Jihadi-Salafis Or Revolutionaries?

On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islamism

Thomas Hegghammer

Abstract and Keywords
This chapter gives an analysis of the different forms of political activism and places Salafism within that spectrum. It argues that Salafist religious doctrines do not explain the political conduct of Salafism's adherents. All the terms researchers have used only add to the confusion. Instead, it argues, one should look at the rationales or strategies of Salafism and other Islamic movements.

Keywords: Salafism, political activism, strategies

Introduction
The question of how to conceptualise and label actors and currents within the Islamist movement has long haunted scholars studying the Middle East. When Islamism became a prominent force in Middle East politics in the 1970s, mainstream political science offered few tools to grasp this hybrid and non- Western phenomenon. A dominant tendency in the scholarship on Islamism since the 1980s has therefore been to adopt Arabic descriptors found in the **(p.245)** discourse of the Islamist actors themselves. Today, terms such

as *"Jihadi"*, *"Takfiri"*, *"Salafi"* and *"Jihadi-Salafi"* are widely used in the academic literature and have started to enter mainstream media. These terms are widely believed to offer a more nuanced and culturally more authentic set of tools with which to analyse the Islamist movement. However, at the same time, the academic literature suffers from a paucity of clear definitions of these terms, as well as inconsistencies in their application to specific groups and ideologues. There is notably considerable confusion about the precise political content of several of these terms. For example, what characterises the political behaviour of Jihadi-Salafi groups? And what does the label Salafi tell us about the political preferences of actors described as such?

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the origin and definitions of Arabic descriptors such as *Jihadi*, Salafi and *Takfiri*, and to assess their relationship with discrete patterns of political behaviour displayed by Islamist groups. The analysis will focus on the most easily observable form of political behaviour, namely violence. While the inquiry may initially resemble terminological nitpicking, it actually has deep implications for two important theoretical debates in the study of Islamism. First is the question of the relative importance of politics and religion in determining the behaviour of Islamist actors; second is the question of whether Islamism is essentially different from other religious and political phenomena.

The chapter starts with a review of the Arabic terms that are most widely used in the academic discourse on radical Islamism. After showing why these theological terms are problematic in the analysis of political behaviour and political violence, I present an alternative approach to classifying Islamist actors based on revealed political preferences.[2] Finally I shall discuss the implications and limitations of the latter approach, as well as the relative utility of the theology-based and preference-based typologies.

Theology-based Terms
Jihadism

Among the most widely used terms in the contemporary academic and media discourse on radical Islamism is that of "Jihadism" and the associated adjective **(p.246)** *"Jihadi"* or "Jihadist", which derives from the Arabic and Islamic term *jihad* (struggle or holy war). "Jihadism" is a relatively new

term that only gained currency in the academic discourse in the late 1990s.[3] Since 9/11, it has made its way into mainstream discourse as a relatively useful term to distinguish violent actors from non-violent, democratic, or progressive Islamists. "Jihadi" has a meaning very close to that of "militant Islamist", although it is practically never used to refer to Shi'i militants such as Hezbollah or Palestinian groups such as Hamas.

The term "Jihadism" is often met with scepticism by Muslims, because it is seen as wrongly associating the noble religious concept of *jihad* with illegitimate violence. While Western academics (and liberal Muslim writers) use the term descriptively, mostly as a synonym for "violent Islamist", conservative Muslims see it as having normative implications that unfairly associate Islam with terrorism. This is one of the reasons why, when Muslim states speak of militant Islamists they consider illegitimate, they do not use the term Jihadist, but rather explicitly delegitimising terms such as "terrorists" [*irhabiyyun*], Kharijites [*khawarij*], "deviants" [*munharifun*], or members of "the misled sect" [*al-fi'a al-dhalla*].

Takfirism

It was a similar desire to delegitimise radical Islamist opposition groups which led Arab states to introduce the term "*takfiri*"—derived from the Arabic for excommunication, *takfir* —in the public discourse in the 1970s.[4] When members of the sect-like group Jama'at al-Muslimin [The Group of Muslims] led by Shukri Mustafa went to trial in Egypt in the mid-1970s, they quickly became known as al-Takfir wa-l-Hijra [Excommunication and Exile], despite the fact that they had never used this name themselves; the name had in fact **(p. 247)** been invented by the state-controlled press to ridicule and delegitimise the defendants.[5]

The delegitimising force of the term *takfiri* stems from the very controversial nature of the religious concept of *takfir*, which signifies the act of declaring a nominal Muslim an infidel. In classical Islamic jurisprudence, *takfir* is an extremely serious measure that can only be pronounced by qualified religious authorities under very specific circumstances. These restrictions are in place to prevent the privatisation and proliferation of the practice of excommunication among

Muslims, which would lead to chaos or *fitna* (sedition). To the broader Muslim public, therefore, *takfiri* is a clearly pejorative term that connotes rebellion and extremism.

In the modern political context, excommunication is essentially a theological or ideological manoeuvre to ostracise other Muslims. In practice, it is evoked in three main types of situations. The first is when an opposition group seeks to topple what they view as a politically illegitimate Muslim regime. By declaring the ruler infidel, they justify the use of violence against him. The second is when official or self-appointed representatives of a conservative majority seek to intimidate holders of minority views on religion, usually individual progressive intellectuals. The third main type of situation is when a small sect views Muslims around them as so morally corrupt that it considers them infidels and seeks to isolate itself from the rest of society. This is a rare an inward-looking use of *takfir* which most often produces withdrawal, not violence.

It is very important to note that the adjective *takfiri* is a label, not a selfappellation. Islamist actors, however radical, virtually never call themselves *takfiri*, but get labelled as such by their enemies.[6] Moreover, these enemies often leave considerable ambiguity on the precise type of *takfir* allegedly being exercised. When Arab state officials employ the term *takfiri* of a group of Islamists, they very rarely distinguish between actors who excommunicate *individual* politicians or intellectuals [*takfir al-'ayn*], and those who excommunicate the *whole society* around them [*takfir al-'umum*]. This distinction is not relevant for states because their purpose is to make the group in question **(p.248)** appear as crazy fanatics, not to explain the content of their ideology. The Arab states' use of the term "*takfiri* " is thus very similar to the way in which Western states use the term "terrorist" to delegitimise their political opponents.

The Arab regime discourse on "*takfiri* " groups has led to the serious misunderstanding in certain circles that "takfirism" represents a distinct ideological doctrine or movement. Some have even suggested that there exists today an organisation or global network of activists operating under the name *al-takfir wa-l-hijra*.[7] Both views are extremely problematic. For a start, there are practically no actors who call themselves Takfiris. The alleged existence of an organisation named al-Takfir wa-l-

Hijra is almost exclusively supported by unspecified intelligence sources. To this author's knowledge, no written statement or manifesto has ever been signed by a group using this name. Moreover, there is no corpus of texts that outline a "*Takfiri* ideology" in any meaningful way. Any such hypothesis would run into the problem of defining the precise political content of this alleged ideology: who exactly do they excommunicate, for what reason and for what purpose? As mentioned above, those who consider other Muslims as infidels do it to different extents (individuals, regimes or societies), for different reasons, (moral or political) and for different purposes (revolution, intimidation, or isolation).

