

Finding Mecca in America

*How Islam Is Becoming an
American Religion*

MUCAHIT BILICI

The University of Chicago Press Chicago and London

Mucahit Bilici is assistant professor of sociology at John Jay College,
City University of New York.

The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637
The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London
© 2012 by The University of Chicago
All rights reserved. Published 2012.
Printed in the United States of America

21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 1 2 3 4 5

ISBN-13: 978-0-226-04956-4 (cloth)
ISBN-13: 978-0-226-04957-1 (paper)
ISBN-13: 978-0-226-92287-4 (e-book)
ISBN-10: 0-226-04956-6 (cloth)
ISBN-10: 0-226-04957-4 (paper)
ISBN-10: 0-226-92287-1 (e-book)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Bilici, Mucahit, 1973- author.

Finding Mecca in America : How Islam is becoming an American
religion / Mucahit Bilici.

pages cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN-13: 978-0-226-04956-4 (cloth : alkaline paper)

ISBN-10: 0-226-04956-6 (cloth : alkaline paper)

ISBN-13: 978-0-226-04957-1 (paperback : alkaline paper)

ISBN-10: 0-226-04957-4 (paperback : alkaline paper) 1. Muslims—

United States—Social conditions—21st century. 2. Islam—United
States. I. Title.

E184.M88B55 2012

305.6'97073—dc23

2012004825

Ⓢ This paper meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992
(Permanence of Paper).

tuba lil ghuraba

Contents

List of Illustrations ix

Acknowledgments xi

Introduction: Muslim Life and American Forms 1

PART ONE Cultural Settlement

- 1 *Finding Mecca in America: Muslim Directionality and the Codification of American Space* 37
- 2 *The English Language and Islam: Genealogy of an Encounter* 64
- 3 *Homeland Insecurity: How Immigrant Muslims Naturalize America in Islam* 90

PART TWO Citizenship Practices

- 4 *Awakening Citizenship: Rights Meet Bearers* 123
- 5 *Seeking Kinship through Abraham: Muslim Interfaith Activism* 145
- 6 *Funny Jihad: Muslim Comedy Takes Flight* 171

Conclusion: On Appropriation and Inhabitation 198

Notes 219 Bibliography 237 Index 253

Homeland Insecurity: How Immigrant Muslims Naturalize America in Islam

There has always been some kind of *nomos* of the earth. In all ages of mankind, the earth has been appropriated, divided, and cultivated. But before the age of the great discoveries, before the 16th century of our system of dating, men had no global concept of the planet on which they lived. . . . Every powerful people considered themselves to be the center of the earth and their dominion to be the domicile of freedom, beyond which war, barbarism, and chaos ruled. SCHMITT 2003, 351

Muslims who become immigrants in the United States face a challenge unusual in the Muslim world: living as a minority in a non-Muslim society. This experience, which we in contemporary multicultural society take for granted, is a new situation for the majority of Muslim immigrants. It is not that Muslims never had minorities among themselves. On the contrary, there have always been non-Muslim minorities living in lands dominated by Muslims. But the reverse has not always been true, especially in the case of Muslims residing in Western societies. Muslim reluctance to settle permanently, and a lack of tolerance toward Islam in the Western world, have both contributed to this historical outcome. Muslim presence in and exposure to non-Muslim environments were historically "temporary" and justified within the legal framework of "necessity" (i.e., due to exception and emergency). The rise of Muslim minorities in contemporary European and American societies is in many

ways a new situation for both the Muslims and the West and therefore poses a challenge to Islamic law and Muslim imagination as well as to the West. The emergence of "permanent" Muslim minorities has significant religious implications. Is it religiously permissible to live in a non-Muslim society? What should be the nature of one's relationship to such a social environment? These are questions that Muslims who are interested in religiously justifying their new environment frequently ask themselves. The answers they find, to employ the much-debated Muslim juridical terms, range from America as an abode of war/disbelief (*dar al harb*) to America as an abode of Islam/peace (*dar al Islam*). The evolution of the Muslim perception of "America as homeland" is an important cultural dimension of citizenship and constitutes an understudied aspect of Muslim cultural settlement in the United States. How do immigrant Muslims overcome their initial sense of "homeland insecurity" and begin to feel at home as Muslims in America?

This chapter is a phenomenological account of Muslim constructions of America as homeland. It starts by articulating the concept of home and what it means to feel at home. It continues with a brief inventory of the cultural idioms or topoi with which early Muslim immigrants and Muslims in the early stages of their immigration made sense of their presence in America. This diasporic moment and vocabulary changed over time as exposure and interaction led to a more nuanced understanding. In addition to these cultural idioms, there are crucial juridical tools by which Muslims religiously interpret America and produce an articulation of America as "home." Therefore, the fundamental question that this chapter answers is how Muslims naturalize the United States in Islam. I aim to capture the dynamics of the transition from being "in" America to being "of" America. In philosophical terms, this is the story of transition from being "present-at-hand" to being "ready-to-hand."

Reality and Its Anomies

One difference between an immigrant and a citizen is that for the citizen home and homeland are the same, while for the immigrant they are not. The correspondence between home and homeland is achieved through the extension of home into homeland: continuity between home and homeland, which is a condition of feeling at home, requires the projection of what is private and subjective (i.e., home, Muslim, communal) into what is public and intersubjective (i.e., city, American, national). Before engaging in a discussion of the transformation of Muslim

discourses on America, we need to establish some theoretical connections between feeling-at-home and homeland and between displacement and the sense of anomie.

A defining characteristic of home is that it is a place where the relationship between the subject and space takes the form of a feeling: feeling-at-home or being-in-the-world. A place is home only when inhabited.¹ It is inhabitation that turns *any* place into home. Hence, there is nothing essentialist about home. When inhabitation generates the feeling of "feeling-at-home," we can say that a place has become home. What is crucial for the sense of home is the experience of dwelling (Heidegger 1971, 143). This subjective recognition of a place as home is a temporal process. The subject appropriates a given space as home only after she projects into that space her subjective being, that is, when she dwells. This projection is also a construction of the subjective world, which becomes the ground for the production of the intersubjective world (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 20). (It must be noted here that this order is correct only for heuristic purposes. Ontologically, the intersubjective world always precedes the subjective world.) In short, "with the dwelling the latent birth of the world is produced" (Levinas 1969, 157).

Simmel provided an early sociological account of the tension or lack of equilibrium between subjective and objective cultures (Simmel 1971; Frisby and Featherstone 1997, 55–75). His discussion of the crisis in culture is in many ways a pioneering study on the topic of homelessness in the general sense of the "homeless mind" of modernity (Berger, Berger, and Kellner 1974). Simmel argued that the increasing division of labor and proliferation of cultural products (objective culture) placed a disproportionate strain on the subject, who could no longer have a true comprehension of her cultural environment. This process of alienation from the environment, or, in Simmel's own terms, the loss of equilibrium between subjective culture and objective culture, was a tragic consequence of modernity.

Arendt also treated the idea of home as a staging ground for entry into the intersubjective realm (Arendt 1998, 207) where different subjects meet and where the encounter of different subjects produces objects (natural or social). Thus, we feel at home where everything is subjective. That is, all objects are subjectivized (e.g., the IKEA desk that is now my late-night refuge); and subjective elements, objectivized (e.g., the arrangement of things on my desk). The Simmelian idea of cultural crisis refers to the collapse of the flow between the subjective and the objective cultures.

In their treatise on the sociology of knowledge, Berger and Luckmann (1966) provide a fascinating discussion of the way common sense (i.e.,

reality, the world as we know it) is produced and maintained. Any given society is an arena of reality construction where individual members participate in the production of objective reality. This reality is sustained as long as the intersubjective realm of lifeworld that underpins it remains available. Thus, any common sense or reality is precarious because "all societies are constructions in the face of chaos. The constant possibility of anomic terror is actualized whenever the legitimations that obscure the precariousness are threatened or collapse" (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 103).

Here, there are several themes that need to be made explicit. First, the reality that each society produces is constructed against a background of chaos. That is, it is produced through the introduction of *nomos* into a realm that is otherwise chaotic. *Nomos* (rule, law, regularity, sense) translates chaos into order and nature into culture. The idea of homeland is one such cultural construction produced on the surface of bare geography. Second, the reality to which *nomos* gives rise is historical, contingent, and fragile. Therefore, anomie, which is the loss of *nomos*, has a terrorizing effect, causing anxiety and insecurity. This includes the anxiety one feels when one is a long way from home and the insecurity of an unfamiliar abode. That is also why unfamiliar or mentally inaccessible things and places are associated with the uncanny. Referring to the fear of the unfamiliar, Freud (2003) links the uncanny to the unhomey and homeless.

Third, the anxiety and insecurity, normally repressed and swept under the carpet by intersubjective dwelling and everyday language, burst in when either the protective shield is removed (internal collapse) or those protected within it move outside it. Hence, anomic terror can happen either temporally (crisis) or spatially (finding oneself outside the coverage area of the shield). In other words, anomie, chaos, and bare nature all manifest themselves in marginal or *liminal* situations (V. Turner 1969, 95). That is to say, they manifest themselves either under the shield or beyond its limits. Outside the shield—or, to use Berger's (1969) own term, outside the "canopy"—all the distinctions dissolve. In the words of a political philosopher, "man erects around himself an artificial netting which conceals from him the abyss" (Strauss 1989, 36). The structure expires and antistructure (V. Turner 1969) begins. The margins reveal the historicity of the structure. At the edges and on the frontiers, the nomothetic format (i.e., constructed reality) ends, and the unformatted surface (chaos) appears, or to put it more precisely, what is beyond appears as chaotic. The relationship between *nomos* and chaos/anomie is crucial for a proper understanding of the experience of people who are

displaced. The Durkheimian discussion of anomic suicide (1951, 241) is directly linked to such displacement. Displacement in this sense might entail encounter with a radically different culture, language, or both.

