist’. The concept of ‘orientalism’ betokens a greater depth of study, but also a withdrawal and a retrenchment. In the eighteenth-century works of synthesis, the East and the West stood side by side as aspects of a universalist view. It had now been realized that there could be no serious discussion of the East without a preliminary study of the original texts, which in turn involved a profound knowledge of the native languages. With the materials that had become available this preliminary work was seen to be immense, involving the editing and translating of texts, the compilation of scientifically planned dictionaries and grammars, the exposition of narrative history, and so on. Specialists might well hold general ideas, but they should as far as possible keep them out of their scientific work. They were left with too little time to keep informed of scientific trends outside their own special field.

Literary and artistic Orientalism was of course fostered by all the events concerning the Muslim East, particularly the ‘Eastern Question’ which was one of the great problems of European politics in the nineteenth century. Significantly, Romantic exoticism has its origin in the Greek War of Independence that attracted Byron (and in which he died in 1824) and was the subject of the

first Orientalist painting (Le Massacre de Scio by Delacroix, which was exhibited in the same year). In that picture and in Victor Hugo’s collection of lyrics Les Orientales (in which the first poem is dated 1825) is present in all its essentials the Romantic’s image of the East, which flourished and persisted for so long in the public imagination: a riot of colour; sumptuousness and savage ferocity; harems and seraglios; heads chopped off and women thrown in sacks into the Bosporus; feluccas and brigantines flying the Crescent banner; roundness of azure domes and soaring whiteness of minarets; viziers, odalisques, and eunuchs; cooling springs beneath the palms; guiaours with their throats slit; captive women subjected to the victor’s ravenous lust. Such highly coloured pictures provide inexpensive satisfaction to the deeper instincts, the murky sensationalism, the unconscious masochism and sadism of the peaceful Western bourgeoisie, as Heine had already discovered. Even when Westerners actually went to the East, this was the image they sought out, ruthlessly selecting what they saw and ignoring what did not fit in with their preconceived picture.

This image, tinged with European sensibility at its own stage of evolution, also reflected a real situation. In the nineteenth century the Muslim East was still an enemy, but an enemy doomed to defeat. Eastern lands were like decaying witnesses of a great past; one could enjoy the luxury of praising them at the same time as the politicians and businessmen were doing all they could to hasten their decay. The possibility of their recovery or modernization aroused no enthusiasm. They might, in the process of modernization, lose the whiff of exoticism which lent them their charm. In the Middle Ages, the Oriental had been regarded as a fierce enemy, but nevertheless on the same level as Western man; in the eighteenth-century enlightenment and the resulting ideology of the French Revolution the Oriental was, underneath his disguise, essentially a human being; now he became a creature apart, imprisoned in his specificity, an object of condescending praise. Thus the concept of homo islamicus was born, and is still far from being overthrown.

The theory that there are different civilizations each evolving in its allotted sphere was becoming universally accepted. Each civilization had been endowed with a particular essential nature. The search for this essential nature accounted for the increasing tendency of scholars to forsake the study of recent periods and to specialize in the ‘classical’ ages when civilizations were deemed to have shown their ‘purest’ characteristics. This tendency was intensified by the two humanist sciences that were favourite pursuits in the nineteenth century: the history of religions, and historical and comparative linguistics. The history of religions, born of the struggle between secular relativist pluralism and the Christian monopoly of ideas, stimulated great interest in the study of Eastern religions as alternatives to Christianity, both in the past and in the present.

The discoveries of historical and comparative linguistics gave to language, indeed to each specific language, a key role. A nation was considered to be identified with its language and to be defined by the characteristics of that language. Biological evolutionism and the creation of the science of physical anthropology focused attention upon the classification of races. Races themselves were looked upon as essential forces endowed with a particularly high efficiency quotient. Increasingly narrow specialization could only hinder the correct appreciation of the contributions made by these sciences. They reached specialists in other fields only in their most vulgarized, mechanistic forms.