Salafism

Another very frequently used concept in the contemporary discourse on Islamism is that of "Salafism".[8] In the Islamist community, Salafi has the opposite connotation value of Takfiri, in the sense that nobody will admit to being Takfiri, while most will claim to be a Salafi. However, there is considerable debate and disagreement about what constitutes Salafism, primarily because Islamists often use it as a normative term, while observers understand it as a descriptive label. The question of the definition of Salafism is too complex to be treated here, so I shall focus on the question of how it relates to political behaviour.

 (p.249) Most definitions of Salafism in the academic literature emphasise that the term derives from the expression *al-salaf al-salih* (the pious ancestors) and that Salafis believe that the Qur'an and the *hadith* [Prophetic tradition] are the only legitimate sources of religious conduct and reasoning. There is also a general understanding that Salafism represents a more literalist and more puritan approach to Islamic doctrine and practice. When academics speak of "the Salafis" or "the Salafi movement," they allude to a nebula of actors whose practice of Islam is more puritan and more rigorous than other Muslims.

Salafi is often used as a self-descriptor by conservative Sunni Muslims and Islamist groups of different shades and orientations. Many Islamist groups and ideologues will readily declare themselves to be Salafis, and the word "Salafi" is also found in names of Islamist groups, such as the GSPC (al-Jama'a al- Salafiyya li-l-Da'wa wa-l-Qital) in Algeria. The reason why the adjective "Salafi" is so popular among Islamist actors is that it connotes doctrinal purity and therefore affords a degree of religious and political legitimacy to whoever describes himself as such. For this reason, the term "Salafi" is often better understood as a bid for legitimacy than an indication of a specific political programme. In many cases, the self-appellation "Salafi" is simply a synonym for "authentic".

This becomes more evident when we look at the specific political actors who have been labelled Salafi or declared themselves as such. The actors who tend to become subsumed in this category constitute a politically very heterogeneous group. It includes actors who between themselves have

diametrically opposing views on crucial political issues. Alleged Salafis include bitter enemies of the Saudi regime like Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi on the one hand and regime apologists like the official Saudi *'ulama* on the other.[9] It includes overtly political Saudi dissidents like Sa'd al-Faqih as well as staunch advocates of apolitical Islam such as Rabi' ibn Hadi al-Madkhali.[10] It includes **(p.250)** apocalypticists like Juhayman al-'Utaybi and pragmatists like Salman al- 'Awda.[11] The crucial problem with the term Salafism, therefore, is that it is a *theological*, not a political category. Used on its own, it says very little about the political preferences of the actors described as Salafis.

At the same time, it is indeed possible to delineate, in broad terms, a certain Salafi intellectual posture or a set of Salafi intellectual traditions. One might speak of a common Salafi approach to scripture that may be characterised as literalist or anti-rationalist. One might speak of a Salafi preference for specific early theologians, such as Ahmad ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya, or Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab. One might also argue that Salafis tend to place particular emphasis on the observance of details of ritual practice and moral behaviour.

Moreover, in well-defined geographical contexts, the term Salafi may connote more specific sets of political preferences. When talking about Kuwaiti Islamism, for example, it makes sense to speak of the Salafis because, in that specific political context, the term connotes distinct and coherent set of preferences which set the Salafis apart from other actors in the field (particularly the Muslim Brotherhood) and which explain their behaviour. Similarly, the "Salafis" in French suburbia represent an observable sociological phenomenon with behavioural patterns distinct from those of their "Tablighi" or "Ikhwani" neighbours.[12] The same applies to other contexts such as Morocco, Syria, Yemen, or Pakistan.[13] In these cases the category is operational because it is the slick **(p.251)** contextualised and defined in relation to competing actors in the local political field. However, it is very problematic to assume that all actors known as Salafis in their respective contexts can be analysed as parts of a single transnational Salafi movement.

Jihadi-Salafism

What, then, about the Salafis who share a propensity for violent rebellion? "Jihadi-Salafism" is a term that has grown in popularity in recent years, but its precise origins remain unclear.[14] It is often said that the Saudi-educated Jordanian ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi articulated the doctrine of Jihadi- Salafism in the early 1990s and propagated it through his London-based disciple and countryman Abu Qatada al-Filastini.[15] However, although al- Maqdisi has used the term Jihadi-Salafi about himself and his ideas, he did not invent the term as such, for in a 2002 interview, he pointed out that "we did not give ourselves this name, but people have described us in this way."[16] According to another account, conveyed by Saudi intellectuals such as Yusuf al-Dayni, the doctrine of Jihadi-Salafism originated in Jamil al-Rahman's Wahhabi-oriented Jihadist community in Kunar in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s.[17] While this is possible, there is little textual evidence to this effect. Adding to the confusion about the origin of the expression, the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi claimed in 2006 to have invented it in the early 1990s, although no written record confirms this.[18]

What the textual evidence does suggest is that the term first gained popularity in the Islamist community in London in the early 1990s. The first written reference—known to this author —to a "Jihadi-Salafi movement" [*al-haraka al-jihadiyya al-Salafiyya*] appeared in an interview with Ayman al-Zawahiri published in the London-based Jihadist magazine *al-Ansar* in 1994.[19] In the academic literature, the term was first used in 1998 in two **(p.252)** independent studies by Gilles Kepel and Kamil al-Tawil.[20] This confirms the London origin of the term: Al-Tawil was a London-based reporter for *al- Hayat* newspaper, and Kepel explained that he first heard the expression from Abu Hamza al-Masri during an interview in London in February 1998.[21] Newspaper searches show that "Jihadi-Salafism" is occasionally used in Arab media reporting from the British Islamist scene from 1999 onward, but it was only from 2003 onward that its use proliferated and entered Western discourse. Two specific factors seem to have contributed to this increase: one was the so called "*Salafiyya Jihadiyya* " terrorism case in Morocco in 2003, which led the Arab press to use the term much more frequently than before.[22] The other factor was the publication of the English

version of Kepel's book *Jihad*, which made a deep impact on the Western academic discourse on militant Islamism.