Immigration is one such displacement.² For immigrants, the most obvious challenge to their sense of reality is the requirement to speak another language, since language is the depository of common sense par excellence. But there are other challenges, especially if their religion is different or has a history of conflict with the religion of the host culture. In the next section, I trace the experience of Muslim immigrants who either find themselves at the frontiers or outside the juridical concept of Muslim homeland (*dar al Islam*).

Muslims Outside the Islamic Canopy?

Medieval Muslim jurists developed a binary opposition to distinguish the legal status of Muslim-controlled lands from the rest of the world. They designated as *dar al Islam* (abode of Islam, abode of peace) the lands where Islam was dominant or had been naturalized as mainstream culture. By that classification, all other places fell under the category of *dar al harb* (abode of war, abode of chaos) or *dar al kufr* (abode of disbelief). In this conception, *dar al Islam* becomes a spatial or geographic projection of the Islamic sacred canopy. Scholars have different opinions as to whether the canopy is held up by an Islamic political rule or by an Islamic mainstream culture even when the ruler is not necessarily Islamic (al-Alwani 2003, 28; Ramadan 2002, 166). What is decisive in either case is whether a certain land has been subject to Islamic nomos and has thus become conducive to an unrestricted, free practice of Islam. In short, *dar al Islam* describes a legal order (and not necessarily a political one³) where geography is codified through the imaginary inscription of Islamic law. The remainder of that geography is mentally "nihilated" (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 114) in order to create the sharp contrast that preserves "mental hygiene" (Zerubavel 1991, 37; Berger and Luckmann 1966, 156). This spiritual appropriation of land finds still another abstract expression in the juridical order of things. Identification of qibla, the direction of Mecca, is yet another form of religious appropriation of land, that is, introduction of nomos.⁴

As a juridical sphere, *dar al Islam* refers to the pacified, codified space enclosed within the canopy. Muslims living within *dar al Islam* are inhabitants of a familiar abode and members of a bounded community. This

sphere that is under public law and familiar for jurisprudential purposes is surrounded by its constitutive other, *dar al harb*. What remains outside, therefore, becomes an extrajudicial, agonistic sphere. In that sense, *dar al harb* is similar to the Greek conception of "barbarian lands." Muslims venture into this unfamiliar abode, the uncanny, only at their spiritual peril.

Concerned with the protection of Islamic identity, the classical Muslim jurists saw no reason why Muslims should move to *dar al harb* permanently. They strongly discouraged people from leaving the abode of Islam unless their departure was due to *darura* (necessity).⁵ This extrajudicial sphere was thus incorporated into the legal canopy through the state of emergency; sojourn in that sphere fell under the paradigm of *exception*.

The Significance of Darura

Darura, or necessity, occupies a special place in all legal traditions because it is the foundation of exception (Agamben 2005, 24). As a limit concept it is the borderline between juridical order and bare life, between facticity and norms (Habermas 1996). Where public law (in this case, Islam) ends, political fact (the agonistic sphere) begins. Therefore, law melts under the conditions of necessity, as implied by the ancient maxim *necessitas legem non habet* (necessity has no law) (Agamben 2005, 1), for necessity has the power to render the illicit (*haram*) licit (*halal*).⁶ But this is not generalizable: necessity justifies only specific, individual cases of transgression through exception.⁷

The movement of Muslims from *dar al Islam* to *dar al harb* is a movement from inside legal order to outside it, from law to exception. According to Carl Schmitt (1976, 10), law has two fundamental elements: norm and decision. In the state of exception—that is, in *dar al harb*—the decision remains while the norm recedes. Put differently, the law loses its objective normalizing power and taken-for-granted character. More specifically, it loses its power of "convention," which is what makes a law law. The new environment does not lend itself to the applicability of the norm developed inside the canopy and demands (a new) decision, an act of construction. At that very moment the agency attributed to the law through reification falls back into the hands of the lawmaker.

The movement from rule (norm) to exception (decision) shifts our attention from the law itself to the lawmaker(s). What had been given now becomes an explicit object of human construction. It is a shift from an already-naturalized, habitualized reality to a reality that is witnessed

at the moment of its construction by human subjects. This de-routinization also corresponds to what Agamben calls “force-of-law without law” (2005, 39).

Therefore, as will become evident later in this chapter, the analogies made by present-day Muslims to the time of Prophet Muhammad are not invalid: there are very real similarities between the contemporary frontiers (margins) of Islam and its center, its beginning. The similarities are both temporal (*hijra*, the early migration of Muslims and the first establishment of Islam)⁸ and spatial (choosing qibla and living in a land that is not yet *dar al Islam*).⁹ Therefore, stepping outside the canopy is a return to the prehistory of the canopy. At the frontiers, where *nomos* is absent, there is an originary indistinction (chaos, anomie). After all, necessity is the first and original source of all law. It is this character of necessity and exception that explains the law and rule (Agamben 2005, 27; Schmitt 1976, 15). In that sense, it reveals the historicity and contingency of the law. At the spatial margins of Islam, Muslims have to reenact what those who codified Islam in the Muslim lands did many centuries ago. As Michel de Certeau has observed, “other lands restore to us what our own culture has seen fit to exclude from its own discourse” (1984, 14).

There are two possibilities for those who find themselves outside the canopy: they can either extend the canopy to cover their spot or engage in the construction of a new one. It will become clear in the case of Muslims that choosing the first seems to lead to the second, as far as the distinction between *dar al Islam* and *dar al harb* is concerned.

Extending the canopy under the paradigm of exception (*darura*) may be done for individual necessities, but if a large number of people reside not temporarily but permanently in what early jurists designated as *dar al harb*, can they still rely on *darura* as a paradigm? The paradigm of *darura* enabled Muslims to make brief forays into *dar al harb*. Now that Muslims have permanently settled in what used to be seen as *dar al harb*, they have to transform necessity into law—bare life into canopy—and cultivate *nomos* on an anomic space. As the examples I give later will clarify, the movement from canopy to anomie is always temporary: it inevitably ends with arrival at a new canopy. Canopy construction, which is the construction of new reality, is similar to dwelling and has a temporal character. In plain terms, a guest who stays for too long is no longer a guest but a lodger. Whether temporal or spatial, the anomic liminality of *darura* expires with either a return to the canopy or the emergence of a new one.

So far, in my discussion of *darura*, the zone of exception, I have touched upon the relationship between *darura* and law and its manifestations in

time and space. Before concluding this section, I shall briefly explain the reason it came to prominence and the type of ethos *darura* engenders.

As a space of unenforceability of law or dispensation from the application of law, *darura* implies the impossibility of experiencing a given place as a fully justified home. Thus, it works as a temporary protective juridical shield (like a raincoat) for limited exposure to *dar al harb*. *Darura* gained jurisprudential prominence in modern times as a result of the processes that caused (dis)placement of Muslims into non-Muslim lands. These processes include colonialism in the past and globalization and Muslim immigration in contemporary times.

A juridical term designating the condition of “crisis times” and “unhomely places,” *darura* has a particular ethos. This ethos is a “deficient mode of care” in the Heideggerian sense.¹⁰ In other words, the ethics of *darura* is negative. It demands avoidance, minimal involvement, and unsettlement. It thus corresponds to the condition and experience of sojourners who do not feel at home. In a more strict sense, this ethos is a diasporic ethos, where home/land is elsewhere and the heart is there. In the next section, I give a quick overview of some prominent topoi of Muslim diasporic culture. Each topos tells us about a certain aspect of the experience of Muslim immigrants.

Topoi of Muslim Diasporic Imagination

Under the conditions of immigration, Muslims are displaced and disembedded from their original national environments. With immigration, they find themselves in a diasporic condition and interstitial location. For example, they are in American society but not (yet) of it. To explore how “Muslims in America” become “American Muslims” we need to first understand the consequences of displacement (immigration). Diasporic conditions trigger the release of some Muslim idioms from their otherwise marginal status and pull them to the surface of Muslim imagination. There are several prominent root paradigms (V. Turner 1974, 67) that immigrant Muslims in America employ in making sense of their experience. These include *hijra* (Prophet Muhammad’s migration from Mecca to Medina), *ummah* (the universal Muslim community), *dawah* (mission or propagation of Islam), and *jihad* (struggle, just war).¹¹

Hijra: When Prophet Muhammad and his followers were persecuted by the pagan Arab establishment of Mecca, he migrated to the nearby city of Medina in the year 622 CE. This event occupies such a central place in the Muslim imagination that it marks the starting point of the

Muslim calendar (called the Hijri calendar). *Hijra* as a movement from Mecca to Medina represents a flight from chaos and oppression to a place of freedom that represents "the city" and "civilization" all at once.¹² The Prophet's *hijra* thus constitutes the primary referent for the Muslim topos of *hijra*, migration. There is also a second event from the early days of Islam that contributes to the term's symbolic meaning: the migration of Muslim refugees to Abyssinia (present-day Ethiopia) in 615 CE. Fearing that the Meccans' hostility to his teachings might lead to the destruction of the nascent Muslim community, Muhammad sent a group of his disciples to seek refuge in the Christian kingdom of Abyssinia. The Meccans sent their own emissaries after them, asking the king to hand over these "insurgents" for punishment. The king instead questioned the refugees and discovered that their "subversive beliefs" differed little from his own Christian doctrine. He granted them amnesty, much to the disgruntlement of their pursuers. For Muslims this historical moment has become a touchstone of solidarity among Ahl ul Kitab ("Peoples of the Book," i.e., followers of revealed scripture) and an emblem of the potential benefits of *hijra*.

Hijra is the primary idiom for Muslim immigrants who seek to frame their displacement—voluntary or not—in religious terms. It is not only the movement from one place to another or departure from one's native land that makes these historical events relevant to contemporary migrants but also the fact that the destinations were in both cases non-Muslim. Thus, *hijra* gained prominence among Muslims in the United States because it provided a framework for their contemporary experience as immigrants (Haddad and Lummis 1987, 156). African American Muslims even interpret their exit from slavery with reference to *hijra* and call *hijra* "The Greatest Migration" (Dannin 2002b, 59, 2002a). At the other end of the spectrum, a fringe radical group of Muslim immigrants based in Britain employs the self-identification Al-Muhajiroun (the emigrants) (Wiktorowicz 2005).