Despite the enormous mass of documents and precise pieces of information assembled together by the specialists, there was an ever-widening divergence between two streams of knowledge. On the one hand, the specialists’ knowledge was deep but focused upon a view of a cultural whole that had now disappeared as such but to which there was attributed an immutable, underlying influence. This influence derived its direction from the most general ideas of the time, which transmitted the findings of the history of religions, of historical linguistics, and of physical anthropology, in the popularized form of a boundless magnification of the
power of religion, language, and race. On the other hand, the problems of actual contemporary life in those societies were considered an ignoble subject left better to the practical observation of traders, travellers, diplomats, and economists. While theoretical knowledge in the eighteenth century attempted to help the practical man in understanding the present, it can be said, in a very general sort of way, that in the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth, on the rare occasions when scholars interfered in this field, they did more harm than good, influenced as they were by current prejudices rather than by science.

Less schematic views of the countries of the Muslim East as evolving societies capable of progress, given favourable conditions, are found principally among statesmen, technicians, and economists when the circumstances were more or less favourable. So it was with Muhammad 'Ali's Egypt, which aroused some enthusiasm in France within the framework of its anti-British policy. Aesthetic exoticism, while it plunged most of its followers into nostalgia of the past and fear of Europeanizing modernization, paradoxically led others, through their sincere and passionate interest in the countries concerned, to opt for progress and therefore to pay more attention to the movements that were taking place there. Here again there was a parting of the ways, and several courses were open, from the envisaging of the desired evolution as taking place under the aegis of the European homeland of this exoticism (Lyautey, L. Massignon, T. E. Lawrence at first), to a stand in opposition to that country (W. S. Blunt), through all possible intermediate positions and with changes of position in the course of one man's life. The influence of the generally accepted opinions of the time gave a different twist to ideas. In his schemes for the regeneration of Islam and the Arab world by a partial and modified return to medieval forms, W. S. Blunt provided very important material that was later to be appropriated, assimilated, and made their own by the early theorists of Muslim and Arab nationalism.

The phenomenon that had most to do with the conditioning of the European view of the East, particularly after the middle of the nineteenth century, was imperialism (for the earlier background of this historical trend see below, Chapter IV, pp. 200 ff.). The economic, technical, military, political, and cultural superiority of Europe was becoming overwhelming, while the East was sinking into under-development. For all practical purposes, Iran and the Ottoman Empire were becoming European protectorates, while the field of direct colonization was spreading into Central Asia to the benefit of the Russians; into the Maghrib and the Ottoman East to the benefit of the British, French, and Italians, particularly after 1881 when Egypt and Tunisia were occupied. All this, inevitably, could only encourage a natural European self-centredness, which had always existed, but which now took on a very markedly contemptuous tinge. The unconscious eighteenth-century view of things from a European standpoint, guided by the universalist ideology of the age, respected non-European peoples and cultures and rightly found in their historical evolution or their contemporary structures of society universal human characteristics, with pre-critical naiveté crediting them with the same underlying bases as European civilization, with only very superficial specific differences. The conscious, theoretical European self-centredness of the nineteenth century made the opposite mistake. Irreducible specificity was assumed at all levels and universal traits or motives were ignored or denied. Moreover, Easterners themselves began in some cases to adopt the European model, starting with its most superficial aspects, and in other cases rejecting totally this model whilst clinging to the most archaic values of their culture, although these had often been renewed from within. Scholars made ever more numerous and more profound specialized studies of the classical ages and of the things that were most closely connected with the culture of those ages. They noted with understandable relish all the signs of their enduring influence at the present time, and consciously or unconsciously they often lent
the guarantee of their scientific authority to such a presentation of things.1

The humiliating situation in which the Muslim world found itself encouraged Christian missionaries and opened new ways for them. Within the framework of normal human inclinations and even in accordance with the general ideas of contemporary science, they attributed the successes of European nations to the Christian religion, just as they attributed the failures of the Muslim world to Islam. Christianity was made out to be by its very nature favourable to progress, and Islam to mean cultural stagnation and backwardness. The attack upon Islam became as fierce as it could be and the arguments of the Middle Ages were revived with up-to-date embellishments. The Islamic religious orders (on whose origins see below, Chapter VIII, pp. 378–9), in particular, were presented as a network of dangerous organizations animated by a barbarous hatred of civilization.2 Paradoxically and significantly, similar conclusions were reached by anti-clericals in the line of Voltaire, who extolled the virtues of Hellenism, a civilization based upon the freedom of the spirit, the worship of reason and beauty, the spring of European greatness, as opposed to the Semitic spirit that made for intolerant rigidity, scholastic dogmatism, fundamentalism, enervating fatalism, and contempt for the plastic arts; to this latter spirit were attributed all the associated misdeeds of Judaism, of Christianity, and of Islam.3