An important justification for the use of the term Jihadi-Salafi in academic circles is the fact that it has been employed by the Islamist actors themselves. However, if we examine the Jihadist literature more closely, the term is not nearly as widely used as a self-appellation as is often assumed. For a start, some of the actors most closely associated with the term have distanced themselves from it. One example is al-Maqdisi's disclaimer mentioned above. Similarly, the Moroccan militants tried in 2002 in the so-called *"Salafiyya Jihadiyya "* case actually rejected this label themselves.[23] More interesting is the fact that a search in *Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad* —the largest online database that holds several thousands items of Jihadist literature—produces only thirty-nine hits for the expression "Jihadi-Salafi" and its variants.[24] Admittedly, we do find **(p.253)** this term in certain prominent Jihadist texts and group names, but the vast majority of instances occur in 2003 or later.[25]

Despite the popularity of the term "Jihadi-Salafi" in the academic literature on radical Islamism in recent years, it is surprisingly difficult to find a politically substantial and specific definition of it. Most definitions, whether articulated by radical Islamists or outside observers, tend to be rather vague. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, for example, described Jihadi-Salafism as "a current which unites the call to monotheism in all its aspects with *jihad* for that purpose at the same time."[26] *Wikipedia* in Arabic states that "[Jihadi-Salafism] calls for *jihad* to change what it considers wrong, outside of *shari'a* and a deviation from religion. It considers *jihad* as an inescapable obligation on every Muslim and as the summit of Islam."[27] This definition is practically devoid of political content.

Although no clear definition of Jihadi-Salafism has thus far been articulated, the existing academic literature on militant Islamism suggests that many, though not all, scholars understand Jihadi-Salafism as having three politically substantial characteristics. First, Jihadi-Salafi groups are perceived as *more extremist and intransigent* than other groups.[28] Second, they are said to draw on *Salafi or Wahhabi religious tradition and discourse* as opposed to the more pragmatic *ikhwani* ideology and discourse of Sayyid Qutb and

the Muslim Brotherhood.[29] Finally they are seen as more *internationalist and anti-Western* **(p.254)** than other groups.[30] While many scholars will nod approvingly at these three points, there are several problems with this proto-definition.

First, it is very difficult to operationalise the notion of radicalism or intransigence. At which level of extremism does an actor start or cease to be a Jihadi- Salafi? If the level of violence is the measure, then we have to explain the fact that on several occasions, prominent scholars described as Jihadi-Salafi have criticised certain militant activists for their excessive use of violence.[31] Moreover, intransigence is also found in groups not usually described as Jihadi-Salafi, such as the Egyptian militants of the 1970s and 1980s or Juhayman al-'Utaybi's rebels in 1979. As seen above, it is not at all clear that the "Salafi outlook" imputes actors with a particular propensity for violence.

Second, it is not at all clear how operational the Salafi-*ikhwani* dichotomy is in the world of contemporary militant Islamism. Sayyid Qutb is still being cited by groups seen as Jihadi-Salafi.[32] Activists associated with the Muslim Brotherhood tradition such as Marwan Hadid and 'Abdallah 'Azzam are still being hailed as martyrs and legends by groups described as Jihadi-Salafi.[33] Moreover, one might argue that the difference in the respective discourses of the early Egyptian militants and the Jihadi-Salafis of the 1990s is overstated. Qutb and Faraj cited Ibn Taymiyya throughout their texts. Islamologist Rosalynd Gwynne has shown that the discursive and theological differences between Faraj's *Absent Obligation* and bin Laden's *Declaration of War* are negligible.[34] So-called Qutbist expressions such as *jahiliyya* [age of ignorance] and **(p.255)** *hukm bi-ghayr ma anzala allah* [ruling according to ungodly principles] abound in texts by ideologues associated with Jihadi-Salafism. Admittedly, the concept of *"al-wala' wa-l-bara' "* [loyalty and disavowal], frequently associated with Jihadi-Salafism, does not appear in Faraj's *Absent Obligation* or Qutb's *Signposts*, but it is not found in all alleged Jihadi-Salafi texts either.

An additional problem arises from the fact that several academics do not include the Salafi-*ikhwani* dichotomy in their conception of Jihadi-Salafism. Some consider the Qutbist revolutionaries of 1970s Egypt and Syria as Jihadi- Salafis.[35]

Others consider that "the origins of Salafi Jihadism can be traced to the Muslim Brotherhood."[36] Yet others see Jihadi-Salafism as representing a mixture of Salafism and Qutbism.[37]

The third allegedly distinctive criterion of Jihadi-Salafism, namely its international and anti-Western character, is also problematic, because several of the key groups and thinkers known as Jihadi-Salafi have never actually focused their struggle on the West. Kepel, for example, first used the term Jihadi-Salafi in the context of the Algerian civil war to describe the GIA, which was fighting a revolutionary struggle against the local regime.[38] More significant is the fact that Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who is considered as one of the most important ideologues of Jihadi-Salafism, has in fact been much more concerned with the struggle against the local Arab regimes than the confrontation with the West or with irredentist struggles in Palestine or Chechnya. Al-Maqdisi defines Jihadi-Salafism as "the current which seeks to implement monotheism through *jihad* against the tyrants."[39] In Islamist parlance, the word "tyrants" [*tawaghit*] connotes the local regimes. More significantly, in the 1990s, al-Maqdisi was actively discouraging Islamists from going to Bosnia and Chechnya on the grounds that it weakened the struggle against the near enemy.[40]

 (p.256) Another problem is that some militants engage in international activism without committing either anti-Western or anti-regime violence. For example, the vast majority of foreign fighters who took part in guerrilla struggles in 1980s Afghanistan or 1990s Bosnia and Chechnya never ventured outside of the main theatre of operations and never explicitly targeted Westerners. Moreover, many of these fighters were from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf and had not previously been involved in regime-critical activism at home.[41] As a form of political behaviour, this was very different from the internal battle waged by the GIA or the transnational terrorism of bin Laden.

What emerges, then, is a problem similar to the one posed by "Salafism", namely that the political content of the term is so unclear that its application extends to actors with very different political preferences and behavioural patterns. The term Jihadi-Salafi notably conceals what is arguably the most significant political rift in the world of militant Islamism since the mid-1990s, namely the question of whether to focus the

struggle on the near or the far enemy.[42] It also conceals the distinction between those international fighters who wanted to confront non-Muslim armies in confined battle zones, like the Arabs in Bosnia and Chechnya, and those willing to employ interational terrorist tactics against Western civilians, such as al-Qaeda. These are not simply tactical disputes, but differences in political priorities that have shaped entire organisations and generated stable and consistent patterns of behaviour.

As theological concepts, "Salafism" and "Jihadi-Salafism" thus have limitations when it comes to analysing Islamist militancy. Put simply, the adjective "Salafi" highlights a distinction that is secondary in informing political behaviour such as violence. When we say that a Jihadi has become Salafi(or viceversa), it tells us virtually nothing about whom he considers his main enemy **(p.257)** or where and how he is going to fight. In order to capture these differences, we may need to approach the phenomenon from a different angle.