Ummah: This concept designates the global community of Muslims (Mandaville 2003; Roy 2004). It also refers to the community of followers of any prophet. Some Muslim scholars link *ummah* to the concept to *shahada* (witnessing). "The greatness of the Islamic *ummah* is to be understood in the fact that it is a community of the middle path which must bear witness to the faith before all mankind" (Ramadan 2002, 158–59). A nonterritorial concept, it allows Muslims to transcend their ethnic, linguistic, and racial differences. In this imagined community, the members of which are tied to each other through exposure to the scripture and

belief in one God, Muslims relate to each other across time and space. In the words of Benedict Anderson:

The strange physical juxtaposition of Malays, Persians, Indians, Berbers and Turks in Mecca is something incomprehensible without an idea of their community in some form. The Berber encountering the Malay before the *Kaaba* must, as it were, ask himself: "Why is this man doing what I am doing, uttering the same words that I am uttering, even though we cannot talk to one another?" There is only one answer, once one has learnt it: "Because we . . . are Muslims." (1991, 54)

Muslim experience in America is often compared to the Muslim experience in Mecca because Muslims discover and feel the extreme diversity within the Muslim community both during their pilgrimage in Mecca and upon their arrival in America. It is at that moment that the concept of *ummah* gains prominence as a way of acknowledging and overcoming differences. The appeal of the concept of *ummah* comes from both the diversity of Muslim communities and their minority status vis-à-vis non-Muslim majority society and consequent need for solidarity.

Dawah: *Dawah* means religious propagation, fulfillment of the religious obligation of representing the faith to outsiders. *Dawah* is the primary mode of relating to the outside of the Muslim community. *Dawah* is not limited to proselytizing but can include charity work and participation in community service. As much as it targets outsiders, the more immediate motivation for its deployment in the foreign setting is the protection of the identity of insiders. As such it becomes a means of preserving religious identity and authenticity. It is an internally articulated means of engaging with the social environment. This sense of *dawah* is particularly relevant, for instance, for members of the branches of the Muslim Student Association (MSA) on university campuses. A female undergraduate Muslim student at the University of Michigan once told me, "I am Muslim. I wear my Muslim identity wherever I go. Every action I make publicly is an act of *dawah*. It is especially important to me because I know that everything I do, every stance that I take, reflects the entire Muslim *ummah* whether I want it or not."

Jihad: Of all the terms discussed here *jihad* looms largest in the American psyche. It is a contested concept for both Muslims and non-Muslims. *Jihad* refers to the constant structuration of the self and the world along the lines of Islam. It literally means struggle; it is the equivalent of self-discipline in Protestant cultures. The concept covers a variety of struggles, ranging from spiritual self-restraint to the collective execution of a just

war. Recent uses of the term in ethnic nationalism and global terrorism have, however, undermined its legitimacy in the eyes of non-Muslims.¹³ Muslims themselves, in turn, employ the term increasingly reluctantly and uncomfortably. Yet they cannot do away with it, since it is part of Islam.

These key idioms have almost nothing to do with America per se as a destination for Muslim immigrants. They are root paradigms that help Muslims make sense of their mobility/movement. The prominence the terms enjoy in America is absent in Muslim majority lands except for those places where colonialism has had a disproportionate impact and thus induced the feeling of being a minority, if we accept a definition of minority in terms of power and not numbers. For a very long time, the Muslim idea of *ummah* was quite marginal and would be felt explicitly only during the once-in-a-lifetime pilgrimage to Mecca. Globalization has altered this fact, but only recently. The power of *ummah*—and, for that matter, *hijra* and *dawah*—as primary topoi derives entirely from the diasporic moment. Therefore, although American Muslims have used these topoi since the earliest period of their immigration, they are like a certificate that authorizes their departure but does not deal with their destination. These topoi are extensions of old homelands; they hardly touch America.¹⁴

Before proceeding any further we need to remember the relationship between law and *darura* (necessity). Law is generated out of necessity and experience, but when it becomes alienated from its ever-changing source (*darura*, charisma), the law faces suspension. Its hardened layer has to be cracked or thinned so that the experience beneath can manifest itself.

What appears beneath the melting layer of law itself will soon become a new hardened layer. This means that just as anomie is temporally limited (transitional) and has to disappear, so does charisma, which is always *in statu nascendi* (Weber 1946, 246; Shils 1972, 110). One person's charisma or anomie is someone else's rationality or reality. In other words, a foreign reality and rationality will always seem anomic and, depending on taste, charismatic. It is always a matter of time and location for the charisma and anomie to (routinize or fade away and thus) become rationality and reality, that is, to become a new canopy—whether one calls it a “sacred canopy” (Berger 1969) or a secular “iron cage” (Weber 1946; 1992, 181).

Therefore, we cannot rely on ideal types without bringing in the freshness of experience. We cannot conceptually understand habitus without understanding dwelling, rationality without charisma, or law/nomos

without *darura*/anomie. It is this linking of binaries that allows us to lay bare the dynamics and origin of social constructions whether they are of home, homeland, or the world or of law and rationality. The question is how concrete experience, practices of lifeworld, face-to-face interactions, and everyday experience in general congeal and theoretically sediment into ideal types, abstract images, and common sense. The understanding of experience and ideal types as mutually embedded in each other in an ever-expanding net that encapsulates us in the form of “the world” allows us to historicize the cultural objects of our analysis.

Changing Muslim Discourses on America

The immigrant Muslims' encounter with America starts well before their arrival, because America has already entered the minds of Muslims as a phenomenon. The portrait that Muslims have of America is usually based not on direct experience but on powerful images or ideal types that are unchallenged. Those images are not necessarily negative, but rather range from positive to neutral to negative. Furthermore, not every Muslim who arrives with negative views of America ends up developing a positive one and vice versa. Nevertheless, one thing is certain: in their own national cultures, Muslims have very little ground for knowing America and rely almost exclusively on ideal types supplied by globalized American popular culture and stereotypes. When the question is posed from a religious-judicial point of view, the status of America becomes even more problematic. America is a non-Muslim and arguably a Christian country. Is America *dar al harb*? And if so is it religiously permissible to stay in America for an extended period of time or even permanently? Under what conditions are Muslims allowed to live in such places?

Some Muslims ask these questions; others do not. Not all Muslims are interested in religious justification of their presence in America. Some might not even be aware of the juridical terms discussed below. Moreover, some of them might be aware yet choose to ignore them in the face of some incongruity between the terms' implications and the reality of their own lives. People can choose to place themselves outside this particular juridical question by rejecting its relevance or avoiding it altogether as a theoretical nuisance. Whether they embrace the relevance of the question or not, however, all Muslims engage in interpretation and produce a certain perspective on America (Haddad 2004, 32; Leonard 2003a, 154).

These questions have come to occupy a central place in American Muslim discourse. Especially after 9/11, according to an American Muslim pundit, such questions create a moral dilemma that needs to be solved:

Many Muslims who see Islam and the U.S. in a state of conflict have enormous problems in beginning to think of themselves as American Muslims. They want the prosperity and the freedom of America, but not its foreign policy or its liberal culture. And Muslim leaders who oppose political assimilation without opposing [legal] naturalization inadvertently place Muslims in a morally delicate situation. There are no simple solutions to this moral dilemma. It will have to be resolved at the theological level. Changes in American attitudes and policies toward Islam and Muslims will also be helpful in this transition to citizenship within the mind of each American Muslim. The theological discussion will have to take American Muslims beyond the *dar-al-Islam* (house of peace) and *dar-al-harb* (house of war) dichotomy. (M. Khan 2002, 10)

Early Muslims considered living in American society a dangerous venture. It meant the risk of assimilation and moral decay. The students who constituted the kernel of American Muslim identity in the 1960s and 1970s wanted only to avoid the negative influence of American society (Schumann 2007, 11). This perception, however, changed over time (Mattson 2003, 203).

The terms or, rather, juridical tools available to Muslims for making sense of American space have outflanked the binary of *dar al Islam* versus *dar al harb*. The dichotomy, which existed for so long because it was not challenged by direct experience, becomes problematic and insufficient when Muslims are actually in America. Reality interferes. The alternative or complementary concepts that were historically marginalized in the production of this binary are remembered, reappropriated, and even possibly invented.¹⁵ Therefore, in addition to *dar al harb* and *dar al Islam* Muslims in minority settings have brought back several notions, the most important two of which are *dar al dawah* (abode of call, propagation, mission) and *dar al ahd* (abode of treaty, contract). In place of the *dar al harb*–*dar al Islam* dichotomy, we now have a continuum of abodes: from *dar al harb* to *dar al dawah* to *dar al ahd* to *dar al Islam*.

This continuum, of course, implies no teleology. It is rather a spectrum of juridical terms providing religious meaning or justification for different discourses Muslims develop with respect to America. In this part of the chapter, I shall highlight what is specific to each of these categories and the relationship between them as phases of a possible process of settlement. This process or spectrum can be both temporal and spatial.

Table 3.1 Stages and juridical tools of Muslim cultural settlement in the United States

<i>Darura</i> (exception/negative)		Law (rule/positive)	
Abode of war (<i>Dar al harb</i>)	Abode of mission (<i>Dar al dawah</i>)	Abode of accord (<i>Dar al ahd</i>)	Abode of Islam (<i>Dar al Islam</i>)
War/chaos External 1970s Visitor	Mission/visit Frontier 1980s Newcomer	Peace/accord Neighbor 1990s Resident	Home/Islamic Home 2000s Citizen
Diasporic		Settled	

There are two broad paradigms under which we can classify the major juridical tools. They are either mobilized under the paradigm of *darura* or construed as part of an existing legal order or as products of a newly articulated code that caters to the needs of Muslims in the minority status. The first two categories (*dar al harb* and *dar al dawah*), which fall under the paradigm of *darura*, are diasporic with respect to the American setting. The last two (*dar al ahd* and *dar al Islam*) come under the paradigm of law and are employed by Muslims in their postdiasporic moment, those who see or want to see America as home. A more comprehensive juxtaposition of the four categories is provided in table 3.1.