Pan-Islamism was a fashionable bogey in the same way and at

1 Daniel in his Islam, Europe and Empire gives more precise information and quotations than anyone else. With regard to explanations, however, his work reeds emerging in accordance with A. Hourani’s suggestions in his review in Middle Eastern Studies, iv (1968), 325 ff.
2 Of outstanding significance is Les Sociétés secrètes chez les Musulmans (Paris–Lyons, 1899) by Father Rosquette of the Lyons Society of African Missions.
3 With some hesitancy, Renan tends towards this view. See especially the famous lecture he gave at the Sorbonne on 30 Mar. 1883, L’Islamme et la science (Paris, 1884). This tendency is taken to its extreme in a book eloquently entitled La Pathologie de l’Islam et les moyens de le détruire (Paris, 1857) by a militant anti-semitic Greek who called himself D. Kimon and who was also the author of an anti-Jewish book, La Politique israélite, étude psychologique (Paris, 1884).

the same time as the Yellow Peril was. Any anti-imperialistic demonstration, even when it sprang from purely local feelings, was attributed to pan-Islamism. The very word suggested an attempt at domination, an ideology of aggression, a conspiracy on a world-wide scale. Thanks to the popular press, to popular literature, and to children’s books, this view was penetrating the great mass of European minds, and it was not without influence among the scholars themselves, particularly when they took it upon themselves to offer supposedly competent advice to those directing the colonial policies of governments. Those scholars who took the greatest interest in contemporary studies, like Snouck Hurgronje or C. H. Becker, and who were more or less obsessed by pan-Islamism, analysing it with a greater or lesser degree of subtlety, tended to see it, however, as a reactionary movement.4 Without subscribing to all the commonly held myths, they were nevertheless inclined to see more unity and organization than there really was in what were in reality loose and widely divergent tendencies.

The majority of specialists, however, took no interest in these problems and were content to adopt the current views of their time whenever they had to deal with matters outside their own branch of knowledge. These specializations of theirs evolved only slowly in their spirit and methods. The philological bias retained its undisputed hold upon Oriental studies. Material for investigation accumulated. Methods of study became increasingly rigorous. Relations between scholars became more numerous and better organized, particularly on the international scale, thanks to such contacts as international conferences of Orientalists, of which the first was held in Paris in 1873. Yet, the analysis of societies, of cultures, of ideas progressed only as a result of the understanding of a few outstanding scholars.

The slow emergence of the social sciences brought little change into this picture. Sociology, psychology, demography, and political

economy were unknown to most specialists of the Muslim East, who did not realize their usefulness for their studies. It is true that the early sociologists looked upon the Muslim world as coming, among other worlds, within their sphere of interest. But they meant either the classical Muslim world or the archaic manners and traditions of the modern Muslim world. General sociologists derived their knowledge from Islamists and, with commendable caution, refrained from venturing too far into a field about which they knew little. The ethnography of the Muslim peoples was the field in which the influence of the new and energetic disciplines was most marked, and yielded such remarkable works as those of E. Doutté (e.g. his Magie et religion dans l’Afrique du Nord, 1908) and E. Westermarck (e.g. his Marriage ceremonies in Morocco, 1914).

The lack of a detailed theoretical model of social structures and their evolution kept history, in the Oriental field as elsewhere, at the level of a purely descriptive discipline. It had, however, been given fresh life by the critical vigour that B. G. Niebuhr (the son of Carsten Niebuhr, the traveller in Arabia) and Leopold von Ranke introduced into source analysis. Such Orientalist historians as G. Weil, A. Sprenger, R. Dozy, and M. Amari followed the same pattern; they were rigorous in the establishment of facts, open-minded in principle about the nature of the historical factors involved, but in fact influenced by the ideas generally current in their time regarding the understanding of the development of events. Thus Sprenger (who by his critical approach in Das Leben und die Lehre des Mohammed, 1861–5, revised the history of the Prophet) was influenced by the Hegelian conception of the Zeitgeist. Alfred von Kremer (1828–89) was doubtless the first specialist to see the history of Islam as an integral whole. His presentation of this was built round the doctrine of the influence of the ideas dominating each age that would supply ‘the key to the understanding of the religious and social system of Islam’.


specialists remained attached to the general idea—often implicit—of the predominance of the religious and ideational factor. The school of French historians in the years 1820–50, who based their historical analysis upon the internal dynamics of the conflicts between social groups, had had no influence on the Oriental field where the conflicts that were outlined were those between ‘races’ and those between religions. Thus Shi‘ism was usually explained as a reaction of the Aryan Persian spirit against Semitic Islam.