Preference-based Terms

An alternative approach consists of applying analytical categories based on the revealed political preferences and political behaviour of militant groups. This is not a new idea. Rudimentary preference-based typologies have been in use by academics for some time. Already in the early 1980s, Gilles Kepel distinguished between the gradualist Muslim Brotherhood, the isolationist Jama'at al-Muslimin and the "Bolshevik-style" revolutionaries of Egyptian Islamic Jihad.[43] One of the first systematic attempts at creating a preference-based typology was carried out by R. Hrair Dekmejian, who in a 1985 book distinguished between "gradualist-pragmatic", "revolutionary" and "messianic-puritanical" Islamist groups.[44] More recently, Barry Rubin has distinguished between "revolutionary", "national liberationist" and "reformist" Islamist actors, while Quintan Wiktorowicz has separated three types of Salafis: "purists", "politicos" and *"jihadis."*[45] Another well-known typology of unclear origin separates between three types of militant groups: *irredentists* who fight locally for a particular territory (e.g. Hamas), *revolutionaries* who fight the so-called "near enemy" (e.g. Egyptian Islamic Jihad), and *global jihadists* who fight the "far enemy." (e.g. al-Qaeda).[46] However, all these typologies are problematic, either because they are inconsistent—mixing means (e.g violence/ engagement/separation) and objectives (e.g. national liberation/regime change/increased social conservatism)—or because they are incomplete— omitting prominent forms of Islamist militancy such as sectarian violence. In the following, I shall provide a more elaborate framework for conceptualising the political behaviour of Islamist actors. The ideas presented below do not **(p.258)** represent a fully developed typology, but are intended as an example of the type of analytical categories that may emerge from the preferencebased approach.

My hypothesis is that there are five main rationales for action that underlie most forms of Islamist activism. Under the term "rationale", I subsume observed mid-term political aims and strategy. These rationales—which may be termed "state-oriented", "nation-oriented", *"Umma*-oriented", "moralityoriented" and "sectarian"—represent the most important *reasons for which Islamists act*. "State-oriented" Islamism is characterised by a desire to change the social and political organisation of the state. "Nation-oriented" Islamism

is defined by a desire to establish sovereignty on a specific territory perceived as occupied or dominated by non-Muslims. "*Umma*-oriented" Islamism is distinguished by a desire to protect the Islamic nation as a whole from external (non-Muslim) threats. "Morality-oriented" Islamism is characterised by a desire to change Muslims' social conduct in a more conservative and literalist direction. "Sectarian" Islamism is defined by a desire to reduce the influence and power of the competing sect (Shi'i or Sunni).

Each rationale has a non-violent and a violent manifestation. The non-violent manifestation of state-oriented Islamism is reformism; its violent form is socio-revolutionary activism. Nation-oriented Islamism produces non-violent as well as violent irredentists. *Umma*-oriented Islamism may produce a "soft" form of pan-Islamism or extreme pan-Islamism, the latter of which comes in two main forms: classical Jihadism and global Jihadism. Moralityoriented Islamism mostly manifests itself in pietism, but its violent form is vigilantism (or *hisba*). Sectarian Islamism also comes in moderate and extreme manifestations.

For violent Islamist groups, these rationales represent the five most important reasons for using violence or objectives for the struggle. Socio-revolutionaries fight for state power against a Muslim regime perceived as illegitimate. Nationalist-separatists fight for a specific territory against a local non-Muslim occupier. Extreme pan-Islamists fight to defend the entire Islamic nation and its territories from external aggression (classical Jihadists will fight conventionally on one local front at a time, while global Jihadists fight the West with all means in all places). Vigilantists use violence to correct the moral behaviour of fellow Muslims, while violent sectarians kill to intimidate and marginalise the competing sect.

It is important to underline that these are rationales for action in the shortand mid-term, not long-term political aims. This distinction is important, **(p.259)** because the issue of determining the end goals of an actor is both difficult and of limited analytical significance. This is because most militant Islamist groups tend to have very vague, similar and utopian end goals that can be used to rationalise a vast range of political and military strategies. Just like the declared aim of "a better world" tells us little of the political preferences of Western political parties, Islamist slogans such as

"establishing the Caliphate" are too vague to tell us anything about the expected political behaviour of a group in the short and mid term.

The typology can thus be illustrated by Table 1 , which distinguishes between rationales on the vertical axis and manifestations on the horizontal axis.

Table 1 : A Preference-Based Typology of Islamist Activism

Rationale	Non-violent form		Violent Form	
	Manifestation	Examples	Manifestation	Examples
State oriented	Reformism	MB, Saudi Sahwa	Socio-revolutionary activism	GIA, GSPC, EIJ
Nation oriented	Nationalism		Violent irredentism	Hamas, LeT, Chechen mujahidin; Islamic Army (Iraq)
Umma oriented	Pan-Islamism	MWL	Classical jihadism Global jihadism	Arabs in Chechnya al-Qaeda, QAP
Morality oriented	Pietism	Tabligh, Madkhalis	Vigilantism	Unorganised hisba
Sectarian	Sectarianism		Violent sectarianism	Lashkar e Janghvi, Iraqi militias

Abbreviations: MB=Muslim Brotherhood; GIA=Groupe Islamique Armée; GSPC= Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat; EIJ=Egyptian Islamic Jihad; LeT= Lashkar-e-Tayyiba; MWL=Muslim World League; QAP=al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula

These are of course overly schematic ideal-type categories. Most violent Islamist actors work to promote several or all of these agendas at the same time. However, I argue that at any given time, all actors have one rationale which is stronger than the four others. The dominant rationale shapes the strategy and priorities of the actor and usually determines the direction and form of its violence. For example, practically all militant Islamist groups are **(p.260)** explicitly hostile to the United States, supportive of the Palestinian cause and critical of secular Arab governments, but they disagree on *immediate priorities*, i.e. what represents the *most urgent* threat and what needs to be done *first*.

It is also important to underline that the distinctions between these ideal types are gradual, and that the constellation of rationales underlying an actor's behaviour is dynamic. The ideology of a militant Islamist group or individual may change over time to become more or less socio-revolutionary or more or less pan-Islamist. Sometimes, though not very often, a group may change its dominant rationale and move, for example, from primarily socio-revolutionary to primarily global Jihadist activist, as was the case with Egyptian Islamic Jihad in the 1990s. In other words, actors are fluid, but the categories themselves are discrete.