In the following sections, I shall discuss the specifics of each of these categories. What are the consequences of perceiving America as an abode of war (*dar al harb*)? Who sees it as such and when? Such questions will be answered for each of the four categories used by Muslims as juridical tools or, to put it in Ann Swidler's (1986) terms, as part of their juridical "toolkit." These juridical terms can be interpreted as symbolic stations in the cultural settlement of Muslims or moments of their internalization of America as a habitat.

Abode of War: An Impossible Homeland

From the perspective that sees America as an abode of war (*dar al harb*), America is *external* to Islam and, as such, is a source of anxiety and cultural threat.¹⁶ This perception is based on a lack of knowledge about what goes on inside America. America, in this view, is a monolith—it is completely profane and without legitimately perceptible *nomos*. It has to be avoided unless there is emergency (*darura*, exception). America is a black box that can be treated only in its totality since it can be grasped—in this understanding—only from without.¹⁷ The ideal type for this conception

is a visitor; it can be said to represent the common understanding of Muslim immigrants in the 1970s.

Changing immigration policies in the 1960s and Cold War politics opened the door for Muslim immigrants and students. Interestingly enough, the students from Muslim countries who came to America to study not only created the nucleus of a Muslim community but also laid the groundwork for the formation of a number of major organizations, including MSA and later the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA). Those Muslims who happened to be in America in this period believed that they were there under *darura*. They saw themselves as an outpost of Islam inside American space. In keeping with this view, they had no connection to the space except for being in it for a short time of necessity. They were geographic and cultural orphans, people out of place. Their plans to go back home kept them always in a precarious position, unsettled. *Dar al harb* (abode of war) characterized the perception of those Muslims, mostly students from Muslim countries, who either were religious or became religious due to diasporic pressures during their studies at American institutions of higher education in the 1960s and 1970s. They set out to acquire American science and technology without getting contaminated by its culture. Their plan to return home after the completion of their studies and their desire to avoid the influence of American culture were two defining features of their attitude toward American space. These students relied on funding from their home countries and were oriented toward their homelands.¹⁸

America was simply a meeting ground for Muslims from various countries. Within the framework of a Heideggerian conception of space, their "American space" did not fully exist. To the extent that care and involvement produce space (the world) for the situated subject, their American space was very small; their primary *concern* was political and cultural solidarity with the Muslim world and its rehabilitation through the acquisition of American scientific and technological knowledge. The institutions built in this era catered to students and were concerned almost exclusively with the preservation of Islamic identity against the corrosive influence of American society. Publications of the time, such as *MSA News* and, later, *Islamic Horizons*, depicted the American environment as an undifferentiated culture having nothing to do with Islam (Schumann 2007, 16). America was technologically superior but morally bankrupt, a perception that echoed Sayyid Qutb's image of America.¹⁹ In the eyes of these identity-centric, diasporic Muslims, America was an undifferentiated mass. It was at worst an impure place, at best a neutral

space for the encounter and education of Muslim activists from Islamic countries.

Their orientation was thus overseas, toward the Islamic world. Their American location gave them extra space and allowed them to mobilize technical and ideological resources for what Benedict Anderson calls "long-distance nationalism" (1998, 58), which in this case meant long-distance Islamism. Even the notion of *dawah*, which was activated in response to displacement—its temporariness notwithstanding—was an *introvert dawah* directed at students themselves. The purpose was to have "an impact on homelands by educating Islamic activists and preparing them for their future return" (Schumann 2007, 18). Inspired by the Islamic revivalist movements in Muslim countries, they interpreted their own experiences in terms of mobility, movement, or mobilization. The idea of returning home turned their stay into a prolonged transit. America was not a place to dwell; it was not home. Therefore, the ethos of living in America was a "deficient mode of care."

Today, most Muslims would reject the idea of America as an abode of war and might even contest the applicability of the term altogether. The culture of "America as *dar al harb*," survives, therefore, mostly in old community literature and biographical narratives about "Muslims then." One would expect the culture of *dar al harb* to have disappeared entirely over the last couple of decades, since today almost every Muslim sees Muslim presence in America as permanent. But it has not. I discovered this persistence when I talked to the imam of a mosque in Detroit in 2007.²⁰ This mosque, which has an Arabic name, describes itself as *salafi*.²¹ The congregation appears to be predominantly Yemeni. Imam Talib, also from Yemen, is on a long-term visa and has been here for a few years. One of the striking things about this mosque is that the imam does not speak any English at all and delivers his sermons in Arabic. He does, however, use a translator. I interviewed him through one of the people who helps translate his sermons and weekend classes. The following exchanges are selections from the interview.

I started by asking his opinion about the English language, since we were not able to communicate in it.

Question: When one immigrates to America, a lot of things change. For example, here all the Muslims speak English. What do you think about the English language?

Answer: English is good for giving *dawah*. When I came here, there were some brothers who could speak both languages [English and Arabic]. That made it easy for me to do my own Islamic studies. If I go to English-language classes, it will take a lot

of driving. Also, you know, classes are mixed, men and women. . . . Muslims should learn this language, of course. If you do not know the language, it is going to be hard. We should give *dawah*.

There are a lot of *masjids* [mosques] which claim to be *ahlul sunnah* [Sunni], but they actually are not spending enough time on *aqedah* [creed]. Kids in this country get very little Islam. Here in this *masjid* we try to focus more on Islam so that kids don't get *shirk* and *khurafat* [violations of monotheism and deviation]. We want them to stay away from *shirk* [worshiping things other than the one God]. This is our focus.

Q: What do you think about the *dar al harb* and *dar al Islam* distinction? What is America in your view?

A: America is a *kuffar* country [the land of disbelief, *dar al kufr* / *dar al harb*]. It is a matter of who is dominant. The dominant identity in this country is *kuffar*. If we can have *dawah*, that is the most important thing. We need to show the people what Islam is. We should teach them.

Q: But Muslims have more freedoms here than in Muslim countries. Think of *hijab*, for example.

A: It is true we have more freedoms, but it does not mean this country is better than the Muslim countries.

Q: Since you have plans to return to Yemen and won't stay in this country, what do you say to Muslims here, those who are going to stay.

A: I say, if they can go back, it is better for them. The future seems very hard here. It is hard to live as a family. It is hard. If something happens, that will be good: if the government *puts all the Muslims in one place* [my italics], that will be good. Then we can live without mixing.

Q: So you would like Muslims to be more isolated and by themselves?

A: Well, we can mix with them to give *dawah* but we should not lose our kids. They should not lose their *deen* [religion].

I left the mosque with some degree of bewilderment in that even though I had observed a whole spectrum of Muslims in the American context, this was a truly *extraordinary* case. Even though many American Muslims believe that they live in "electronic internment" since 9/11, I had never met one who considered internment—be it electronic surveillance or physical imprisonment similar to what Japanese Americans endured during World War II—to be desirable. Here was a Muslim who was "in" America and believed that the best thing that could happen to Muslims living in this country was to be placed in a ghetto or camp. Interestingly enough, the Detroit-Dearborn area is currently the only place in America that approximates a ghetto (Abraham and Shryock 2000). Yet the significant concentration of Arab Muslims in the area still seemed

insufficient to this imam, as far as the protection of Islamic identity was concerned. The only justification for Muslims to stay in this country was *dawah*; otherwise, America was a *kuffar* (infidel) country, *dar al harb*, and to protect their religion, Muslims should leave as soon as possible. America was an insecure place and could never qualify as a homeland. This insecurity was not so much about civil rights and liberties—concerns shared by many Muslims—but about religious reproduction and spiritual purity.

To inquire further into his mosque's relationship to the American environment, I asked if they were involved in any interfaith activities. He replied: "No interfaith activity here. All our information [about Islam] is on the website. I say, go to call them to Islam but not to listen to them. Those who go and say, 'We are the same, no difference,' they are wrong. Call them to Islam."

According to this introverted view of Islam and the Muslim community, America had to be avoided, and when that was not possible, then the only legitimate form of involvement was *dawah*, which for this imam meant conversion. Any other form of involvement should be shunned. "Interaction" with the outside world was thus not a two-way street.²² It is not surprising that this was the only mosque in my research area where they try to convert visitors, even Muslim ones, to their form of Islam. Other colleagues who visited this mosque told me that they were approached with an intention to convert even though they had made it clear that they were there for research alone.

Most past Muslim immigrants had and some Muslims in the early stage of their immigration today still have a slightly tamer view of the American environment and the role of Muslims in that they perceive themselves as an outpost of Muslim geography in an alien land. As long as their presence is temporary, they comfortably continue to hold the view that America can be an abode of war. This ideal typical perception of America as abode of war/chaos changes only under the influence of direct experience, interaction, and the recognition of dwelling that is usually outside the control of the subjects. The concept of *dawah* (mission, call to Islam), which together with *darura* (necessity) is one of the two justifications for being in America, eventually outgrows the juridical category of abode of war and becomes the point of reference in itself. Limited engagement in the form of *dawah* ultimately leads to a perception of America as an open field for unlimited *dawah*. *Dawah* is no longer directed at other Muslims but at non-Muslim others. This change of orientation also marks the transition to the next stage where America is perceived as a land of mission.

Abode of Mission: An Outpost in the "Land of Possibilities"

As an abode of war, America represented the absolute outside and an anti-homeland. As an abode of mission, while still external to Islam, America is recognized as an adjacent space. As such, it becomes a *frontier*. It is a target of concerned interest or a destination of risky spiritual venture. In this conception, America is a field of exploration that is at once dangerous and potentially beneficial. The most significant change in the perception from the earlier one is that America is no longer a monolith. Weak signs of differentiation emerge as the newcomer withholds his or her final judgment about America while approaching it with caution. The newcomer's presence is most likely temporary or in its early stages.