However, under the influence of the social conflicts of his time, the philologist H. Grimm was the first to investigate in his Mohammed (1892–5)—much too summarily of course—the influence of social factors in Muhammad’s life. A theologian, J. Wellhausen, who had achieved fame through his theses concerning Biblical criticism and the history of Ancient Israel, showed in his Die religiös-politischen Oppositionsparteien im alten Islam (1901) that the appearance of religious schisms in the early days of Islam evinced the dynamism of political and social conflicts. C. H. Becker was to proceed along the same road in his Islamstudien (1924–32) and L. Caetani was to go even further in the evocation of economic factors (e.g. in his Studia di storia orientale, 1914). And so at the beginning of the twentieth century, under the influence of the current concerns of the time, there was some tendency to question the eclectic positivism of the time, not replacing it by a general theoretical analysis of social structure and social dynamics, but simply transposing and emphasizing the predominant factors of the contemporary European world. Most of the specialists reacted rather sceptically to these attempts, some of which were indeed excessive and open to criticism; they remained cautiously agnostic.

8. European ethnocentrism is shaken

In this field as in others, the war of 1914–18 shook the self-confidence of European civilization, with its belief in indefinite progress on the same lines, and thereby shook European ethnocentrism. The Arab revolt in the East, the Kemalist movement in
Turkey, the shaking up of the diverse nations of the old Russian empire, the revolts in India, Indonesia, and elsewhere, all of them in line with the Young Turk and Iranian revolutions of the 1908-14 period, showed that European hegemony could be called in question. On the morrow of the war, O. Spengler’s dazzling work *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (1918-22) was published. On a more specific subject, the American Lothrop Stoddard brought out *The Rising Tide of Color against White World-Supremacy* (1920). The same author produced a book significantly entitled *The New World of Islam* (1921). This publicist, a non-specialist, was well informed, and without denying his racist viewpoint he showed that profound changes were creating a ‘strange new East’, in large measure the result of Western influences. The new image that he propounded was basically that of a world revolving round a mysterious, fundamentally different, hostile, and slightly repugnant nucleus made up of an ignorance and savagery rarely restrained by religion, custom, and a small enlightened elite. But he made room too for universal factors like the struggle against foreign intrusion. Such a view of things remained roughly that of the great European and American public, except that the emphasis was laid rather on the first factor, the latent and inadequately restrained savagery, the fanaticism that had been unleashed to meet the civilizing thrust from the West.

This undermining could not fail to have its effect. The figure and work of T. E. Lawrence are a dramatic example of the collision between romantic exoticism and a reality apprehended empirically in its universal aspects but still infused with the magic delusions of local colour. Exoticism at times led to a deeper understanding of native aspirations, as in the case of the Turcoophile disciples of Pierre Loti. More often, however, the anti-colonialists were universalists with little interest in the past or in the specific characteristics of the present, which they regarded as the vestigial traces of a barbarous past that had better be destroyed. Exoticism tended rather to lead colonial statesmen to try to preserve the older forms and seek allies among the indigenous conservatives.

to denounce the nationalist intellectuals—whether reformists or revolutionaries, socialists or not—as pale imitators of Europe, and driven by abstract, ill-digested ideas to destroy their own inheritance. Generally speaking that was also the verdict of the public at large. Modernization was looked upon as a spurious element, a betrayal of individuality.

Under the same heading we may perhaps range the view of the esoterists who sought in the Muslim East, as well as e.g. in the Buddhist East, a pattern of the wise life, a contact with supra-sensory realities and with the ancestral secrets that a long line of initiates had handed down. Far from seeing in the Muslim Sufi brotherhoods the inspiration of the Devil, they saw in them rather cells through which the ancestral theosophical tradition was transmitted. Some, like René Guénon (1886–1951), were converts to Islam and died on Muslim soil. In Europe and America this spiritual tendency, this fabulous vision of an esoteric Islam made possible the success of numerous sects which in varying degrees derived from Islam and, allowing for all kinds of misconceptions, even from Orthodox Islam and from such a religion as Baha’ism.