Two main variables allow us to determine the relative importance of the different rationales in the ideology of an actor, namely *behaviour* and *discourse*. To each rationale there is an accompanying ideal pattern of behaviour that is logically connected to the political substance of the rationale. Socio-revolutionaries attack mostly government targets. Nationalist-separatists attack primarily the local occupier. Classical Jihadists also attack mainly the local occupier in the area they have chosen to fight, while global Jihadists usually attack Western (primarily US) targets in any location. Vigilantists tend to direct their violence against morally transgressing Muslims and symbols of moral corruption in society. Violent sectarians mainly attack members of the opposite sect. "Reading" an actor's behaviour is sometimes complicated by the fact that a particular target may have a double symbolic significance (for example, for militant Sunnis in Iraq, Shi'is symbolise both the government and the Shi'a community), and by the fact that an attack on a particular target may be an instrumental way of reaching another objective (cf. the attacks by al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya on Western tourists in 1990s Egypt

as a form of economic warfare against the government). We therefore also need to look at what the actor is saying about his own struggle.

Sometimes, radical Islamists articulate their immediate political priorities in concise and specific language, which makes it easy to identify the dominant rationale. More often, the discourse will be vague or ambiguous, citing general slogans (such as "establishing God's rule") or denouncing more than one enemy. However, I argue that each rationale has an accompanying ideal-type discursive theme or "frame" which allow us to identify the dominant rationale even when it is not explicitly stated. The socio-revolutionary discursive theme is the mismanagement of the Muslim ruler. The examples used to justify the **(p.261)** call for action are mainly tales of oppression, torture and corruption, as well as the secularism and hypocrisy displayed by the local regime. The irredentist discourse, on the other hand, focuses on territorial occupation. The call for action is supported by evidence of the Muslim right to the land and illustrations of the brutality and bloodthirstiness of the occupier. The extreme pan- Islamist discourse focuses on the external threat to the life and territories of all Muslims. Pan-Islamists usually support their call for action with long lists of examples of non-Muslim infringements on Muslim territory and symbols of Muslim suffering at non-Muslim hands. Texts by morality-oriented Islamists emphasise the moral corruption and deviance of contemporary Muslim society, while sectarian discourse is characterised by self-victimisation as well as demonisation of the other sect.

There are at least three analytical advantages to preference-based typologies like the one presented here. First of all, while certainly not perfect or complete, it provides for descriptors which match the principal patterns of behaviour displayed by militant Islamist groups more closely than do theology-based terms. This improves our ability to explain and predict the actions and strategies of Jihadist groups. For example, a group with a clear global Jihadist discourse and past record of behaviour is much more likely to direct its future violence against a Western target than a government target. Similarly, an irredentist group is unlikely to resort to international operations, and groups engaged in moral policing will rarely resort to sectarian violence. There are admittedly cases of groups changing their pattern of behaviour—such as the socio-

revolutionary Egyptian Islamic Jihad joining al-Qaeda's global Jihadist project or the global Jihadist Zarqawi network in Iraq going sectarian—but this is arguably the exception rather than the rule. Moreover, these terms make it easier to identify and analyse precisely such behavioural changes.

A second advantage with preference-based categories is that they provide a basis for nuanced thinking about the causes of Islamist militancy. It notably allows us to consider the hypothesis that different ideal types of activism have different root causes. For example, it is reasonable to assume that socio-revolutionary Islamism thrives on socio-economic problems and violent state oppression, while irredentist Islamism tends to emerge in areas of territorial conflict between a Muslim and a non-Muslim population. Conversely, it would allow for more nuanced analysis of the effect of certain structural factors such as poverty on Islamist militancy. Rather than look for the effect of poverty on terrorism or Islamism in general, we may examine its effects on different types of Islamism. It may well be that socio-economic factors are **(p. 262)** more strongly correlated with socio-revolutionary and vigilantist Islamism than with irredentist or pan-Islamist militancy. Similarly, a given political development might affect different types of groups in different ways. For example, a torture scandal in the Egyptian prison system is likely to mobilise more socio-revolutionaries than pan-Islamists. Likewise, a symbol of Muslim suffering like Guantanamo Bay will be more readily seized upon by global Jihadists than by sectarian groups for propaganda purposes.

A third advantage with categories rooted in political behaviour as opposed to theology is that they facilitate the study of Islamist militancy in a comparative perspective. By highlighting the political core of the activism of Islamist groups, it becomes much easier to spot similarities with other, non-Islamist, forms of political violence. This is not to say that Islamism can or should be reduced to its political core, only that there may be some similarities between certain aspects of Islamist activism and other political phenomena that are worth exploring. For example, it is possible that the analytical distinction between socio-revolutionary and ethno-nationalist ideologies, fruitfully applied to the analysis of secular militancy in 1970s Europe, may have relevance for the study of militant Islamism.[47] Irredentist Islamist groups such as Hamas seem to be larger, more pragmatic and have a socio-

economically more heterogeneous recruitment base than do socio-revolutionary Islamists such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, thus echoing key differences between ethnic-separatists (such as ETA and IRA) and leftist Extremists (such as Rote Armee Fraktion and Brigate Rosse) in Europe. There could in other words be certain generic structural differences in form, behaviour and recruitment patterns of militant groups that recur across religious and cultural boundaries.

The rationale-based approach no doubt has important limitations, and it is likely to inspire three main lines of criticism. Some will argue that there is a danger of projecting Western analytical categories onto the complex and idiosyncratic phenomenon of Islamism. The underlying assumption of this argument is that Islamism is best understood through the terms and categories used by the Islamists themselves. This point is valid to some extent, because some Western commentators have indeed tended to ignore the study of Islamist discourse and make prejudiced assumptions about the motivations of Islamist actors. However, taken to its logical conclusion, this argument leads to essentialism and exempts militant Islamism from social scientific scrutiny. **(p.263)** The assumption that political actors can only be analysed using concepts employed by the actors themselves is a flawed one. Analytical categories in the social sciences are not made to please the actors, but to accurately represent observable and discrete phenomena so that one can construct theories with universal and predictive value. If the concepts and categories are clearly defined, rooted in observable behaviour and constructed with an acute awareness of relevant cultural specificities, then their Western origin is irrelevant.

Another line of criticism would consist of arguing that the typology falls into the trap of excessive categorisation of an inherently fluid and dynamic phenomenon. While it is true that excessive labelling is a problem in contemporary scholarship, no researcher can do without categories—they are a prerequisite for scientific analysis. Of course, all ideal type categories face the problem of accounting for gradualism and ambiguity, but the ideological fluidity and mobility of individual activists does not eliminate the need for discrete categories. We have already noted that most Islamists work to promote several or even all of the five main types of objectives at the same time, and that the relative importance of a given

rationale for a group's behaviour may vary over time. The aforementioned categories should thus not be seen as isolated boxes but rather as overlapping spectrums.