In the stage of abode of mission, the notion of *dawah* (mission) undergoes a shift in terms of orientation: now it explicitly targets non-Muslims. The introvert conception is replaced by an extrovert one as some involvement with America becomes possible. The primary concern is still the preservation of identity *through* a narrowly defined engagement with American society. Even though America is still viewed as a place of moral decay, Muslims are now seen as capable of contributing to its positive transformation, and reluctant involvement becomes a desirable partial participation. A shift also occurs from activism that targets Muslim students to activism aimed at changing an otherwise-threatening environment. In this transformation, the Qur'anic idea of "promoting good and preventing evil" becomes a touchstone.²³

If previously the Muslim world and America were polar opposites, in this stage even though they are still largely monoliths, they each acquire negative and positive aspects—the problems of the Muslim world and some virtues of America are acknowledged. The Muslim world or past homelands now lose their sharpness and complexity in the mind's eye of the immigrant, and this distancing from the past homeland is accompanied by the development of a comparably limited "nearness" to the American environment. In terms of community development, this approach characterizes the 1980s. Early signs of recognizing America as a "nation of immigrants" emerge, and the possibility of somehow fitting in becomes imaginable for the Muslim immigrant.

Yet even though the beginnings of settlement are observed, America is still diasporic: this settlement has not yet fully disengaged itself from a movement that began elsewhere. Muslims who were in transit are now settled into "mobility" and outreach. In the process, *darura* (excep-

tion) becomes a conditional "stay." One can stay, but only to perform *dawah*! That is, a shift occurs from conditional visit to conditional stay. A necessity-based risk has become an opportunity-based one.

As a consequence of the shift, calling America an abode of war becomes increasingly difficult and the term itself is seldom employed. As Mustapha, a young Muslim I interviewed, stated, "If America is *dar al harb*, what does that add to you? What matters more is whether you as a Muslim change yourself and your environment." The formerly monolithic and impure surface of America is now seen as receptive to the inscription of Islam. Along the same lines, an essay published in 1985 in *Islamic Horizons* claims, "We cannot continue to throw out the baby of *dawah* with the bathwater of our disaffection towards this government and society. For clearly we have been placed here with a purpose. . . . If we plan to leave tomorrow, we still have today to work, to do our share in remodeling what has been called a *dar al harb*—a home of hostility—into a *dar al Islam*—a home in which all Muslims can seek shelter. For wherever we are, our Home is Islam" (Omar 1985, 10, quoted in Schumann 2007, 21).

So either Muslim institutions change their orientation, or institutions with a new orientation emerge in their stead: institutions oriented toward "non-American" Muslims in America and the Muslim world are replaced by a "global Muslim" discourse with some localization. The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), established in 1982 in response to the fact that more and more of the students who had planned to return to their homelands ended up staying and forming families in the United States, is a perfect example of this new transformation. Now a Muslim community occupying North American space came into existence with early and small signs of localization and settlement. For instance, the essay quoted above and published in *Islamic Horizons* was titled "Participation of Muslims in America as a *Land of Possibilities*" (my italics).

In addition, the Muslim community is no longer identified with students but with their families: ISNA catered to this emergent community, which was still diasporic but was now inclined toward settlement. In this stage the community's institutions begin to engage the American environment, but only on the grounds of ideology and self-interest aimed solely at the dissemination of Islam. Still, this reluctant settlement and narrow involvement transform the nature of the Muslim community from being a thin "outpost" of Muslims in an alien land to a "thicker" extension of the global Muslim community at large. To sum up, the ideological transition from the 1970s to the 1980s was one from students to

families, from MSA to ISNA, from avoidance to protectionism through partial involvement.

Though this mind-set had its heyday in the 1980s, it can still be found in Muslim communities in the United States. I saw it reflected in some of my conversations with Muslim community leaders. One such example was Imam Haroon of Masjidun-Nur (Mosque of Light) in Detroit. Established in 1978, this inner-city mosque is at present predominantly African American. The imam himself is from the Caribbean (the island of Granada) and is ethnically South Asian. He had been serving as imam at this mosque since 1984 when I asked his opinion on several issues. Although very conservative and introverted, his views about the American setting were more nuanced than those of the previous imam in that—at least on a few registers—he thought that the American context was unusual. “Sometimes *ulama* [religious scholars] overseas do not know the life here. They do not know how America is different. There are some necessities. You cannot say that women should not drive. If she is Muslim and her family is non-Muslim and against her, how can she call her brother to drive her to the hospital? Like this there may be necessities in America.”

When asked about the distinction between abode of war and abode of Islam, he preferred to avoid the binary and emphasized instead the perception of America as “a land of possibilities” in the following manner:

I have been able to pray at the airport, at the mall, or at the bus station. Since I've been here it has been very easy to live Islam. I don't know what category America fits, but we are free to live Islam and do *dawah*. Sometimes people are more welcoming. Once there was a non-Muslim woman; she invited us to her house when she saw that we were going to pray on the grass. She did not know us, but she invited us to pray at her house.

[America] is Allah's country. We're here to invite people to Islam. We are here for the guidance. Some scholars say it is not permissible to stay in a non-Muslim land. But what about those who are from here? Where will they go? The earth is vast, and for making a living, anywhere is OK. Some *sahabas* [companions of the Prophet] did both living and *dawah*.

When asked how he views the future of Islam here, he noted, “I see a great future because of the saying of Prophet Muhammad, ‘Islam will dominate and not be dominated.’” Despite the relative openness to and appreciation of the American environment, his response to my question on interfaith activism, which I use as an index of involvement with the

social environment, revealed the striking ambivalence produced by the perception of America as abode of mission:

No, we don't do interfaith activities. My personal opinion, I don't feel the need for it. They stay their way and we stay our way. We respect but don't talk. . . . I think it became more difficult after 9/11. But some non-Muslim African Americans started to wear *kufi* [Muslim skullcap] and say, “as salamu alaikum,” to support us. We have no hostility with others. . . . The main thing is *dawah*; I don't want to use that word, but we work for *dawah*; it is an imperative for us.

Dar al dawah basically takes Muslim immigrants to the threshold of settlement, and as such marks the limits of diasporic orientation. The negative connection with the environment (through the juridical device of *darura*) is now replaced by a narrowed yet positive connection (based on a redefinition of *dawah*). At this point, the neat division “anything Muslim is good, anything American is evil” starts to erode. Yet the Muslim subject is still mentally located in another homeland and has only a limited justification for his presence in America.

Abode of Accord: From Mission to Dialogue

As *dar al ahd* (abode of accord) America is *neighbor* to Islam and a party to an accord; it is a source of mutual benefit. America is religiously justified and protected by religious laws such as the injunction that Muslims must obey the law of the land wherever they live. America thus becomes even more differentiated and emerges as a peaceful space of opportunity for Muslims, but one that has not yet been fully internalized or naturalized. The benefits and opportunities now supersede the risks. This conception's ideal type is a resident: his presence is permanent, with the reservation that one day he might have to leave. The stage represented by the concept of abode of accord entails a cautious embrace and the early phase of settlement. Many Muslims interpret abode of accord with relative comfort due to its resonance with the social contract theories of American society. Abode of accord, therefore, symbolizes the first cultural encounter of the immigrant Muslim with American citizenship. While for abode of war and abode of mission, the Muslim just happens to be in America, in the conception of abode of accord he begins to see himself as part of a larger society in which he, too, has a stake. It thus allows Muslims to imagine a place of their own inside American society, creating the possibility of an American Muslim cultural “ghetto”—in the

positive sense of the term—within a liberal society. More specifically, abode of accord represents a communitarian understanding of membership in American society, where private autonomy is slightly expanded and buttressed as an adequate domain for the survival of Islamic identity. The sense of belonging that abode of accord generates is located in the spectrum between a protected subject and a full citizen.

Muslims who see their new environment in this way no longer hold themselves apart from majority society but still preserve their distinct identity. They share with the rest of the society a culture in which Islam seeks a place. The idea of abode of accord therefore lends itself to a spectrum of existence from reluctant participation to hopeful and safe engagement with the American environment.

In 1999 the Mauritanian shaikh Abdallah Bin Bayyah was invited by the Zaytuna Institute, a neotraditional center of Islamic learning based in California, to speak to American Muslims in the Bay Area. He delivered his lecture in Arabic, translated by an American convert, Shaikh Hamza Yusuf. After examining the needs and conditions of Muslims in diaspora, Shaikh Bin Bayyah discussed the problem of the status of lands where Muslims are minorities. He criticized the dichotomy of abode of war and abode of Islam:

Most people think that the world is divided into two abodes, the abode of peace and the abode of war. The abode of peace is the land of the Muslims, *dar al-Islam*, and the abode of war is everywhere else. In [former president] Nixon's book that I read a translated version of called *Seize the Moment*, Nixon wrote a long chapter on the Islamic phenomenon of the modern world. One of the things Nixon said . . . is that they view the world as a dichotomy of two abodes: the abode of peace and the abode of war. So, the central aspect of international relationships with the Muslims is aggression; it is one of war. This idea is wrong. There are three abodes: there is the abode of peace, the abode of war, and then there is the *abode of treaty* where there is a contractual agreement between two abodes. (Bin Bayyah 1999)

The shaikh explained the relationship between immigrant Muslims in America and their country of immigration by referring to his entry into the country. His personal border crossing became an illustration of entry into abode of accord/contract:

For instance, when I came into this country, they issued me a visa, and I signed something. In the issuance of the visa and my signing of it, a legally binding contract occurred. It was an agreement that when I came into this country, I would obey the

laws and would follow the restrictions that this visa demanded that I follow. This was a contractual agreement that is legally binding according even to the divine laws. In looking at this, we have to understand that the relationship between the Muslims living in this land and the dominant authorities in this land is a relationship of peace and contractual agreement—of a treaty. This is a relationship of dialogue and a relationship of giving and taking.