The irresistible tide of anti-colonialism caused in narrow but influential sectors of Western society a change in the image of the Muslim world. The movement towards independence, which on its purely nationalistic side was represented by the upper-class Muslims who wished to adapt themselves to the West in order to acquire the dynamic and dominating virtues of private enterprise, evoked much sympathy in Western governmental and business circles. In 1945 an Englishwoman, Freya Stark, wrote a book with the significant title *East is West* which she dedicated to ‘her brothers the young effendis’ and in which she stood in opposition to Kipling’s imperialistic and exoticizing attitude. Islam was considered to be a religion like any other which, while supplying its followers with spiritual reasons for living, must not hinder their economic activities, and which could be used as a bulwark against the ravages of atheistic Communist ideology.
The anti-colonialist ideology of the left took an altogether different course. Conversely, the universalism which it had derived from its liberal or socialist roots tended to change into recognition or even exaltation of individuality. Henceforward the values appertaining to the former colonized peoples were to receive their meed of admiring praise, even when the very normal misunderstandings tended towards the discovery in them, albeit in specific forms, of the very values that animated the European communities concerned. To some of those who were most deeply committed in this direction, Islam appeared intrinsically to be a naturally "progressive" factor. There were even conversions to Islam.

This tendency was particularly striking in a group of left-wing Catholics at the head of which stood a very learned French specialist, Louis Massignon. Imbued with a mystical view of history and rooted in the secular Christian tradition of devotion to the poor and humble, he carried to the utmost limit the latent tendency of the Christianity of recent times which had found its most forceful and perspicacious exponents in the Roman Catholic Church. The menace of atheism, the revision of traditional standpoints whose responsibility for the dechristianization of the Western masses seems obvious, the return to the fundamental and original values of the Christian faith, have all brought about a feeling of oneness with, rather than hostility towards, other religions. The ecumenical movement, though it has not given up its claim to be in possession of the whole truth and must gradually bring the wayward to it, has nevertheless renounced extra-spiritual pressure and recognized that the upholders of other beliefs are partners in debate and eventual allies, men of good faith attached to values worthy of respect, no longer enemy forces to be crushed. In October 1965 the Vatican Ecumenical Council paid homage to the "truths" that Islam had handed down concerning God and His power, Jesus, Mary, the Prophets, and the Apostles. While in the Middle Ages it was thought that such "truths" were masks under whose guise the fundamental Islamic imposture gained admission, people are now coming round to the view that Muslim "errors" are of doubtful importance in the face of the basically important monotheistic message which Islam bears.

This revolution in thinking has made a Christian appraisal of Muhammad a matter of some delicacy. It is no longer possible to see him as nothing but a sheer devilish impostor, as in the Middle Ages. While the greater number of the Christian thinkers who give some attention to the problem cautiously suspend judgement, some Roman Catholic specialists in Islam see him as a "religious genius". Others go even further and have come to ask whether, in a way, he was not a true prophet, seeing that St. Thomas Aquinas speaks of directive prophecy not necessarily implying unerringness and impeccability. In line with Massignon, some Christians have been struck by the spiritual value of Muslim religious experiences and disturbed by the historic injustices of their own people towards Islam, both as a religion and as a group of peoples quite recently reduced to submission and despoiled. They have accordingly been led to formulate opinions which might justify the charge of syncretism and "islamizing heresy" that indignant supporters of the integrity of the Church have levelled at them.

In this way the anti-colonialist left, whether Christian or not, often goes so far as to sanctify Islam and the contemporary ideologies of the Muslim world, thereby going from one extreme to the other. An historian like Norman Daniel has gone so far as to number among the conceptions permeated with medievalism or imperialism, any criticisms of the Prophet's moral attitudes, and to accuse of like tendencies any exposition of Islam and its characteristics by means of the normal mechanisms of human history. Understanding has given way to apologetics pure and simple. As for specialist scholars, they are split between indifference on the one hand and the various shades of opinion on the other.