The third and most pertinent line of criticism would argue that an exclusively political approach does not sufficiently take into account the theological dimension of militant Islamist ideology or the social dynamics of violent behaviour. For a start, this typology leaves little room for dynamics of a religious or theological nature, such as the *ikhwani-* Salafi dichotomy. For example, this framework would describe both the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Saudi *Sahwa* as reformist movements, thus glossing over the many important ideological —and behavioural—differences between them, notably on issues related to social conservatism. Moreover, this rationalist perspective may impute Jihadists with a higher degree of political awareness than is sometimes the case. In certain situations, the behaviour of militant groups is determined less by political considerations than by a concern for survival, vengeance motives or other idiosyncratic reasons. Similarly, individual militants may be driven more by social factors (such as the desire for companionship) than by an ideological programme, and may thus drift from one type of activism to another as their social relationships evolve.

It is important to point out, however, that the preference-based approach to conceptualising actors must not be equated with a structural-functionalist view on the causes of Islamist violence. Saying that Islamist actors have discrete **(p.264)** political preferences is not the same as saying that the causes of Islamist violence are exclusively political or socioeconomic. Clearly, ideology matters. However, ideology—even religious ideology—is not the same as theology. Islamist ideology has both theological and political dimensions and may be analysed from both perspectives. The preference-based approach simply highlights the politics, it does not necessarily ignore religion.

Concluding Remarks

The relationship between politics and religion in the study of Islamism is undoubtedly a complex one, and no one perspective is in itself sufficient to understand this hybrid phenomenon. The choice of terminology in scientific studies must ultimately depend on the purpose of the analysis. Theology-based terms such as Salafi and Jihadi-Salafi, when clearly defined, are useful for the analysis of texts and discourse, because they refer to positive theological traditions and apparatuses and may help identify the intellectual origin of particular texts, actors or ideological currents. The term Salafism may also be fruitfully applied to the study of political actors in particular national or regional contexts, when these actors' political agendas are clearly defined and contextualised.

However, when it comes to comparative analyses of political behaviour, especially violence, theological categories are less adequate as they are not associated with discrete sets of political preferences. The term Salafi, as we have seen, says very little about the expected political behaviour of actors labelled as such. We must therefore be particularly careful not to conflate theological orientations and social movements. A social movement, by definition, presupposes a set of political preferences.[48] Theological categories, however, are usually vague and ambiguous in their political content. The notion of a global Salafi(or *takfiri* or Jihadi-Salafi) movement, while appealing as a collective noun, is in fact very problematic, because the actors subsumed in this category do not share political preferences. Salafis around the world work for different political agendas and thus pull in different directions. This is one of the main reasons why the Salafi movement has proved, and will remain, frustratingly difficult to analyse. **(p. 265)**

This analysis has shown that the study of a hybrid and non-Western phe nomenon such as Islamism does not necessarily require a unique vocabulary. On the contrary, culturally specific terminology, when used carelessly and excessively, may even be detrimental to scientific analysis. It may generate Durkheimian *prénotions* —terms that are taken for granted and encapsulate phenomena that are really distinct—and it may isolate an academic field from the impulses of the broader

social sciences. Therefore, striking a balance between the search for the universal and sensitivity to the specific is as indis pensible as it is difficult.

Bibliography

Bibliography references:

Dekmejian, R. Hrair, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985.

Fandy, Mamoun, *Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001.

Gerges, Fawaz, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2005.

Gwynne, Rosalynd, 'Usama Bin Ladin, the Qur'an and Jihad', *Religion* vol. 36, no. 2 (2006), pp. 61–90.

Hegghammer, Thomas, and Lacroix, Stéphane, 'Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-Utaybi Revisited', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* vol. 39, no.1 (2007), pp. 103–22.

Hegghammer, Thomas, *Violent Islamism in Saudi Arabia, 1979–2006: The Power and Perils of Pan-Islamic Nationalism*.Paris: Sciences-Po (PhD thesis), 2007.

International Crisis Group, *La France face à ses musulmans: Emeutes, djihadisme et dépoliticisation* (Europe Report no. 172), Brussels, 2006.

International Crisis Group, *Islamism in North Africa I: The Legacies of History*, Brussels:, 2004.

Kenney, Jeffrey T., *Muslim Rebels: Kharijites and the Politics of Extremism in Egypt*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Kepel, Gilles 'Les GIA à travers ses publications', *Pouvoirs*, vol. 86 (1998), pp. 67–84.

———, *Jihad: Expansion et déclin de l'islamisme*, Paris: Gallimard, 2000.

———, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.

———, *The Roots of Radical Islam*, 2nd English ed., London: Saqi Books, 2005.

Krekar, Mulla, *Med Egne Ord* [In My Own Words], Oslo: Aschehoug, 2004.

Lacroix, Stéphane, and Hegghammer, Thomas, *Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who Are the Islamists?* (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2004).

Livesey, Bruce, 'The Salafist Movement', *Frontline* (www.pbs.org), 25 January 2005.

Makarenko, Tamara, 'Takfiri Presence Grows in Europe', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, vol. 17, no. 2 (2005).

McCarthy, John D., and Zald, Mayer N., 'Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory', *American Journal of Sociology* vol. 82, no. 6 (1977), pp. 1212–1242.

 (p.266) Mili, Hayder, 'Jihad, without Rules: The Evolution of Al-Takfir Wa Al-Hijra', *Terrorism Monitor*, vol. 4, no. 13 (2006).

al-Munafisi, Usama, '*al-Salafiyya al-jihadiyya: bidayat wa malat*, (Part 5 of 10)',*al-Inba'*, 2005.

Naji, Abu Bakr, *al-khawana*(www.tawhed.ws).

———, *idarat al-tawahhush*, (www.tawhed.ws).

Pargeter, Alison, 'The Islamist Movement in Morocco'*Jamestown Terrorism Monitor* vol. 3, no. 10 (2005).

Rubin, Barnett, 'Arab Islamists in Afghanistan', in John Esposito (ed.), *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform*?, Boulder: Lynne Riener, 1997, pp. 179–206.

Rubin, Barry, 'Islamic Radicalism in the Middle East: A Survey and Balance Sheet', *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, vol. 2, no. 1 (1998), pp. 17–24.

al-Salim, Muhammad, '*39 wasila li-khidmat al-jihad wa-l-musharaka fihi* ', *Sawt al-Jihad Publications* (2003).

al-Tawil, Kamil, *al-Haraka al-islamiyya al-musallaha fi-l-Jaza'ir*, Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1998.

Waldmann, Peter, 'Ethnic and Sociorevolutionary Terrorism: A Comparison of Structures', in *Social Movements and Violence: Participation in Underground Organisations*, edited by Donatella Della Porta, Greenwich: JAI, 1992, pp. 237–57.

Weissmann, Itzchak, 'The Politics of Popular Religion: Sufis, Salafis and Muslim Brothers in 20th Century Hamah', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 37, no. 1 (2005), pp. 39–58.