The shaikh also articulated the conception of America as an abode of treaty:

The first essential thing is that you respect the laws of the land that you are living in. . . . In this country, the ruling people are allowing you to call people to Islam. They are not prohibiting you. . . . It is necessary for us to show respect to these people. Islam prohibits us from showing aggression towards people who do not show aggression towards us. . . . We also have to be good citizens because an excellent Muslim is also an excellent citizen in the society that he lives in.

Muslim discourses, including those of the Zaytuna Institute, which hosted Shaikh Bin Bayyah in 1999, have changed since then in response to the aftermath of 9/11. Zaytuna's change of orientation can be traced through the writings of its leaders, among them Imam Zaid Shakir.²⁴

As far as Muslim community leadership is concerned, the idea of abode of accord appears to have been the dominant conception in the 1990s. Since 9/11, it has been criticized by Muslim public intellectuals who urge a complete transition to the conception of America as an abode of Islam. Muqtedar Khan, a Muslim professor of political science who became prominent after 9/11, finds the idea of abode of accord an inadequate and morally problematic position for Muslims in the United States (M. Khan 2002, 8). From another perspective,²⁵ Tariq Ramadan, a European Muslim intellectual, finds the same term untenable due to its dependence on the old dichotomy of abode of war—abode of Islam. Instead, he proposes *dar al dawah* (abode of mission)—using a sense different from my own discussion above—and he even calls for a total abandonment of the idea of abodes: "At a time when we are witnessing a strong current of globalization, it is difficult to refer to the notion of *dar* (abode) unless we consider the whole world as an abode. Our world has become a small village and, as such, it is henceforth *an open world*." The whole world, according to Ramadan, is therefore an abode of call/mission. We should "stop translating the notion of *dar* in its restrictive meaning of 'abode' and prefer the notion of *space*, which more clearly expresses the idea of an *opening of the*

world, for Muslim populations are now scattered all over the world." This global space is *dar al dawah* (space of testimony/mission), where Muslims "bear witness before all mankind" (Ramadan 2002, 147).

Abode of Islam: "Thinking without Accent"

Encouraging Muslim political participation, Agha Saeed, Muslim political activist and president of the American Muslim Alliance, wrote that Muslims need generations who "not only speak without accent but also think without accent" (2002, 55). To him "thinking without accent" means changing the orientation of Muslims in America from preoccupation with the Muslim world to taking an interest in American domestic issues. Criticizing immigrant generations for being too much invested in goings-on in their countries of origin, Saeed finds hope in new generations of Muslims who instead regard America as both home and homeland.

In the conception of abode of Islam or abode of peace, the ideal type is a citizen, a person who feels at home in America and thereby achieves equilibrium or symmetry between the subjective culture (Muslim identity) and the objective culture (American culture). America no longer remains a mismatched habitat for a Muslim habitus developed elsewhere. Rather, it becomes an American Muslim habitus in an American habitat. As such, even immigrant parents who might not consider America their homeland would not hesitate to call it the homeland of their children.

When I asked a Bangladeshi imam in Hamtramck, Michigan, what he thought of America as a new home for Muslims, he replied, "There is no return; we have settled here." When I said, "But you know there are Muslims who have reluctance because of the distinction of two abodes," his response came very quickly: "Oh no, no. I take one poet; he said, [quotes first in Bengali, then translates freely] 'China is mine. Arabian Peninsula is mine. Japan is mine. America is mine. I'm a Muslim. All the world is my country.' That is my understanding. I decided to live over here; I'm a citizen of this country; this is my country. It is my children's country."

In the three previous perceptions of America, Muslims had remained in their prepolitical state in relation to American politics. It is only with the conception of America as abode of Islam/peace that membership in American society begins to translate into active citizenship and political participation. If "abode of accord" (*dar al ahd*) designates an American environment not incompatible with Islam, "abode of peace" (*dar al Islam*) designates an American environment that is perceived as Islamic.

Muslims who regard America as an abode of peace actually consider American values to be lost or alienated Islamic values. As Ingrid Mattson, the current president of ISNA, notes:

Among the most interesting efforts to permit Muslims a full embrace of American identity is the attempt to show that the constitutional democratic structure of America is almost equivalent to the political structure of an ideal Islamic state—in other words, a dialectic in which a redefinition of Islam meets a particular definition of America so that American democracy is identified with Islamic *shura* (consultation) and freedom of religion is identified with the Qur'anic statement "there is no compulsion in religion." (2003, 207)

The legal structures of democratic society become an extension of Islamic political order, if not an unnoticed embodiment of it. On the European front, Tariq Ramadan argues that abiding by the law of the land is an extension of following Islamic law:

Implementing the Sharia [Islamic law], for a Muslim citizen or resident in Europe, is explicitly to respect the constitutional and legal framework of the country in which he is a citizen. Whereas one might have feared a *conflict of loyalties*, one cannot but note that it is in fact the reverse, since faithfulness to Islamic teachings results in an even more exacting legal *implantation* in the new environment. *Loyalty to one's faith and conscience requires firm and honest loyalty to one's country*; the *Sharia* requires honest citizenship within the frame of reference constituted by the positive law of the European country concerned. (2002, 172; italics in original)²⁶

The perspective identifying Islam with American values tends to emerge among American-born children of immigrants (i.e., the second and third generations) and among convert Americans seeking harmony in their double identity. For example, Robert Dickson Crane, a former adviser to President Nixon and convert to Islam, writes in his *Shaping the Future: Challenge and Response*, that "the basic principles of Islamic law are identical to the basic premises of America's founding fathers, but both Muslims and Americans have lost this common heritage" (1997, 45). This was the implicit theme of the keynote speech that Hamza Yusuf of Zaytuna Institute delivered in 2007 in Chicago at the annual convention of ISNA. He argued that not only are Muslim and American values aligned, but American Muslims are the true inheritors and present-day bearers of "old-fashioned American values," which otherwise have been lost in the modern world.

Similarly Mirza A. Beg, a Muslim freelance writer, wrote the following in an essay that was posted on several Muslim websites and that advocated Muslim participation in American democracy:

America has been a land of immigrants ever since the founding of the Republic. Though European in the beginning, in the last few decades, it has welcomed all, irrespective of color, ethnicity or religion. . . .

As Muslims, Islam enjoins us to be just and truthful, in thought, works and deeds; as well as be respectful of other religions while practicing the tenets of Islam. As Americans we cherish the constitution and the bill of rights. *America is our home* [my italics] and our children's future.

Democratic norms are embedded in Islamic heritage. . . . The only way for a peaceful religion to flourish is in a democratic setting, without coercion. Freedom is a yearning of all human souls. The quest of centuries for equality and justice led to the realization, that the only guaranty of individual freedom is to guarantee freedom for all, within a constitutional framework. It culminated in the pluralistic American democracy. (Beg 2008)

This new "Muslim homeland" can be considered more Islamic than most, if not all, Muslim countries. A land of freedom (especially religious freedom) and democracy, America is a heterogeneous arena of good and bad, right and wrong. Just like historically Muslim lands, America also has its share of bad things. But it is up to Muslims to live Islam. They can contribute to its culture and society not only by their faith but also through their hard work and service. America is no longer an opportunity space or a land of possibilities; it is a privilege for Muslims. As such it places them in a special status with regard to both America and the Muslim community at large. American Muslims see themselves as having a special location and a historical responsibility—indeed, a number of contemporary Muslim intellectuals have called it a "manifest destiny" (M. Khan 2002, 1). American Muslims could even come to lead the Muslim community at large (the *ummah*).

Muslim writers publish articles with such titles as "Life, Liberty, and Pursuit of Happiness are Islamic Values." The pursuit of happiness (which had been regarded by Qutb, under the paradigm of abode of war/chaos, as antithetical to Islam) is now seen as part of Islam. Islam becomes an *American religion*, part of the landscape of American civil religion in the minds of Muslims themselves. Interfaith consciousness matures and interfaith activism intensifies. At the 2007 ISNA convention, Victor Ghalib Begg, a local champion of interfaith activism and board member of the Muslim Unity Center in Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, asked, "Where is Muslim ecumenicalism? Protestants and Catholics had their 'ecumenical'

moment and are now well past it; this is a stage we Muslims should also go through, both among Muslims and with the non-Muslims."

Now America is home and the Muslim world is the target of outreach. At the stage of America as abode of Islam, the shift of perspectives is complete. Muslims see things from the "point of view" (i.e., location) of their new home/land, America. They are now set to make strategic incursions into the Muslim world, seeking to derive benefits from it (in the form of cultural resources) while avoiding its problems (corruption, authoritarianism). Whereas previously only converts had behaved in this way, it now becomes common practice among the children of American immigrants. New generations of Muslims often criticize the "cultural Islam" of their parents, which they see as immigrant confusion of culture with religion. They want to dissociate Islam from its Middle Eastern or South Asian "baggage" and make it an *American* religion. Often they ignore the fact that America also comes with its own "culture," that "pure Islam" without a local culture is nowhere to be found. What had once been approached with suspicion (i.e., America, the abode of war/chaos) is now naturalized, and what was natural for their parents (i.e., overseas culture) has now become an object of suspicion.