The influence of the new problems posed by the social sciences now extends to Oriental studies. In ever greater numbers specialists, whether concerned with the medieval Muslim world or with

1 Already typical of this view is the book Mahomet, Israël et le Christ (Paris, 1956) by the theologian Ch.-J. LeDit.
later periods, approach the problem from the sociological angle. Economic history and social history, which were so long ignored, have at last been taken up by a fairly large number of scholars. Over the whole field of Islamic studies an effort is being made to go beyond purely philological work and reach, at least in part, syntheses which are no longer based on simple common-sense or philosophical generalities, but on the results achieved by scholars working in a chosen field of social phenomena: historians who study such and such a coherent group of phenomena, demographers, economists, sociologists, etc.

At the same time contacts with indigenous scholars have multiplied. The main obstacle was for a long time the small number of specialists who had freed themselves from the medieval modes of study and thought. Collaborators in these fields were in the past often merely informants, whose contribution had to be totally thought out afresh by the European scholar. The social obstacles to the setting up of really specialized teams came partly from the colonial status of the Muslim East and partly from social and cultural traditions. These difficulties have been overcome in part only. Others have sprung up, arising mainly from the trenchancy of ideological options open to the Muslim world at a time of bitter struggle against the traces and after-effects of European domination. Such times are eminently favourable to ideological extremism which itself makes objective study difficult. European scholars are often put off by this extremism, whose motives they do not always understand, just as they also overlook the ideological components of their own judgements. But the obstacle is serious, even though it may be easily overcome in the case of research bearing on narrow and well-defined points.

Another very marked general trend consists in taking more interest than formerly in what used contemptuously to be called the 'low periods'. A cultural essentialism stressing the paramountcy of religion and 'race' and acknowledging the existence and per-durability of a 'pure' type for each civilization, had led to the dominance of the study of the Muslim Middle Ages. Under the influence of economic and social research, of the new sociological direction, of contacts with economists, demographers, and anthropologists, as great an interest is now taken in the study of more recent periods, a situation encouraged by much more plentiful documentation. It has been pointed out that, for instance, the Ottoman Empire, Safavid Persia and the Great Mogul Empire, represent Islam at the height of its powers. Even the period of close contacts with the West and that of the birth of modern ideologies present problems which, though more or less modern, are not on that account unimportant or contemptible.

As in the other social sciences, the accepted view now is that problems must be defined, debated, and illuminated in every possible way. This entails inter-disciplinary co-ordination and excludes any factitious hierarchy of noble and ignoble disciplines. The trend towards the accumulation, collation, and indexing of material prepared and presented as well as possible, a trend which

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1 The first congress of Islamic studies with a sociological trend was held at Brussels in 1961 (Colloque sur la sociologie musulmane, 17-19 septembre, 1961. Actes, Brussels, n.d.).

2 Cf. Cl. Cahen’s ‘Histoire économique et sociale de l’Orient musulman médiéval’, Studia Islamica, iii (1955), 93-115, in which he lays down a programme for future studies. The first symposium specifically devoted to the medieval, modern, and contemporary economic history of the Muslim world was held in London in 1967. Some of the pioneers, whose viewpoints are largely at variance, have been Jean Sauvaget, Bernard Lewis, and Claude Cahen.

3 Particularly enlightening is Bichi Farès’s article, ‘Des difficultés d’ordre linguistique, culturel et social que rencontre un écrivain arabe moderne, spécialement en Egypte’, Revue des études Islamiques, x (1930), 221-42. The difficulties which literary men face are equally valid for research workers in the social sciences.

4 This was not given its due weight by the Egyptian sociologist A. Abdel-Malek in his criticism of European orientalism where, however, there are many things of value (‘L’Orientalisme en crise’, Dugencs, xli (1964), 103-40). Cf. the rejoinders by Cahen in a letter to Dugencs, xlix (1965), 135-8, and F. Gabrieli, ‘Apologie for Orientalism’, Dugencs, l (1965), 128-36.