Wiktorowicz, Quintan, 'Anatomy of the Salafi Movement', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* vol. 29, no. 3 (April-May 2006), pp. 207–39.

Wright, Lawrence, 'The Master Plan', *New Yorker*, 11 September 2006, pp. 48–59.

al-Zawahiri, Ayman, '*Mawqifna min Iran—al-radd 'ala tuhmat al-ta'awun bayna al-haraka al-jihadiyya al-Salafiyya wa Iran al-rafidiyya* ', *al-Ansar*, no. 91 (1994).

Notes:

(¹) Thomas Hegghammer (hegghammer@gmail.com) is a Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School and a Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). The author thanks Stéphane Lacroix, Steffen Hertog, Brynjar Lia and Will McCants for useful comments on early drafts of the chapter.

(²) In this article I use the term "theological" broadly as a synonym for "normatively religious". I do not make the traditional Islamological distinction between theology (the study of God) and jurisprudence (the interpretation of God's Laws).

(³) A search in the *New York Time* s electronic archive, which goes back to 1851, reveals that these words were first used in 1999 and 2000 respectively. The *Washington Post* first used the term in 2002.

(⁴) Although the word *takfir* had already been used by islamologists for some time, it was first used by mainstream media in 1977 in connection with the Shukri Mustafa case. Neither the *New York Times* nor the *Washington Post* used the word "takfir" between 1981 and 2000. The adjective "takfiri" was introduced in the media discourse later: the *New York*

Times first used it in October 2001. For more on Arab state uses of religious terms to delegitimise opponents, see Jeffrey T. Kenney, *Muslim Rebels: Kharijites and the Politics of Extremism in Egypt*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

([5]) Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003, p. 70.

([6]) A rare possible exception was the case of a Sudanese group which reportedly called itself "al-Takfir wa-l Hijra" and carried out several attacks on a moderate Islamist group called Ansar al-Sunna between 1994 and 2000; see 'Attack on a Mosque in Sudan by Fundamentalist Kills 20', *New York Times*, 10 December 2000.

([7]) See for example Chris Hedges, 'A Powerful Combattant in France's War on Terror', *New York Times*, 24 November 2001; Tamara Makarenko, 'Takfiri Presence Grows in Europe', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, vol. 17, no. 2 (2005), and Hayder Mili, 'Jihad without Rules: The Evolution of Al-Takfir Wa Al-Hijra', *Terrorism Monitor*, vol. 4, no. 13 (2006).

([8]) "Salafism" has been used in Western scholarship on Islam since the early twentieth century. In the media discourse, on the other hand, it's a new term. The *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* did not use the term "Salafi" or "Salafist" until 2000.

([9]) Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi became an enemy of the Saudi regime after calling for the violent overthrow of the Al Saud in a 1989 book entitled *al-Kawashif al-jaliyya fikufr al-dawla al-Sa'udiyya* [The Obvious Proofs of the Infidel Nature of the Saudi State].

(^{10}) Sa'd al-Faqih is a Saudi opposition activist who fled to London in the early 1990s at the height of the political confrontation between the Saudi regime and the reformist *Sahwa* movement, see Mamoun Fandy, *Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001. Rabi' ibn Hadi al-Madkhali (see Stephane Lacroix's chapter on Nasr al-Din al-Albani earlier in this book) is a Saudi religious scholar associated with a stricly apolitical and pietist Salafism. In the early 1990s, the Saudi government promoted Madkhalism as an ideological counterweight to the popular *Sahwa* movement. Many of English-language internet sites promoting Salafism—notably www.Salafi publications.comand its affiliates (www.rabee.co.uk, www.albani.co.uk, etc)—are in fact part of this Saudi government-sponsored effort to depoliticise Islamism.

(^{11}) Juhayman al-'Utaybi led an apocalyptic sect which seized the Great Mosque in Mecca during the pilgrimage in Mecca in November 1979. See Thomas Hegghammer and Stéphane Lacroix, 'Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al- Utaybi Revisited', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* vol. 39, no.1 (2007), pp. 103–22. Salman al-'Awda is a Saudi religious scholar who spearheaded the *Sahwa* movement in the early 1990s. Since his release from prison in 1999, al-'Awda has taken a less confrontational stance against the government, promoted dialogue with the West and recognised non-Wahhabi Islamic traditions in the Kingdom; see Stéphane Lacroix and Thomas Hegghammer, *Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who Are the Islamists?* (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2004).

(^{12}) *La France face à ses musulmans: Emeutes, djihadisme et dépoliticisation*, (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2006), pp. 13–16.

(^{13}) See for example Itzchak Weissmann, 'The Politics of Popular Religion: Sufis, Salafis and Muslim Brothers in 20th Century Hamah', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 37, no. 1 (2005), 39–58.

(^{14}) This term was first used by the *New York Times* in 2005. It has been used by *al-Sharq al-Awsat* since at least 1999.

(^{15}) For more on Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, see chapter 3 earlier in this book.

(^{16}) *'hiwar ma' al-shaykh abi muhammad al-maqdisi sanat 1423* [Conversation with Sheikh Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi in 2002]', (www.tawhed.ws).

(^{17}) Interview with Yusuf al-Dayni, Jeddah, January 2007. For more on the Wahhabi community in Kunar, see Barnett Rubin, 'Arab Islamists in Afghanistan', in John Esposito (ed.), *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform*?, Boulder: Lynne Riener, 1997, pp. 196–7.

(^{18}) See Lawrence Wright, 'The Master Plan', *New Yorker*, 11 September 2006, p. 50.

(^{19}) Ayman al-Zawahiri, *'mawqifna min Iran—al-radd 'ala tuhmat al-ta'awun bayna al-haraka al-jihadiyya al-Salafiyya wa Iran al-rafidiyya* [Our Position on Iran—Response to the Allegations of Cooperation between the Jihadi-Salafi Movement and Rafidi Iran]', *al- Ansar*, no. 91 (1994).

(^{20}) Kamil al-Tawil, *al-Haraka al-islamiyya al-musallaha fi-l-Jaza'ir* [The Armed Islamic Movement in Algeria],Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1998, p. 60 and Gilles Kepel, 'Le GIA à travers ses publications', *Pouvoirs* vol. 86 (1998), pp. 70–1.

(^{21}) Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: Expansion et déclin de l'islamisme*, Paris: Gallimard, 2000, p. 395.

(^{22}) A search in the electronic archives of *al-Sharq al-Awsat* (which go back to early 2001) shows that before mid-2002, "Salafi jihadi" (and its variants) was only used in a handful of articles, mostly about Abu Hamza and Abu Qatada. In contrast, between July 2002 and May 2003, there were nearly a hundred articles containing this term, the vast majority of which were about the Moroccan investigation.