The signs of a more autonomous Islam can be seen in the words of Maher Hathout, a Muslim community leader, who spoke at a Muslim conference in the early 2000s, stating: "As much as we can make clear that Muslim-American identity is not a natural extension of the Middle East, the better off we will be."²⁷ As American Muslims gain relative autonomy vis-à-vis other Muslims, America becomes in their eyes an increasingly complex entity. America presents manifold eidetic appearances while the Muslim world shrinks to a few ideal types. The process of autonomization of American Islam is best illustrated in a piece that Imam Zaid Shakir of Zaytuna Institute wrote in response to the Danish cartoon crisis that broke out in September 2005.²⁸ In "Clash of the Uncivilized: Insights into the Cartoon Controversy," Shakir criticized the Muslim protestors in the Middle East and elsewhere for ignoring the consequences of their irrational behavior for Muslims living in the West:

One of the most disturbing aspects of the current campaign to "Assist the Prophet," for many converts, like this writer, is the implicit assumption that there is no *dawah* work being undertaken here in the West, and no one is currently, or will in the future enter Islam in these lands. Therefore, it does not matter what transpires in the Muslim East. Muslims can behave in the most barbaric fashion, murder, plunder, pillage, brutalize and kidnap civilians, desecrate the symbols of other religions, trample on their honor, discard their values and mores, and massacre their fellow Muslims. If any of that

undermines the works of Muslims in these Western lands, it does not matter. If it places a barrier between the Western people and Islam, when many of those people are in the most desperate need of Islam, it does not matter. If our Prophet, peace and blessings of God upon him, had responded to those who abused him in Ta'if with similar disregard, none of the generations of Muslims who have come from the descendants of those transgressors would have seen the light of day. (2006)

Shakir's critique of "Muslims in the East" represents a threshold moment in the separation of American Islam from its imagined origins in a Muslim world that is growing increasingly unrecognizable in the eyes of American Muslims. And as he goes on to note, this symbolic separation is truly remarkable:

As Muslims in the West, we may be approaching the day when we will have to "go it alone." If our coreligionists in the East cannot respect the fact that we are trying to accomplish things here in the West, and that their oftentimes ill-considered actions undermine that work in many instances, then it will be hard for us to consider them allies. . . . No one from the Muslim East consults us before launching these campaigns. We have a generation of Muslim children here who have to go to schools where most of them are small minorities facing severe peer pressure. Their faith is challenged and many decide to simply stop identifying with Islam. Is that what they deserve? We have obedient, pious Hijab wearing women, who out of necessity must work, usually in places where they are the only Muslims. Should their safety, dignity, and honor be jeopardized by the actions of Muslims halfway around the world? (2006)

The process of autonomization of American Islam is accelerated by second- and third-generation American Muslims who make fun of their immigrant parents and Islamophobic non-Muslim compatriots. The rise of Muslim comedians, especially in the post-9/11 era, amply attests to this transformation.²⁹ The emergence of an American Muslim ethos and the development of a sense of being at home in America reverse the relationship between the abode of peace and the abode of chaos. America becomes the land of order and pure reality, while the homeland of immigrant parents retreats into chaos and anomie. Now, the Muslim world is seen through an American lens and judged *from* that location.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the way in which immigrant Muslims eliminate their sense of homeland insecurity and gradually come to see

America as a new homeland. As Muslims begin to dwell in America, either the American *nomos* becomes legible to them, or they introduce a new Islamic *nomos* to the American surface. Often the two possibilities converge.

Phenomenologically speaking, our situatedness creates nearness and distance. Muslim views of America are shaped by their relative exposure to American space and the degree of their involvement with it. This chapter has traced the transition from the paradigm of exception (*darura*) to the construction of legal order on a previously anomic space. As we have seen, the abode of chaos—abode of peace binary faces an irruption of experience and is shattered into a plurality of new categories—and, as a consequence, the Muslim lifeworld in America becomes religiously legitimate and meaningful. Examination of the stages of this process reaffirms that there is no such thing as a blanket Muslim perception of America, a salient reminder at a time when Muslim loyalty to the American nation is viewed with increasing skepticism.

This discussion of the juridical tools that help immigrant Muslims feel at home rests on the concept of "cultural settlement," which highlights the dynamic relationship between habitus and habitat. Bourdieu's notion of habitus is often construed as a tool for understanding the persistence of past forms of symbolic violence. My study shows the dialogical rearticulation of habitus through settlement, that is, through the inhabitation of a new cultural environment. The gradual character of this process, which entails a "digestion" of the new environment on both the politico-communal and the psychic level, requires attention to issues of temporality and space. Furthermore, unlike legal inclusion and naturalization, which focus on the role of sovereign or disciplinary apparatuses of power in integrating the newcomer, cultural settlement pays attention to the agency of the displaced subjects, who are seen to appropriate their new homeland, even as it appropriates them.

Taking a phenomenological approach to the immigrant experience sensitizes us to particular aspects of the settlement process: the way displacement causes disequilibrium between the subjective culture of the individual and the objective culture of their environment; the terror and anomie they experience at this loss; the way their dwelling in a new space generates, over time, a new canopy, a new ethos, and a new common sense. The human being and the world he or she inhabits are much less dissociable than our liberal conceptions of citizenship tend to suggest. In an important sense, the immigrant does not move from one part of the world to another. He moves from one world to another. Truly "being" in that new world, as Heidegger reminds us, demands an unmaking and

remaking of self, a shift from a deficient mode of care, which is a disposition of nonattunement toward the new environment, to an attitude of involvement, openness, and attunement. A proper phenomenology of the immigration experience—that is, of the processes of dissociation from the past and *there* and reassociation with the now, the *here*—reveals a transformation from chaos and confusion, from life as a constant state of exception, to attention, receptivity, and nomos. This is creative work, both on the part of the immigrant and on the part of the society that receives him. Immigration, with its discordance between habitus and habitat, ceases to define a person only when concordance is established between habitus and new habitat in a gradual process of mutual appropriation.

Citizenship Practices

- American Muslim mosque libraries. This holds true for African American mosques as well.
7. In a recent visit to the Muslim Center of Detroit, a predominantly African American mosque with a vibrant community and leadership, while checking the books on display and for sale after the Friday prayer I was not surprised to see Mawdudi's book *Toward Understanding Islam*.
 8. As noted by Barbara Metcalf, "Islamic bookshops in Washington DC, Durban, London and Karachi will likely carry the same range of English books produced by English-speaking Muslims throughout the world" (1994, xv).
 9. For an extended discussion of CAIR, see chapter 4. An extended profile of Walid is in chapter 5.
 10. A. James, interview with Dawud Walid, *Muslim Observer*, January 6-12, 2006.
 11. For example, English has been receiving particular attention from the US government. In an effort to combat Islamic extremism, the Bush administration seems to have engaged in promoting the English language. In 2003 the *Washington Post* reported the recent change in school curricula in Qatar as "more English, less Islam" (Susan Glasser, "Qatar Reshapes Its Schools, Putting English over Islam," *Washington Post*, February 2, 2003).
 12. According to the British daily *The Independent*, within ten years half of the world will be speaking English (James Burleigh, "English to Be Spoken by Half of the World's Population within 10 Years," *The Independent*, December 9, 2004).
 13. Many Muslims would object to the distinction between center and periphery for Islam since theologically the religion is not tied to any location. Nevertheless, the geographies where Islam has a recent presence despite its historical presence elsewhere can be defined as the periphery of Islam.
 14. *Dawah* is the Arabic word for service and propagation of Islam. It is an important idiom in the discourse of English-speaking Muslims and an essential element in the repertoire of diasporic Islam.
 15. Malaysian Muslim scholar Sayyid Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, along with many other Muslim scholars before him, classifies the learning of other languages as *fard kifayah* (a communal obligation), "which means that there has to be a certain number of educated Muslims who should master certain languages so that they can acquire the knowledge that could be obtained through those languages" (Mohd-Asraf 2005, 115).
 16. A list of American-based Muslim thinkers who have influenced overseas Muslim intellectual life would include important scholars such as Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Fazlur Rahman.
 17. Suhail Karmani, the editor of *TESOL Islamia*, an online journal, parodies this problem of "future tense" in an interesting essay, "Future Im-perfect" (2003a).
 18. Most Muslims would object to the translation of *jihad* as "holy war." Similarly, Muslims would also prefer the use of the word mecca/Mecca only in a religious context.

19. Muslims initially used the labels and titles present in the mainstream culture. For example, the first Muslim mosque in Michigan (1921) was advertised as the "Muhammadan Prayer Hall." In other instances, mosques were called Moorish or Moslem "temples." Such titles were gradually replaced with "Islamic Center" or *masjid*, the Arabic word meaning "mosque." The evolution of names and titles provides an interesting illustration of the shift from the labels applied by someone else to one's own designation.
20. Credit for the successful codification of some Islamic vocabulary should go to the Nation of Islam (led by Elijah Muhammad and Malcolm X) and its successor, the American Muslim Mission (led by Warith Deen Mohammed). They successfully corrected the spelling and hence pronunciation of some major terms in the media. Old British uses such as "Moslem" and "Koran" were replaced by "Muslim" and "Qur'an." The latter are increasingly becoming the norm even while the former remain in use.
21. SoundVision's mission statement notes that "the attitudes and behavior of men and women today are shaped and molded by the media whose ideals and images, by and large, are non-Islamic. SoundVision aims to produce content with Islamic ideals and images for all current and future media. SoundVision would like to lead the *Ummah* in the field of communication, *Insha Allah*."
22. Laurie Goodstein, "U.S. Muslim Clerics Seek a Modern Middle Ground," *New York Times*, June 18, 2006.
23. For more on African American Muslims and their relationship to Christianity, see chapter 5.
24. Abdullah Yusuf Ali, *The Holy Qur'an* (1934); Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthall, *The Meaning of the Glorious Qur'an* (1938).

CHAPTER THREE

1. Home is a special kind of space: it is carved out of a general space and marked as exclusive; it is the surface upon which subjective construction of a world takes place. Our selves are anchored in the things around us. It is because of the intensity of this anchoredness that we often say "there's no place like home." Home is the place where the subjective (self) pours itself out in things (Levinas 1969, 153). Unlike the street (or city square), which is a public space presumably accessible to all citizens, home is not open to all. It is a topographically opaque spot on the surface of public space. On closer inspection, of course, we notice that the street is not open to everyone either: it is open only to citizens (similar to Habermasian public autonomy [Habermas 1996, 34] and the boundaries of nation). Yet it remains an intersubjective realm. By contrast, home is a subjective realm, an exclusive space corresponding to the private autonomy of the individual in liberal political philosophy (Arendt 1998). The private and public spheres are, respectively, subjective and intersubjective—that is, the domains of individuation and de-individuation.

2. An extreme case would be the situation of individuals kidnapped into slavery, which results in social death (Patterson 2005).
3. Islamic law is not necessarily state law. It is produced by jurists who are often outside the control of the state.
4. The Jewish religious idea of *eruv* stands between the Muslim idea of qibla and the notion of *dar al Islam*. An *eruv* is a symbolically appropriated place where space is codified and made—literally—navigable during the Sabbath. The single most important social function of the *eruv* is the creation of a communal domain through a religious marking of the public sphere. The *eruv* sets aside a portion of the public sphere and symbolically transforms it into a communal sphere (Rosen Zvi 2004; Cooper 1998).
5. American Muslim scholar Nuh Ha Mim Keller describes *darura* as vital interest: "How is it possible that the ruling of Allah could vary from place to place? One scholarly answer is found in the Islamic legal concept of *darura* or 'vital interest' that sometimes affects the *shari'a* rulings otherwise normally in force. Although the fundamental basis of Islamic law is that it is valid for all times and places, Allah Most High, in His divine wisdom, stipulates in Surat al-Hajj that '*He has not placed any hardship upon you in religion!*'" (Qur'an 22:78) (Keller 1995).
6. Here is an illustration of a prosaic case of *darura*: if a Muslim is marooned on a desert island with nothing to eat but a ham sandwich, he or she may eat it.
7. A Shia handbook that I obtained from the Islamic Center of America in Dearborn, where it is used as a textbook for English-speaking youth and converts, addresses the issues of Muslim minorities in the West: "A believer is allowed to travel to non-Muslim countries provided that he is sure or feels confident that the journey would not have a negative impact on his faith. Similarly a believer is allowed to reside in non-Muslim countries provided that his residing there does not become a hurdle in the fulfillment of his or her religious obligations" (al-Hakim 1999, 42).
8. "During the early days of Islam, a number of Muslims took refuge in the non-Muslim land of Abyssinia in order to preserve their faith. This episode bears particular significance [to the situation of Muslim minorities today] because it occurred at a time when the foundations of Islamic law and *fiqh* [jurisprudence] were still being established" (al-Alwani 2003, 30-31).
9. Chapter 2, on qibla, also reveals the starting point of the canopy and its end point. Perhaps nowhere else do we have mosques with two qiblas but in Medina and Detroit.
10. In *Being and Time*, a phenomenological critique of the Cartesian division of the world, Heidegger argues that modern rationalism assumes "a worldless subject" (1962, 144) and ignores the idea of *worldhood*. As human beings, we are not self-contained subjects but entities in an existential state of being-in (1962, 84). Unlike objects, we are always oriented; we are in the

world and we have a world. Our being in the world is quite different from a chair's being in the room (1962, 81). Our residence in the world is made possible by our involvement with it. While our relationship to our environment is one of encounter, that of two objects is not. They are in that sense worldless. Our practical experience of being-in-the-world is

such that [our] Being-in-the-world has always dispersed itself or even split itself up into definite ways of Being-in. The multiplicity of these is indicated by the following examples: having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining. . . . All these ways of Being-in have *concern* as their kind of Being. . . . Leaving undone, neglecting, renouncing, taking a rest—these too are ways of concern; but these are all *deficient* modes, in which the possibilities of concern are kept to a "bare minimum." (1962, 83)

In Heidegger's later thought, the idea of being-in-the world evolves into the concept of "dwelling." Once anchored, the subject can produce sustained interaction, which leads to habitualization and the construction of the world (Berger and Luckmann 1966). Heidegger's paragraph quoted above makes clear that there is an intimate link between dwelling and ethics. For being-in-the-world or dwelling is understood in terms of *care*, involvement, the disposition that allows something to matter to us. Dwelling situates us in a world, not in the sense in which a chair is *in* a room, but rather in the sense in which someone is *in* a family or *in* love with someone else (Foltz 1995, 156). To put it in more familiar sociological terms, Bourdieu's notion of habitus is a simple inversion of Heidegger's notion of dwelling. Dwelling is *us in the world* and habitus is *the world in us*. Thus, as a term that captures both habit and ethos, "habitus" has dwelling as its history. Ethics develops through involvement with the environment. In that sense, there is a homology between the degree of involvement and the nature of the ethics (or ideology) one has toward that environment. This will be further illustrated in the case of Muslims in America, where different degrees of involvement with American habitat are linked to different conceptions of America, ranging from the abode of war (*dar al harb*) to the abode of Islam (*dar al Islam*).

11. A note on transliteration: Except for *jihad*, these terms have no standard transliterations. The reason we have a standard transliteration for *jihad* is that, thanks to mass media and global terrorism, it has "settled," or sedimented, in the English language, albeit—Muslims believe—with some distortion. The same cannot be said for the other words, which can be spelled *hijrah*, *umma*, or *daawah* (or *da'wah*), respectively. I am using the most common spellings. For an extended discussion of the fate of Islamic terms in relation to English, see chapter 2.

12. *Medina* is both the Arabic word for “city” and the root of *madaniyyah*, “civilization.”
13. The author of *Jihad vs. McWorld*, for example, notes that “while for many Muslims it may signify only ardor in the name of a religion that can properly be regarded as universalizing, I borrow its meaning from those militants who make the slaughter of the ‘other’ a higher duty” (Barber 1996, 17).
14. The list of Muslim immigrant topoi can be extended to include tropes like *ijtihad*, which refers to the mechanism for new codification and extension of the Islamic juridical canopy so that it includes new legal cases. Put more simply, *ijtihad* is the seeking of the reasonable ruling in the face of new situations.
15. Recent Muslim perspectives on this subject include calls for a generalized *darura* and reclamation of alternative juridical concepts. “Perhaps, in modern times, it is more precise to speak of ‘*asr al-darura*’ (time of necessity) instead of *dar al-darura*, since for Muslims, to a great extent, living under *darura* conditions has become the norm in the global village and is more associated with the *Zeitgeist* rather than the geographical locality of one’s residence” (Yilmaz 2002, 39).
16. It would be interesting to compare early American frontier discourse with the Muslim discourse depicting America as frontier. My intuition tells me that the association of the frontier with chaos, the devil, and risk is a common thread in both cases. A topic not much discussed and yet worthy of noting here is that certain threads in the discussion of Muslim presence in America portray Islam and Muslims as a “frontier within” that needs to be (re)removed and pushed back. The calls for internment of Muslims and the alarmist idea of an “enemy within” espoused by some conservative pundits illustrate the persistence of frontier discourse in its postterritorial forms.
17. The same can be said for the perspective of some of the Muslims in Europe. In Tariq Ramadan’s words, such Muslims are “living in Europe out of Europe. To avoid being absorbed into Western societies, they have found a refuge within community life. . . . The aim is to be ‘at home,’ in Europe but at home” (2002, 186; italics in original).
18. Oil-producing countries like Saudi Arabia had disproportionate ideological influence during the early decades of Muslim immigration to the United States.
19. Sayyid Qutb, chief ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood, visited and spent two years in the United States in 1948–50. Upon his return to Egypt he wrote an essay, “The America I Have Seen,” in which America represented everything that Islam was not (Qutb 2000). One section of the piece bears the title “America: The Peak of Advancement and the Depth of Primitiveness.”
20. I have chosen to suppress the name of the mosque and refer to its imam by a pseudonym in deference to his concerns about publicity. He also

- expressed reluctance at the idea of recording the interview. The dialogue is based on my notes taken during our conversation.
21. A movement in Sunni Islam, Salafism seeks to restore the golden age of Islam by purging what it perceives to be later cultural influences and innovations. This simplistic conception of Islam is a modern form of Puritanism.
 22. Although the imam and his mosque identify themselves as *salafi*, not all *salafi* imams would hold these ideas. The development of diplomatic language among immigrant imams and community leaders is an interesting thread for further research.
 23. This Qur’anic injunction charges Muslims with the responsibility of changing their environment in a positive way. It lends itself to multiple interpretations. Some groups use it as a justification for interventionist, authoritarian practices, while others (e.g., many African American Muslim groups) consider it an Islamic basis for social justice work.
 24. As a matter of fact, the transformation that Shakir has personally experienced and that partly represents the trend in the Muslim community can be observed clearly in two interviews that Shakir gave to Bill Moyers of PBS on January 18, 2002, and on June 22, 2007.
 25. In my discussion, while talking about the cultural settlement of Islam in the United States, I take the liberty of drawing on the European perspective. This is not because I treat both cases under the general rubric of Western Islam—although that would be fully justified—but because intellectual discourses circulate back and forth across the Atlantic and need to be analyzed in conversation with each other. A simple illustration of this is the attempt on the part of Notre Dame University to hire Tariq Ramadan, which created enthusiasm among the new generation of American Muslims and stirred a debate on academic freedom when the State Department revoked Ramadan’s visa on obscure grounds and denied him entry to the United States in 2004.
 26. “Wherever a Muslim, saying ‘I testify that there is no god but God and that Muhammad is His Messenger’ is in security and able to perform his/her fundamental religious duties, he/she is *at home* for the prophet taught us that the whole world is a mosque” (Ramadan 2002, 144; italics in original).
 27. I should note that the change of political orientation is still ongoing. There has been a shift in the American Muslim “political qibla” from Jerusalem to Washington, from the question of Palestine to domestic American Muslim issues.
 28. A Danish newspaper, the *Jyllands-Posten*, published twelve highly unflattering cartoons of Prophet Muhammad, which provoked responses in the Muslim world that ranged from a boycott of Danish goods to violent street protests, including the torching of the Danish embassy in Syria.
 29. For more on Muslim comedians, see chapter 6.