5 Confirmation is already to be found in a book by an enlightened non-professional scholar, F. Grenard, Grandeur et décadence de l’Asie (Paris, 1939). The same trend is apparent in B. Lewis’s ‘The Mongols, the Turks and the Muslim Polity’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th series, xviii (1968), 49-68.
was moreover never exclusive, is giving way to a tendency towards rational discussion of the problems. Both have their good and bad points. The ascetic pursuit of perfection which occasionally led to an undue narrowing of outlook has been replaced by panoramic views that may lead to futile platitudinizing. Such a course may endanger in a deplorable way the indispensable task of publishing basic documents that, in overwhelming numbers, are awaiting editing, collating, and indexing. It is true, however, that modern techniques afford the hope that, within limits, such material may be dealt with more speedily.

Taking an extreme view, some have spoken of the end of Orientalism. The question must, however, be examined very delicately. What is at stake is the end of the dominance of philology. There are signs of the abandonment of the view held implicitly for over a century that a philological training is adequate to the solving of all the problems arising within a linguistically defined field. This idea, which cannot be maintained on rational grounds, sprang from the pressing necessity of a philological training for the serious study of the problems raised within that field. The vast increase in available material, together with the tools of research and the progress of methods of study, now enables one, if not to by-pass the philological stage, at least to devote less time to it. Progress in the social sciences has also shown the complexity of problems that could not be solved with the sole help of common sense, a profound knowledge of the language and, possibly, the inspiration of broad philosophical principles. The pursuit of oriental studies, and particularly of Islamic Studies, has therefore become more arduous and less specific. Contact with other disciplines, once a luxury, is now an inescapable need. The progress which lies before us is impressive; the price that will have to be paid for it is not too high.

**Maxime Rodinson**

**II**

**ISLAM IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD**

Born in one of the most primitive and backward regions of the ancient world, Islam soon overstepped its frontiers, developing from a local phenomenon and an internal factor in Arabian life into a universalist religion and a world force, in a process about which historians still dispute. For those who study the obscure dynamism of this process, it is neither Oriental nor Occidental, nor can it be given any other geographic or cultural specification; it is only the mysterious force radiating from the new faith, and of the state founded by it, which developed in every direction and produced a surprisingly united civilization despite the very diverse environments and cultural levels upon which it flourished. But the aim of this book and of this chapter is not to follow and characterize Muslim civilization in its full extent, but to consider its influence and its ‘legacy’ to the Western world, and in this chapter more especially, to the Mediterranean West, the lands around that sea over which at one time the Roman Empire extended and which, when Islam made its appearance, were still in part subject to the ‘second Rome’, Byzantium, and in part liberated from it by the profound disturbances of the barbarian invasions and migrations. Some of these lands were then to become lasting Muslim territory (Dār al-Islām) and are still so today; others were so in the Middle Ages and in modern times for a longer or shorter period and have later ceased to be so, and these first come to mind when one speaks of an inheritance or a legacy left to their subsequent history and culture from the Muslim period. Still others were never to know a permanent settlement of Islam within their confines but experienced, by their contiguity to Islamized
FOREWORD

The production of this new Legacy of Islam has had a not dissimilar course from that of the original 1931 version. The principal editor of the first Legacy of Islam, Sir Thomas Arnold, died before the book appeared, and it was Professor Alfred Guillaume who finally brought it out. In the present case, the late Professor Joseph Schacht began the project as sole editor. But he died on 1 August 1969, leaving a gap amongst senior Islamic scholars, he being factice princeps in regard to Islamic legal studies; his own chapter in this present book, ‘Islamic religious law’, terse but full of insights, shows his mastery of this complex aspect of our studies.

Schacht chose all the contributors, and when he died the typescripts of almost all the contributions had come in, whilst those submitted in foreign languages were being translated into English. It was at this point that the Delegates of the Oxford University Press invited me to take over the editorship, involving completion of the editing of contributions and the supervision of the book through the press. Schacht had not had the opportunity of getting a conspectus of the chapters contributed when they were in their final edited form, and I found that there was some inevitable overlapping and variation in emphasis. It seemed to me that the differing viewpoints of the contributors, each an expert in his or her own particular field, had to be allowed to stand, if only as a testimony to those many problems in our studies which are capable of more than one type of treatment or interpretation. I have nevertheless endeavoured to draw the chapters together by judicious cross-referencing; and use of the index should further help the reader where a particular topic spans more than one chapter. A consequence of the original editor’s death and the ensuing hiatus has been an unavoidable delay in publication, so that some chapters reflect the state of knowledge in their subject as it was some years ago. In many cases bibliographies have been revised at the proof...