(^{23}) Alison Pargeter, 'The Islamist Movement in Morocco', *Jamestown Terrorism Monitor*, vol. 3, no. 10 (2005).

(^{24}) The following are the results from a search conducted on www.tawhed.wson 21 January 2008: *al-Jihadi al-salafi*: 0 hits; *al-Salafi al-jihadi*: 14 hits; *al-Salafiyya al-jihadiyya*: 22 hits 10 of which occur in texts by a certain Abu al-Fadhl al-Iraqi); *al-Salafiyun al-jihadiyun*: 1 hit; *al-Salafiyyin al-jihadiyyin*: 2 hits.

(25) The term has notably been used by the ideologue Abu Bakr Naji, see Abu Bakr Naji, *alkhawana* [The Traitors] (www.tawhed.ws),pp. 5–6 and Abu Bakr Naji, *idarat al-tawahhush* [The Management of Savagery], (www.tawhed.ws), p. 3. It has also been used in group names, such as the GSPC and the short-lived Iraqi group al-Jama'a al-Salafiyya al-Mujahida in 2003. In recent years, the term Jihadi-Salafi has also been used in postings on Jihadi discussion forums.

(26) *'hiwar ma' al-shaykh abi muhammad al-maqdisi sanat 1423 '*.

(27) *al-Salafiyya al-jihadiyya ", Wikipedia* in Arabic (http://ar.wikipedia.org; accessed 5 January 2007.)

(28) See for example Kepel, *Jihad*, p. 255, andBrynjar Lia, 'The Rise of Salafi-Jihadi Groups in Iraq: Some Preliminary Observations', Lecture Manuscript, University of Oslo, 20 November, 2003, p.2.

(29) See for example Gilles Kepel, *The Roots of Radical Islam*, 2nd English ed., London: Saqi Books, 2005, p. 15; Kepel, *Jihad*, p. 404; Sa'ud al-Sarhan, *'al-Tayyar al-Salafi al-jihadi* [the Salafi Jihadi Current]', (manuscript, 2003); Sa'ud al-Sarhan, *'al-wala' wa-l-bara': al-idiulujiyya al-jadida li-l-harakat al-islamiyya* [Al-Wala Wa-l-Bara: The New Ideology of the Islamist Movements]', manuscript, 2003.

(30) See for example 'Salafi', Wikipedia in English, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salafi (accessed 6 January 2006) or *Islamism in North Africa I: The Legacies of History*, (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2004), p. 3.

(31) Such was the case of Abu Qutada and Abu Hamza in London who broke relations with the GIA in the mid-1990s over the issue of excessive violence. Similarly, in 2005, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi criticised Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi in Iraq for his excessive use of suicide bombings. Sheikh Abu Basir al-Tartusi also criticised the perpetrators of the 2005 London bombings.

(32) See for example Muhammad al-Salim, *39 wasila li-khidmat al-jihad wa-l-musharaka fihi* [39 Ways to Serve Jihad and Take Part in It], *Sawt al-Jihad* Publications (2003).

(³³) see'*Imam al-jihad al-mu'asir: Abdallah Azzam* [the Imam of Contemporary Jihad: Abdallah Azzam]', *Sawt al-Jihad*, no. 13 (2004) and '*Marwan Hadid: al-alam al-shahid* [Marwan Hadid: The Martyred Luminary]', *Sawt al-Jihad*, no. 11 (2004).

(³⁴) Gwynne shows that both rely extensively on Ibn Taymiyya's rulings. They quote many of the same texts, to the extent that Gwynne suggests that bin Laden may have borrowed from Faraj. She does not identify a specific "Salafi" orientation in bin Laden's text or an "*ikhwani*" orientation in that of al-Faraj. See Rosalynd Gwynne, 'Usama Bin Ladin, the Qur'an and Jihad', *Religion* vol. 36, no. 2 (2006), pp. 61–90.

(³⁵) Usama al-Munafisi, '*al-Salafiyya al-jihadiyya: bidayat wa malat* [Salafi Jihadism: The Beginnings] (Part 5 of 10)', (*al-Inba'*, 2005).

(³⁶) Bruce Livesey, 'The Salafist Movement', *Frontline* (www.pbs.org), 25 January 2005.

(³⁷) 'Leading Progressive Qatari Cleric: By Permitting Suicide Operations, Al-Qaradhawi and His Ilk Have Caused a Moral Crisis in Islam', *MEMRI Special Dispatch*, no. 968 (2005).

(³⁸) Kepel, *Jihad*, p. 255.

(³⁹) '*hiwar ma' al-shaykh abi muhammad al-maqdisi sanat 1423* '.

(⁴⁰) "Q: The Fronts that have been opened in Chechnya, Afghanistan and elsewhere have enticed many youth from this current and tens of them have gone there. How do you view this move? It is said that you opposed it.

A: The fronts that have opened in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia and elsewhere have clearly benefited the call and the struggle [*al-da'wa wa'l-jihad*]. I may not have been in favour of vacating the fronts near us and letting our youth emigrate, but there have been benefits in terms of experience and expertise in the military field [...] and it has influenced the local populations, and this is certainly a blessing for the struggle. However, I did ask the influential proselytisers and the religious students in particular to stay in their countries." From "*hiwar ma' al-shaykh abi muhammad al-maqdisi sanat 1423.*"

(⁴¹) Thomas Hegghammer, *Violent Islamism in Saudi Arabia, 1979–2006: The Power and Perils of Pan-Islamic Nationalism*. Paris: Sciences-Po (PhD thesis), 2007.

(⁴²) Fawaz Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*:Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

(⁴³) Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt*.

(⁴⁴) R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985, p. 59.

(⁴⁵) Barry Rubin, 'Islamic Radicalism in the Middle East: A Survey and Balance Sheet', *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, vol. 2, no. 1 (1998), 17–24; Quintan Wiktorowicz, 'Anatomy of the Salafi Movement', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* vol. 29, no. 3 (April-May 2006), pp. 207–39.

(⁴⁶) The origin of this tripartite typology is not clear, but it has been articulated by authors as different as the scholar Fawaz Gerges and the Islamist ideologue Mulla Krekar. See Fawaz Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*, pp. 1–2; Mulla Krekar, *Med Egne Ord [In My Own Words]*, Oslo: Aschehoug, 2004, p. 239.

(⁴⁷) See for example Peter Waldmann, 'Ethnic and Sociorevolutionary Terrorism: A Comparison of Structures', in *Social Movements and Violence: Participation in Underground Organisations*, edited by Donatella Della Porta, Greenwich: JAI, 1992, pp. 237–57.

(⁴⁸) See for example John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, 'Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory', *American Journal of Sociology* vol. 82, no. 6 (1977), p. 1218.

Access brought to you by: